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to my mother (1950 – 2012),
who escaped in her very own way(s).
and to J (2003) and C (2008),
whose lines of flight
I hope to follow
until my own final escape.
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what if …
. . . what if the equation of anthropology, study of things human, with ethnog-
raphy, the study and description of an ethnos, were a recent event? And what 
if one set out to undo this equation? If one were to cut loose the former from 
the latter? 
Actually, what if one were to not only cut loose — liberate — anthropology from 
ethnos/ethnography/ethnology but also from “the human” tout court — from the 
in its aspirations time and place independent conception of the human as “Man” 
that first surfaced in the seventeenth century and that has since marked the con-
dition of possibility of the human sciences (chief among them anthropology)?
What would — what could — an anthropology after ethnos / after “the hu-
man” look like? What if …?
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introduction
 — all of it  — 
Today, what is anthropology?
For most of the twentieth century, most anthropologists understood them-
selves as ethnographers. The art of anthropology, that was the careful, fieldwork- 
based description of faraway others — of how social structures secretly organized 
the living together of a given society, of how a people had endowed the natural 
world surrounding them with cultural meaning.
While the poetics and politics of ethnography changed dramatically over 
the course of a century, the basic equation of anthropology with ethnography 
remained so evident, so obvious, that the possibility of questioning it occurred 
to hardly anyone.
But today?
Beginning in the late 1990s, new, unanticipated lines of research have 
emerged that have little — in some cases nothing — in common with anthro-
pology defined as ethnography, that is, the fieldwork- based study of an ethnos 
(Greek for “a people”). The idea for this book grounds in the observation that 
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one, perhaps unintended, effect of at least some of these new lines of research 
has been that they silently differentiated anthropology from ethnography — as 
if they differentiated a curiosity about the human from the fieldwork- based 
study of ethnos, of territorially imagined societies and their culture or social 
structure, their symbols and rituals and structures of belief.
After Ethnos is an attempt to bring the dissociation of anthropology from 
ethnography into view. It is an attempt to rethink anthropology — all of 
it — from the perspective of the “after.” What is more, it is an attempt to in-
crease the intensity of the turbulences, the trouble that the after triggers. And 
it is an attempt to make available (at least some aspects of) the new/different 
anthropologies “after ethnos” it has allowed for.
 — escapes (always)  — 
After Ethnos is a nonprogrammatic book.
My aim is not to argue that all of anthropology is “after” ethnos. Nor do 
I mean to suggest that there is a new, still emergent formation — the anthro-
pology after ethnos. I have not sought to provide a programmatic statement 
of what an anthropology after ethnos — after ethnography, culture, society, 
place — might look like. Much of anthropology continues to revolve around 
just these concepts. Rather, the ambition (if this is not too ambitious a term) 
of After Ethnos is to look for escapes from the already thought and known, from 
scripts. My goal has been to look for opportunities to break free, to depart, to 
leave behind, to derail, to undermine. After Ethnos is about (the possibility of) 
lines of escape. The various escapes the book offers go in different, perhaps 
even mutually exclusive, directions.
However, I do not look for ways to go (arrive) somewhere.
 — the human (deanthropologized)  — 
It was only very gradually that I began to understand that the differentiation of 
anthropology from ethnos also leads to a dissociation of anthropology from the 
human, that is, with the abstract, time- and place- independent figure of “Man” 
that was invented and stabilized in Europe between the 1630s and the 1830s 
and that has marked the historical condition of the possibility of a discipline 
called anthropology.
Culture, society, history, language, suffering, nation, meaning, symbol, 
ritual, myth, nature, subjectivity, the body: What if all the concepts anthro-
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pologists have relied on, however implicitly, to stabilize “the human,” to set it 
apart, to create a separate human reality that would require its own science 
(anthropology), were actually inventions of a recent European past rather than 
human universals on which one would build “anthropological” knowledge?
Could one rethink anthropological research as the continuous practice of 
deanthropologizing anthropology? As an effort to let fieldwork accidents give 
rise to surprises in which humans — and anthropology and bacteria and robots 
and landscapes and snails and much more — are released from “the human”? 
Not once and for all, as if there were some better, truer ontology waiting 
elsewhere (I am not an ontologist), but time and time again?
After Ethnos is an effort to think out loud about these questions. What is 
more, it is an attempt to wonder if anthropology could be a form of inquiry — 
an art — that always seeks to exceed its own condition of possibility.
 — fieldwork (itself)  — 
After Ethnos is also an effort to differentiate fieldwork — understood as a tech-
nique of immersion into everyday life, as a methodological opportunity to let 
accidents give rise to the unanticipated — from ethnography, that is, from the 
fieldwork- based study of an ethnos.
I am an anthropologist, but not an ethnographer. I conduct fieldwork — but not 
ethnography. 
Why and to what ends does one conduct fieldwork when one is not — no 
longer — conducting ethnography? What is fieldwork itself? What is its object — 
 if any?
 — form (exposure)  — 
When I then sought to enroll others in the project of imagining anthropologies 
after ethnos / the human, I ran into vehement — at times furious — critique.
Why would you abandon ethnos? Why culture and society? Are you a neo-
liberal? What is your politics? Why do you emphasize thought and philosophy? 
Isn’t this anthropocentric? Don’t these concepts transport the worst of the 
nineteenth century — reason, big white men, elitism, parochialism, colonial-
ism? Why do you speak of the emergent? What is the aim of your focus on the 
new/different? Doesn’t your approach reflect a modernist, linear philosophy 
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of time? Why — and to what ends — would one study movement or the “always 
new”? What would that even mean? Doesn’t space matter?
I found the questions troubling, the vehemence with which they often were 
articulated unsettling. Until, at one point or another, I began to understand 
that the reason for the critique I faced was not my project as such — not the 
push toward the “after” — but that my language, the vocabulary that I had 
available for myself (in many ways a reflection of the places of my education 
and thus of chance rather than of design) could not accommodate the anthro-
pologies after ethnos / the human my critiques envisioned.
Differently put, I began to understand that the stakes of the “after” I sought 
to make available exceeded the vocabulary of possibilities I had relied on to 
make the after visible. 
When I began to write up After Ethnos, I was determined to preserve — or 
capture — as much of that which exceeds me as I could. How, though? How 
to capture that which exceeds oneself? The response I eventually came up 
with I think of in terms of exposure: I wrote the first chapter, on anthropol-
ogy (free from ethnos), presented it on multiple occasions (some formal, many 
more informal) — and then meticulously documented (often times taped) the 
comments and challenges I found myself confronted with. Once back home, 
I worked through these challenges, time and again, baffled, angry, surprised, 
happy — until a set of texts emerged, texts that carry me into uncharted territo-
ries, that is, into terrains in which my initial language fails (or is challenged), 
failures (challenges) that give contours to stakes I wasn’t aware of when I set 
out to write. The outcome is a set of responses — of differentiations — that run 
somewhat diagonal to the arguments I offer in chapter 1, that explore its stakes 
differently (from different vantage points).
Next I wrote chapter 2, “on” the human (after “the human”). I repeated the 
same process — exposure, taping comments/conversations, working through 
them, writing texts that would give contour to that which exceeded my initial 
formulations — while keeping in mind what I learned when I wrote the texts 
following chapter 1. Then came chapter 3, on fieldwork (itself), and eventually 
chapter 4, on the actual (rather than the emergent). 
Each chapter, thus, is followed by a series of digressions — some short, oth-
ers not exactly short — and differentiations that were triggered by the critical 
interventions of friends and interlocutors.
The final product is an untamed book, exuberant, provocative, fierce, funny 
(or so I hope), and always looking for lines of escape.
After Ethnos, while written by me, (hopefully) exceeds me in multiple ways.
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 — surplus  — 
What is anthropology once it is differentiated from ethnos? 
What is anthropology when one gives up the once constitutive interest in 
spatially coded differences? If one bids farewell to culture, society, territory?
What is anthropology when one breaks not only with “the human” but as 
well with the idea that there is a separate human reality — humans as more 
than mere nature, as culture and/or society — that demands its own kind of 
science? When one breaks with the human without assuming that beyond the 
human there is some other, some truer reality? Without assuming that beyond 
the human lays some saving moral ground (nature)? That is, when one rejects 
ontology (or ontologies)?
Can an anthropology “after the human” be practiced at all?
What is fieldwork after it has been decoupled from ethnography? Is field-
work the only form anthropological research can take?
Why and to what ends does one conduct anthropology after ethnos/the hu-
man? What is the purpose? Truth? Knowledge? Of what?
Today, what is anthropology? What is anthropological?




What is it all about? What is anthropology?
What is anthropology’s job? What’s its domain?
. . . I don’t know what anthropology . . . is,
but I don’t think that it is or should be defined as ethnography.
david schneider, Schneider on Schneider.
one
In retrospect it seems as if the ethnographic project of classical modernity 
came to an end at one point in the late 1990s. I write “in retrospect” because 
the passing away of anthropology in its form of classical modern ethnography 
was — awkward as this may sound — an unintended effect, an accident. As it 
was unintended, no one had been waiting for it, and so it could be recog-
nized only in hindsight — in “retrospect” — and not without surprise and even 
sadness.1
Already in the 1970s the ethnographic project as it was envisioned by Ad-
olf Bastian and Friedrich Ratzel in Germany; by Franz Boas in the United 
States; by Alfred C. Haddon, William H. R. Rivers, Alfred R. Radcliffe- Brown, 
and Bronisław Malinowski in Great Britain; and by Émile Durkheim, Marcel 
Mauss, Paul Rivet, and Lucien Lévy- Bruhl in France had come under severe 
critique. The purpose of this critique was not to bring ethnography to an end. 
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The goal of the various critical voices that had begun to emerge in a system-
atic, accumulative fashion since the late 1960s was to improve — poetically as 
well as politically — the ethnographic documentation of those faraway others 
that anthropologists had begun to systematically study at the turn of the nine-
teenth to the twentieth century.2 It was meant to correct what seemed to many 
to be the “mistakes” of the great ethnographers of the past.3
For the purpose of my argument, there is no need to retrace here the in-
tricate ways in which the many different kinds of inner- disciplinary critique 
developed over time; it suffices instead to provide a sketch of the one line of 
critique that marked, at least from the retrospective point of view from which I 
write, the beginning of the (unintended) end of classical modern ethnography, 
the critique of the philosophy of history on which ethnographers had relied 
since the late eighteenth century.4
“Classical modern ethnography has come to an end.”
What does it take for this sentence to sound as obvious and as uncontroversial 
as if one were to say, “Classical modern painting has come to an end”? 
Is the end of classical modern ethnography really controversial?5
t wo
In Europe, the second half of the eighteenth century brought what one could 
refer to as the “temporalization” of the spatial differences of life forms. It was 
a period during which the number of travel accounts that provided reports 
of foreign forms of human existence — whether from the past or from else-
where — significantly increased, leaving interested observers with the baffling 
question of how one could make sense of this bewildering diversity.6
The philosophes of the Enlightenment approached this challenge by way 
of inventing a new, previously unknown genre of scholarly literature, history. 
Authors as diverse as Voltaire, Turgot, Condorcet, Kant, Ferguson, and Herder 
(and many in their aftermath) began writing the first histories of “mankind” 
that were arranging the people of the world along a single axis that led from 
those others who were “still” living ab originem (the premoderns, “living fos-
sils” as Edward Burnett Tylor would later famously call them) to those Euro-
peans who had “already” progressed through history and hence were at home 
in the here and now (the moderns).
For the coming into being of anthropology, the emergence of history — and 
of the singular collective called humanity that was the imagined author of 
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history —was a decisive event: the emphatic distinction between premoderns 
and moderns humans brought about the condition of the possibility of the field 
of study that late eighteenth-century authors began to refer to as “ethnogra-
phy” — a field of study defined by its modern expert knowledge of those who 
were still living in the premodern past (for a history of the term ethnography 
see chapter 3).
Ethnography emerged as the “science” of the people without history, with-
out state, without science — of those “still” living in a cosmos, with mythical 
structures, magic, and rituals.
The critiques of the 1970s and 1980s observed that many of the twentieth 
century ethnographers — even though they had long moved against the very 
idea of the “primitive” or the “premodern” — were ultimately still relying on 
the distinctions invented by eighteenth-century European philosophers: as long 
as they described the other with words like “cosmos,” “myth,” “ritual,” “kin-
ship systems,” and “magic” — all markers of a past — they were ceaselessly re- 
inscribing the temporal distinction between “them” and “us” they had set out to 
critique. As long as the ethnographic project was conceived of in terms of clas-
sical modernity, there seemingly was no possibility to escape the predicament: 
anthropology was and continued to be contingent on the philosophy of history.7
What was one to do?
The dominant response to what Johannes Fabian called the “denial of co-
evalness” (Fabian 1983) — the active effort, on behalf of ethnographers, to lo-
cate the friends they have found in “the field” in the past — was the effort to 
find ways of anthropological inquiry and ethnographic writing that would lead 
ethnography beyond the great divides of modernity. One important approach 
to this challenge was to write historical ethnographies, carefully documenting 
the long “world historical” involvement of other societies (thereby undermin-
ing the myth of the “timeless other”).8
Another significant approach designed to achieve coevalness was the effort 
to find ways of integrating concrete others into ethnographic texts — by way 
of naming friends one has found in the field, by way of giving space to their 
“voices,” by way photography and co- authorship. Self- consciously, ethnogra-
phers began experimenting with new forms of writing ethnographies — an “ex-
perimental moment” that led to a wave of reflective, polyphonic, dialogic, and 
other forms of ethnographic texts.9
In the shadow of these two dominant approaches — both of which, despite 
their critical intent, were affirming the very idea of the classical ethnographic 
project (they were meant as improvement) — a small group of anthropologists 
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opted for an altogether different approach for leading anthropology beyond 
the temporal dilemmas so deeply inscribed in the idea of ethnography. And 
while this “third way” was initially hardly influential, it quickly gained a dy-
namic of its own — a powerful dynamic that was to lead anthropologists away 
from their established preoccupations and into thoroughly new terrains, em-
pirically as well as conceptually. 
For so many years, or so one could summarize the argument of this “third 
way” in retrospect, ethnographers have tried to convince the world that the 
primitive is not primitive, that the Other is not timeless, that “we” are “con- 
temporaries,” and nobody listened. So maybe it would now make sense to go 
ahead and ask, “Have we ever been modern?”
In order to convey a sense of the critical ethos that informed this question 
in the mid- 1980s, I cite a passage from Paul Rabinow’s contribution to Writing 
Culture (Marcus and Clifford 1986): “We have to anthropologize the West. We 
have to show how exotic its constitution of reality has been: emphasize those 
domains most taken for granted as universal; make them seem as historically 
peculiar as possible; show how their claims to truth are linked to social prac-
tices and have hence become effective forces in the social world.”10
In the mid- to late 1980s there were fairly different ways of taking up this 
call to “anthropologize the West.” Some took it to mean an ethnographically 
grounded critique of the hegemony and ideology of Western science and medi-
cine; others believed it suggested that the institutions constitutive of our pre-
sumed modernity (science, technology, political economy, medicine) are as 
culturally peculiar, as socially constructed, as myth and ritual; and yet others 
embraced it as a suggestion to carefully study the “modern” as a distinct form 
of reasoning.
Recall Bruno Latour’s Nous n’avons jamais été modern — first published in 
1991 (in English in 1993) — and you see the synergetic coming together, in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, of anthropology, critical theory, the sociology 
of scientific knowledge, science studies, literary critique, feminism, cultural 
studies, and medical anthropology (Latour 1991, 1993).
Of course, humans existed before the late eighteenth century — but the human is 
a distinctive eighteenth- century formation (see chapter 2). And, of course, humans 
were telling histories long before the eighteenth century. The argument here is not 
that humans were ignorant about the differences between past and present. How-
ever, most of these histories had been — and continued to be — local stories, that is, 
histories of local groups and people. A universal history of humanity, of humanity 
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as such (and humanity is a concept — a collective — that was unknown before the 
turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century), from its earliest emergence 
at some point in the past to the present is a distinct product of the second half 
of the eighteenth century. And many of the key categories that anthropology has 
historically relied on to describe its object of analysis emerged alongside this uni-
versal history — culture, humanity, history, morals, body, nation, primitive, progress, 
race, society. Most of these concepts were unknown previously — or they assumed 
entirely new meanings. 
three
Perhaps there is no need here to delve into the intricacies of inner- disciplinary 
developments or to trace how the first, still somewhat awkward “ethnogra-
phies of the West” gradually gave rise, via detours, to anthropology as it is 
practiced in today’s major research departments (at least in North America). It 
suffices instead to note, first, that at one point in the late 1980s or early 1990s a 
number of anthropologists began to enter — per fieldwork — domains that were 
formerly believed to be beyond the scope of anthropological expertise or inter-
est, most notably (but by no means exclusively) medicine, science, and tech-
nology.11 And, second, that what was at first a quite “exotic” enterprise, at least 
by the standards of classical ethnography, namely the anthropologist in the 
laboratory, soon became one of the most important and innovative fields of an-
thropological research — the anthropology of modernity, of science, medicine, 
media, the Internet, finance, technology, and much more (at home and afar).
The effect of this growth in unexpected directions has been a far- 
reaching — still ongoing — metamorphosis of anthropology; it led, especially 
on the level of a new generation of anthropologists that was no longer educated 
in traditional terms and no longer conducted classical fieldwork, to the emer-
gence of a thematically new kind of anthropology, one thoroughly removed 
from classical modern ethnography and its interests in segmentary lineages, 
gift exchange, and mythic structure (all topics that, together with the study 
of rituals, still dominated anthropology in the 1970s and early 1980s and that 
are largely absent from today’s journals).12
A sense of just how far- reaching the metamorphosis anthropology has been 
undergoing is, is conveyed by the controversies that surround the attempts to 
revise the intellectual tool kit of the discipline that the new anthropology has 
brought about.13 These revisionisms (plural) are the direct result of the observa-
tion that “the old” concepts and tools — namely those anthropology provided to 
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those who set out to study ethnos, its culture, its kinship structures, its economy, 
mode of subsistence, political systems, and religion — seemed less than useful for 
studying and analyzing “the new” domains anthropologists had entered.
How does one study an hiv epidemic? And how science? What is interest-
ing about, say, adult cerebral plasticity? And what about neoliberal city plan-
ning? Or the emergence of transnational companies? Or co
2
 bubbles in ice 
that were frozen for millions of years and that are now released? Or cheese 
making? Or Hurricane Katrina?
In the late 1990s anthropology was entering an open situation, a situa-
tion full of passionate disagreement, of regret, of polemic as well, but also of 
the clear sense that there was a need for innovations: new research domains 
brought about the need to articulate new forms of anthropological curiosity, 
new tools, new ways of thinking about and designing research.14 
Arguably, anthropologists are still experimenting with such tools, curiosi-
ties, and research designs — and amid their experimentation they recognized 
(some surprised, others simply sad) that the ethnographic project of classical 
modernity had ceased to exist.15
What began as a response to the temporal dilemma built into classical mod-
ern ethnography had become a project thoroughly decoupled from precisely 
this classical modern ethnography.
four
One of the most exciting intellectual effects of the decoupling of anthropology 
from classical modern ethnography has been (or so I dare say) the emergence of 
the possibility of a “philosophically inclined anthropology.” In order to specify 
what I mean by this clumsy phrase — a philosophically inclined anthropology — 
and to clarify in what sense its becoming possible has been an effect of the 
decentering of the classical ethnographic project, I would like to contrast the 
concept of “anthropology” that it advances with the comprehension of anthro-
pology that was built into modern ethnography (for it is precisely on the level 
of conceptualizing anthropology — what it is, what its challenge is — that the 
philosophically inclined variant has been an event).
What from the perspective of classical modern ethnography, did the term 
“anthropology” refer to?
If one addresses this question to the works that have shaped twentieth- 
century anthropology — from Rivers to Malinowski or Radcliffe Brown to 
Turner, from Boas and Benedict to Mead and Geertz — a perhaps surprising 
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but consistent picture emerges: In its form of classical modern ethnography, 
anthropology has been much less concerned with anthropos (Greek for “the hu-
man”) than with ethnos. Ethnographers, it turns out, have never really asked 
Was ist der Mensch?16 No, the question that has nourished their curiosity, that 
drove them to conduct research and that animated their debates was not the 
question concerning the human but rather the question what forms human 
living together could take. And the reason for this focus on ethnos rather than 
anthropos is that they ultimately took it for granted that the question concern-
ing the human had long been answered: If anthropology assumed the form of 
ethnography then because ethnos, ultimately, was the answer to the question 
concerning anthropos. Most clearly this taken for grantedness comes into view 
when one turns to the two most prominent “answers” that have stabilized an-
thropology qua ethnography, “society” and “culture.” 
Humans, or so “social” anthropologists have argued, are “social” beings. 
Wherever one turns, they live in a “society” and whatever they do is embed-
ded in and shaped by societal patterns: Nothing “human” can exist outside of 
things social. The challenge faced by the social anthropologist, consequently, 
is to travel the world and to ethnographically document, on the one hand, 
the various forms societies may take (ideally working toward an inventory 
of these forms), and to show, on the other hand, that a proper comprehension 
of these forms is the true key for understanding how humans live and think 
and exist in the world.
In a similar (and yet so different) way, “cultural” anthropologists have 
taken it for granted that humans are — what else? — “cultural” beings. They 
have taken it for granted, that is, that what distinguishes humans, what sets 
them apart, is their capacity (pace Marvin Harris and cultural materialism) to 
endow themselves and their surroundings with meaning. Indeed, as the cul-
tural anthropologist sees it, nothing humans can do or think of exists without 
meaning — be it in complex rituals or in a simple experiment. Even the very 
idea of “society” (or so the “cultural” critique of “social” anthropology goes) 
is ultimately a cultural category, is meaning.17 It follows that the challenge 
faced by the cultural anthropologist — who is equipped with the certainty that 
whatever she will find, however bizarre, is culture — is to travel the world, to 
ethnographically document foreign “cultures” and show that a proper compre-
hension of the “web of meaning” that is constitutive of a culture is the true key 
for understanding how humans “are” elsewhere.18
For social and cultural anthropology the question is not — and never was — 
Was ist der Mensch? but rather What forms can society and culture take?
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The possibility of what I have suggested to call a philosophically inclined 
anthropology (after ethnos) opens up precisely where the answers on which 
anthropology in its form of ethnography has relied — on which it has been built 
its house of knowledge — fail and assume the form of a question.19
Take, for example, “culture.” When did “culture” — the suggestion that hu-
mans are more than mere nature, that they live in a distinctive human sphere 
of innovation that demands its own science — become a convincing answer to 
the question concerning the human? Arguably “culture” is not a timeless cat-
egory. It was not always around, has not always and at all times been central 
to thinking about things human. “Culture,” this is to say, has a history and 
is a place- specific category of thinking about humans in the world (the term 
culture was first used to conceptualize humans — the place of humans in the 
world — in the late 1770s, by Johann Gottfried Herder).
On the surface of things “culture” — or “society” — may seem to be a neutral, ana-
lytical term. However, this seemingly neutral analytical term silently transports an 
eighteenth- century conception of humans as more than mere nature that might 
be entirely inadequate to the present. For example, in the age of anthropogenic 
climate change, would one really want to be a cultural anthropologist? 
The possibility of the field of research I have described as a philosophically 
inclined anthropology opens up precisely where given anthropological ways of 
defining the human — culture, society/the social, history — lose their evidence: 
where they get cracks, however subtle, where they begin to produce questions 
rather than answers, where they become a problem, rather than a solution.
If humans were not always “cultural,” if there once were conceptually — 
epistemologically and ethically — different ways of being human in the world, 
then couldn’t it be that there are instances in the here and now that escape 
the conceptualization of the human implicit in the culture concept (or in the 
concept of society/the social)? Instances that open up new, different, yet un-
known, possibilities of being human? Ones no one has ever seen or heard of?20
If there was a before or, indeed, many different kinds of before, then 
couldn’t there also be an after? Or many different kinds of after? Each with its 
own, distinctive line of flight?
Where the classical ethnographer begins with an answer — culture, society — 
and then travels the world and decodes the life forms she finds in terms of her 
answer (ceaselessly reducing others to her own concepts), the philosophical 
anthropologist (of thought — and the human — in motion) is curious to find 
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out if, today, other possibilities of thinking the human exist or are coming into 
existence, possibilities that in their conceptual specificity escape the concep-
tual grid of our already established ways of thinking and knowing things hu-
man, that undermine their self- evidence and thereby open up new — hitherto 
unthought of — spaces of being (which are to be explored by way of fieldwork 
and research).
Where social and cultural anthropology always only find more of the same — 
 for all there is and ever will be is culture and society — the philosophically 
inclined anthropologist finds herself confronted with a question. Or better: 
with a set of questions, questions that the old answers cannot tame anymore.
From the perspective of the philosophically inclined anthropology I seek 
to outline here, modern ethnography is an intellectually (and ethically) highly 
problematic enterprise. It keeps the doors firmly locked, which the philosophi-
cally inclined anthropologist (of thinking) is ceaselessly pushing wide open; 
it shuts out the possibility that “elsewhere” it could be “different,” where the 
philosophically inclined anthropologist is busy exploring precisely this possi-
bility, curious to know/learn if yet unthought of ways of answering (and pos-
ing) the question concerning the human are coming into existence.
The philosophically inclined anthropology has opened up a vast new space of 
research curiosities and possibilities where before there simply was — nothing.
five
What one may call the disciplinary significance of the coming into existence of 
the possibility of a philosophically inclined anthropology is that it has allowed 
(at least some) leaving behind the dilemmas anthropologists have struggled 
with ever since they have entered new terrains — the fact that neither their es-
tablished objects (societies and cultures) nor their taken for granted decoding 
tools (society and culture) are helpful for understanding the new phenomena 
and constellations they are confronted with.
Isn’t it curious how in classical modern ethnography the explanans and the ex-
planandum, the thing to be explained and the thing that explains, are one? 
Is avian flu a cultural category? Is the Internet a social fact?21
For the philosophically inclined anthropologists these questions are of no 
significance. As they don’t define anthropology as the study of “society” or 
“culture,” they are liberated from what appears from afar as the desperate ef-
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fort to adjust the concepts of “society” or “culture” in such a way that one may 
“anthropologically” study, for example, avian flu or the Internet.
The decoupling — the liberation — of anthropology from ethnography/ethnos 
has opened up the possibility of a different kind of anthropology, one that is 
neither focused on society nor on culture but on “thought” and the curious 
figure that has once been called “Man.” 
Are new ways of answering (or posing) the question concerning the hu-
man emerging today? In what areas? In yeast biology? In drosophila genetics? 
In behavioral dog genomics? In avian flu research? In hiv vaccine research? 
In the study of adult neurogenesis? Where, and in which ways, do we see the 
humanum in motion, in metamorphosis?22
Perhaps one can see now why I call this a “philosophically inclined anthro-
pology.” It rearticulates anthropology in anthropological terms; it is focused on 
the human and on thought rather than on culture or society.23
And perhaps one can also see why I call it a “philosophically inclined an-
thropology.” It is philosophical to the degree that it is a variant of the critical 
work of thought on thought that is guided by the effort to find out — by way 
of fieldwork and research — how and to what extent it might be possible (or it 
has become possible) to think differently.24 To be a philosophically inclined 
anthropologist is to orient oneself in thinking by way of thinking — in order to 
find out if, and if, then in what concrete ways new venues of thinking/being 
are coming into existence.25 
It is only a slight exaggeration — and a retrospective one — to say that in the 
last two decades (since the late 1990s) anthropology has been liberated from 
the dominance of ethnography — from the focus on ethnos, society, and cul-
ture. And this liberation has brought about a condition of possibility for prac-
ticing anthropology in anthropological (rather than ethnos- graphic) terms.26
As if it were an empirically inclined, fieldwork-based philosophy.27
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anthropology and philosophy (differently)
I anticipate critique.
“But the encounter between anthropology and philosophy is hardly 
a new one. Anthropologists have conversed with philosophers for a long 
time!”
I concede. Anthropologists and philosophers have conversed for a 
long time. But I would want to add two clarifying observations about form 
and content of this long- standing exchange.
First, the overwhelming majority of the discussions between anthro-
pologists and philosophers were grounded in the taken- for- granted, mu-
tually shared understanding of anthropology as ethnography. The role 
assumed by the anthropologist vis- à- vis the philosopher — call it the divi-
sion of labor that structured their exchanges — was that of the expert of 
not yet modern societies and cultures.
Second, almost all of the conversations between anthropologists and 
philosophers have revolved around two themes only. On the one hand, 
there were discussions about the difference between “primitive” and 
“modern” modes of thought, and, on the other hand, there were discus-
sions about the universal existential grounds of what it means to be hu-
man, across time and space.
What I have suggested to call a philosophically inclined anthropology 
departs from both form (the equation of anthropology with ethnography) 
and content (the two themes around which the conversation revolved). 
And it is precisely this departure that creates the condition of the pos-
sibility for anthropology to become itself philosophical: to curiously and 
courageously enter the terrain formerly left to the philosophers.
Let me explain.
primitive thought 
It has arguably been the most persistent question that anthropologists and 
philosophers have discussed with one another — the question whether or 
not “primitive thought” differs in kind from “modern thought.” The origins 
of this question lay in a little known disagreement between Lucien Lévy- 
Bruhl (1857 – 1939) on the one hand and Émile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) and his 
18 chapter one
nephew, Marcel Mauss (1872 – 1950), on the other. To be more precise, it lay 
in Lévy- Bruhl’s subtle provocation of Durkheim and Mauss.
Throughout the nineteenth century, philosophers and anthropolo-
gists took it for granted that the categories of thought that organize the 
human mind were no different among “the primitives” and “the mod-
erns.” While there was wild disagreement among the European savants 
about what these categories actually are — or how many there are — no 
one doubted that they would be the same the world over, independent 
of time (when one lived) or place. If “the primitives” seemed to think 
differently, then only because they were still closer to nature than to  
civilization — their capacity for reason had not yet fully emerged. Like chil-
dren, they were caught in a state in which fiction and reality, reason and 
imagination had not yet differentiated themselves from one another.
Durkheim and Mauss took issue with this common wisdom. They 
agreed that the categories of the mind were the same the world over (in 
fact, they assumed that Aristotle’s list of categories was accurate; Durk-
heim and Mauss 1902). However, they vehemently rejected the equation 
of the supposed primitives with children. The effort to explain the his-
tory of humanity in terms of the developmental psychology, their critique 
went, grounds in the assumption that humans at all times and in all places 
are freestanding individuals. And that, Durkheim and Mauss argued, is 
simply wrong. Humans don’t live isolated lives onto their own. Instead 
humans live in society and are social beings: And how a human being 
thinks (about itself and the world) is ultimately inseparably related to the 
structure of the society to which that human being belongs (Durkheim 
1912; see also Mauss 1931, [1938] 1950). If one wishes to understand why 
primitive people think differently, thus, there is no alternative to taking 
on a careful study of the structure of their societies.
What Durkheim and Mauss reported from their efforts to take on a so-
ciological analysis of thinking, is that the more primitive a social structure 
is, the more primitive the thought processes of that society are. The ex-
ample the two French anthropologists time and again relied on to prove 
their argument were the Aranda of Central Australia: if the Aranda seri-
ously claimed that lizards or emus were their brothers, then this wasn’t 
because they talked childish nonsense. On the contrary, it was because 
the Aranda — Durkheim and Mauss judged them to be the most primitive 
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still living society — used their kinship system to order their natural sur-
roundings. No surprise, then, that the plants and animals of their environ-
ment seemed to them part of their society.28
Gradually, over time — this was Durkheim and Mauss’s rewriting of the 
eighteenth- century philosophies of history — as societies would get more 
differentiated, as different kinds of expertises would emerge, thought 
would differentiate itself as well. However, it would still — it would always — 
be contingent on the structure of society.
(The category of the individual, for example, was to them the distinc-
tive product of our modern, highly differentiated and fragmented soci-
eties: an individual life, according to Durkheim and Mauss, was basically 
impossible in closely knit socities where no space for individual differ-
ences — let alone individualized life trajectories — existed.)
Lévy- Bruhl was troubled by the social ontology of Durkheim and 
Mauss. What triggered his hesitancy seems to have been his familiarity 
with German philosophy, to which the concept of society was entirely 
unknown. Indeed, it is a bit as if Lévy- Bruhl, an expert on German philo-
sophical thought, wondered whether the concept of society, so central to 
French thought from Comte to Durkheim and Mauss, wasn’t ultimately a 
French obsession rather than a breakthrough to the universal grounds of 
being human (as Durkheim and Mauss claimed).29
Was there any necessity to take for granted, as Durkheim and Mauss 
did, that all thought at all times was reducible to — and explicable by — the 
structure of the society in which one lived? Wasn’t that a somewhat naïve 
exemption of “society” from the contingencies of history? Indeed, wasn’t 
society itself a historical, and thus time- and- place- specific, category of 
thought?
Lévy- Bruhl felt provoked — and set out on his own explanatory jour-
ney: he began to read through ethnographic texts and soon began to ar-
gue that the categories of the mind were not at all universal. The philoso-
phers — and Durkheim and Mauss — had gotten this completely wrong. 
He was convinced, and argued in many books and essays, that he had dis-
covered that there was a general structure of the primitive mind as such, 
one that radically differed from the minds of the moderns: if the minds of 
the latter were logical, then the minds of the former were “pre- logical.”
Lévy- Bruhl has been widely and wildly critiqued, for good reasons. 
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And yet his work opened up a possibility that excited ethnographers for 
much of the twentieth century: that elsewhere people might think in ways 
radically different from how Westerners think. Could that be?
A brief genealogy would have to hint at the work of Evans- Pritchard 
on the Azande and the Nuer (he exchanged letters with Lévy- Bruhl); Mar-
cel Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen’s research of Dogon thought; Meyer 
Fortes’s exploration of the pattern of Tallensi sense making; Lévi- Strauss’s 
juxtaposition of bricolage and engineering; Richard Horton’s juxtaposi-
tion of African and European styles of thinking; or the rationality debate 
of the 1970s.30
the existential grounds of being human 
The second conversation — or collaboration — of anthropologists with 
philosophers has, broadly speaking, concerned the exploration and (eth-
nographic) validation of the universal — existential — grounds of what it 
means to be human.
If the first conversation has a somewhat straightforward point of  
origin — Lévy- Bruhl’s provocation of Durkheim and Mauss — that allows a 
somewhat linear genealogy, the second one is more dispersed and scat-
tered: there are no clear starting points (or too many to be listed), and con-
sequently there are no easily identified lines of descent. However, there 
is still a somewhat general pattern that one could describe thus: anthro-
pologists read philosophical descriptions of the human condition (mostly 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, mostly concerned with 
death, pain, suffering, disease, and angst as the horizon of the human) 
either to obtain a decoding tool that will allow them to make sense of the 
rituals of the people they study (with the effect that rituals mostly appear 
as societal organizations of existential passages), or to procure a language 
available for making faraway others visible — if under different cultural 
and social circumstances — as struggling with moral and existential ques-
tions familiar to their readers at home, with the consequence that a shared 
human space (a shared humanity experience) between the near (“us”) and 
the far (“them”) opens up.
It is a bit as if philosophers provided a theme — and anthropologists 
ethnographically documented its variation and thereby also its validity.
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Even though the choice of philosophical authors is largely idiosyn-
cratic — there are no schools of, say, Heideggerian anthropology — the list 
of philosophers of the human condition anthropologists have relied on 
is rather short. The most prominent are (in random order): Søren Kierke-
gaard (specifically his reflection on being onto death and on angst and 
pain as markers of the human), Ludwig Wittgenstein (his ordinary lan-
guage philosophy as much as his reflections on pain and the limits of lan-
guage), William James (the variety of psychological experience), Martin 
Heidegger (on death and time, as well as on being thrown into the world), 
and, more recently, Emmanuel Levinas (his ethics of the other) and Gilles 
Deleuze (his concept of becoming).31
A recent edited volume by Das et al. (2014) — The Ground Between: An-
thropologists Engage Philosophy — documents just how prominent this 
second form (still) is in contemporary anthropology.
departure
What difference does the departure from ethnos make? What is the effect 
of the dissociation of anthropology from ethnography on the relation be-
tween anthropology and philosophy?
If one oversees the conversations between anthropologists and phi-
losophers as they have taken place thus far, it appears that they have been 
organized by a rather one- sided division of labor, according to which phi-
losophers provide the broader framework within which anthropology 
unfolds. 32
Both exchanges, for example, the one on the primitive mind and the 
one on the universal existential grounds of the human, are — insofar as 
they are grounded in an interpretation of anthropology as ethnography (as 
the study of supposedly non- modern, mostly non- European societies) — 
contingent on the idea of a universal of history of humanity: they are con-
tingent, that is, on the suggestion (1) that “humanity” comes in the form 
of a family of nations (societies); (2) that some of these societies (nations) 
are of an altogether different quality than European societies; and (3) that 
this difference — the difference between us and them — is ultimately a 
temporal difference.
All three — humanity, society, history — are arguably eighteenth- and 
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nineteenth-century philosophical inventions that were unknown to prior 
times. 
Anthropologists appear largely unaware of their contingency on phi-
losophy. A quote from the introduction contributed by Arthur Kleinman, 
Michael Jackson, and Veena Das to The Ground Between provides a case in 
point — and also serves me to make clear the stakes of a departure from 
ethnos.
We explicitly exclude from [our] consideration[s] the field of philo-
sophical anthropology . . . since [for philosophers] anthropology 
was a term for reflections on the question of man rather than an 
empirical inquiry into the differences among human societies.33
Kleinman et al. write these lines as an explanation as much as a critique. 
Their reproach is that philosophers are merely concerned with “reflec-
tions” and the abstract (“man”), while anthropologists, experts of the real, 
are concerned with the “empirical” and the concrete (“human societies” 
as they actually exist).
Other anthropologists have made similar claims. For example, Didier 
Fassin, in the same volume, has claimed that the difference between an-
thropology and philosophy is that the former “makes sense of the world 
via scientific inquiry into a society.”34
What Fassin and Kleinman and Das choose to forget (or are unaware of, 
it seems) is that their conception of anthropology — as the ethnographic 
study of society or of the differences among human societies — is actually 
itself the product of philosophical “reflection on the question of man.” It 
is the product of a time- and- place- specific “philosophical anthropology” 
that was unknown prior to the eighteenth century (the concept of “soci-
ety” and the suggestion that humans are “social beings” — beings who live 
in and are shaped by society — first emerged in the works of Montesquieu 
and Rousseau and was then later stabilized and ontologized by Adolphe 
Quetelet and Durkheim).
It thus is a bit as if the authors — whose works have opened up entirely 
new ways of anthropological research35 — are unaware of the division of 
labor on which the concept of anthropology they uphold (anthropology 
as the ethnographic study of differences between human societies) is con-
tingent: first the philosophers, experts of abstract reflections, work out a 
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general theme, and then the anthropologists come along, self- declared 
experts of the concrete, and empirically document the ethnographic vari-
ation of the general theme worked out by philosophers. 
They may understand their ethnographic reports as a critique of phi-
losophy — of philosophers — and yet, their critiques remain contingent on 
the philosophical framework within which their critiques are articulated.
I think that just this ignorance (in the sense of not knowing) of one’s 
contingency on philosophical concepts has been a distinctive feature of 
the vast majority of encounters between anthropologists and philosophers 
that occurred under the framework of classical modern ethnography.
The possibility of a philosophically inclined anthropology opens up 
in the very moment in which the framework philosophy has provided 
to anthropologists lose their evidence and become a problem: When 
(some) anthropologists find themselves compelled to abandon the study 
of “the differences among human societies” (call it ethnography) in favor 
of taking up “the question of man” because the answers that philosophers 
had provided to this question — and that have organized anthropological  
research — have become visible in their historicity and contingency, with the 
consequence that anthropology has become an open question.36
Once anthropology breaks free from ethnos (and its answer- based an-
thropology) and turns toward the human (question- based), it can bring 
its own condition of possibility, and hence its contingency on general 
philosophical setups, into a critical intellectual focus, making it into an 
explicit object of thought. What is more, it can expose its own conditions 
of possibility in its fieldwork/research and ask if today new ways of think-
ing and knowing the human are emerging, ways that escape the estab-
lished philosophical concepts on which anthropology has thus far been 
contingent: humanity, the human, history, culture, society, the social, lan-
guage, meaning subjectivity, and nature (all concepts the philosophy of 
modernity has assigned to it)?
Differently put: once anthropologists break with ethnos, anthropology 
has the potential to venture into the terrain it formerly left, unwittingly or 
not, to philosophy: a study of the conceptual grounds constitutive of the 
human and the real.
Anthropology itself can become philosophical.37
However, where philosophy has tended to provide conceptual grounds 
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as a basis for universal knowledge production — or, at the very least, as 
formulations of general truths about the world / the human — the phil-
osophically inclined anthropology (after ethnos) I try to bring into view 
here is interested in conceptual grounds only insofar as it wishes to get 
away from them. It puts them at stake in the concrete everyday scenes of 
fieldwork in order to let them get derailed, as a means to bring the new/
different into view.
Not as a means towards an end (newer, better universal grounds) but 
rather as an end in itself (no more universal grounds).
One venue for an anthropology “after ethnos,” thus, would be a phil-
osophically inclined anthropology understood as the fieldwork- based 
study of thought — of concepts, of the categories that order thought at a 
given time in a given domain (international law, yeast biology, consulting, 
neuroscience, humanitarianism, film making, primatology, etc.), and of 
how these concepts and categories mutate over time (or mutate into new 
ones), thereby changing the order constitutive of things — among them 
the human thing — in ways for which no one has words or concepts yet.
Would it be a gross exaggeration to call it an empirical philosophy in 
its own right? And would it be a gross exaggeration to call this kind of 
empirical philosophy an ethical — virtuous — practice? Precisely insofar as 
in one’s inquiry one exposes — puts at risk — one’s ways of knowing and 
being?
What if anthropology were not conducted to produce knowledge or 
truth but as a philosophical exercise?38
Humans were not social beings prior to the eighteenth century?
They were not. Though note that the argument here is a conceptual 
one: perhaps humans have always lived in relations, in groups. However, 
these relations/groups were, prior to the late eighteenth century, not con-
ceptualized as societies, and consequently humans could not be framed 
as social beings. The implication here is that the pattern of knowledge 
so familiar to us — society, the social, social context, social theory, social 
suffering — is not applicable to times that didn’t know it, and that it might 
well be that today new spaces of living together open up that escape the 
logic of the social, thereby leaving the social sciences in jeopardy.39
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philosophy/Philosophy
Philosophy? Are you serious? Why would you hold on to philosophy?
The question has followed and troubled me for some time. It is usu-
ally articulated as a mild — or straightforward — reproach: nineteenth cen-
tury? Big old German men with beards? Dust? The primacy of reason and 
the pathos of the parochial?
I want to attempt an answer by opening up a distinction between “phi-
losophy” and “Philosophy.” 
As a student in Germany, I was trained in capital- P Philosophy, as it 
revolves around Vernunft as expression of the Geist. I took classes on fa-
mous philosophers, mostly big men (many without beards, though), or 
on single books they have written. I learned to practice hermeneutics, 
that is, together with others I attended seminars in which we, under the 
guidance of professors (almost all men), worked meticulously through 
texts, slowly, one sentence, often one word, at a time. We reconstructed 
the thoughts an author articulated, deliberated why he used this and 
not that term and sought to reconstruct the conversations he had, the 
previous authors he reacted to, the development of his philosophy, and 
so on. In addition, I attended lectures in which exceptionally well- read 
Philosophy professors traced the subtle mutations of concepts through 
time, usually from the Greeks to the present, thereby making visible dif-
ferent epochs, each classified as different, somewhat clearly demarcated 
episodes in the history of reason (modernity might have been about 
fragmentation, but in its fragmentary quality it was still a fairly consis-
tent epoch among epochs).
In many ways philosophy — lowercase p — is a whole different under-
taking. 
It is interested in thought, too — but in a different kind of thought, and 
in a radically different register. Lowercase- p philosophy does not attend 
to books (even if this sounds cliché) but to scenes of everyday life; it is 
not concerned with authors but rather with the presuppositions that are 
implicit, often in contradictory ways, in everyday life and that have no 
author.
I think of these presuppositions as thought fragments, or, alternatively, 
as nowhere clearly articulated philosophies of life.
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I attend to these scenes — these philosophies (whether in the lab or in 
the market place). I collect them, arrange them, write their histories (how 
they appeared, how they changed over time), and annotate them as an 
effort to render visible the philosophies of life, of things, of relatedness, of 
the world they silently transport.
What interests me most, however, are instances in which the phi-
losophies that have silently organized the everyday fail, in which some-
thing new/different occurs that escapes them and thereby breaks open 
a novel space that renders them useless, with the consequence that a 
radical uncertainty emerges where before there was nothing but taken- 
 for- grantedness.
Not that I would be interested in the new “it” that might sooner or later 
emerge from such scenes — but because I am interested in the irreducible 
openness that reigns when no new “it” has yet emerged.
I call the practice of attending to the thought fragments that silently 
animate everyday life — this art of thinking about thought — philosophy.
At times I also call it poetry insofar as it attempts to capture that which 
cannot be captured. Or “political,” in that it celebrates the impossibility of 
knowing or being known.40
Arguably there are resemblances with, echoes of, the millennia- old prac-
tice of thinking about thinking — of orienting oneself in thought, of trans-
forming oneself into an object of thought to reach calmness of mind — 
described under the term “philosophy.”41
But there are unbridgeable differences with the nineteenth- and the 
twentieth- century European practice of Philosophy.
Lowercase- p philosophy cannot afford — and couldn’t think less 
about — the grandeur of capital- P Philosophy. It delimits itself with vehe-
mence from the guardians of the Geist, whether they are tracing the his-
tory of reason, establishing the limits of what can reasonably be said, or 
simply regulate, by inventing rules, the use of words so that no accidents 
of thought might happen.
Lowercase- p philosophy isn’t sovereign mastery (of what?). Instead 
it is a minor practice. It is the art of accidentally finding oneself in situ-
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ations in which capital- P Philosophy — the presuppositions on which it 
has relied — are being dissolved. It doesn’t give rise to (nor aspires to) the 
firm voice that articulates epochal ruptures, nor does it authorize truth 
claims — as truth is not what it is after. Instead it is interested in releasing 
things — the human — from truth.
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thought/abstract, thought/concrete  
(the problem with modernism) 
“I wonder,” a friend approached me after she had read an earlier version 
of chapter 1, “I mean just as a follow- up, what do you mean by ‘thought’?”
“Are you uncomfortable,” I asked back, a bit worried, “by my focus on 
thought?”
“Yes,” she nodded. “I am. But in complicated ways.”
“Can you explain?”
I knew from prior conversations — or presentations — that occasionally 
my talk about an anthropology of thought left people uncomfortable.
“Sometimes,” she offered her critical reading, “you speak of thought 
as your own practice. Like you think or you orient yourself through think-
ing, thereby making something into an object of thought. I understand 
that and am with you. I think that thinking as a practice, or as a mode, as 
you call it, is really important. But at other times, and this is where I am re-
ally ambivalent, it sounds as if you suggest that thought itself, thought as 
such, exists. Is thought an actual object? Something that exists out there, 
in the abstract? A sphere unto itself?”
Thought in the abstract.
In a short text, published in 1900, just after he returned from his field 
expedition to the Torres Strait, W. H. R. Rivers had reported that his in-
terlocutors, smart and skilled in so many ways, had proven themselves 
utterly incapable of abstract thought (1900:82): “The thought of people 
of the lower culture are highly developed so far as the concrete is con-
cerned, while in abstract matters the terminology may be scanty and ac-
companied by a poor development of abstract thinking. The rule which 
follows is that the abstract should always be approached through the 
concrete.”42
Ever since I first read these lines I have been fascinated by them. In 
my understanding, this is one of the very first instances where someone 
suggests that the possibility of getting at thought — the abstract — was to 
carefully immerse oneself into concrete, everyday life. What is more, it is 
one of the very first times someone suggested that life, as organized by 
thought, differs between people or societies.
To me, Rivers, together with Lévy- Bruhl (who, of course, was much less 
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interested in fieldwork/the empirical), marked the beginning of the pos-
sibility of understanding anthropology as an empirical philosophy.
“Generally speaking,” I replied, thinking of Rivers and Lévy- Bruhl, “I 
mean those vague presuppositions that somehow structure, in the form 
of background assumptions of which we mostly are not aware, what we 
do.”
“And you can identify them?” my friend smiled, disconcertingly.
It took me some time to come to terms with this smile — and to learn to 
differentiate my first reply to her into two closely related and yet incom-
mensurable ones.
reply 1
What do I mean by “thought”?
For the longest time, my reply would have been that I mean systems 
of thought: systems that underlie what we do, that silently organize our 
world and structure who we think we are, our sense of self.
My reference here is to a body of literature — one critical for my ori-
entation — that ranges from anthropology (Rivers and Lévy- Bruhl, Evans- 
Pritchard, Durkheim, Mauss and Lévi- Strauss) to history (Bachelard and 
Canguilhem) and philosophy (Foucault).43 Collectively, these authors 
have repeatedly suggested that there is an underlying grid — some call 
it a system, others speak of concepts or categories of thought, an epis-
teme, a script — that is constitutive of things and of their relation with one 
another.44
Rivers, Lévy- Bruhl, Evans- Pritchard, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault — 
 I have not only spent years reading these authors. I have lived with and 
learned from them. I have loved them. And in some sense, I still do.
And yet, the smile of my friend led me to open up a difference.
Do I really want to suggest that behind the irreducible turbulences 
of everyday life there is a system? Am I really ready to suggest that the 
concrete is ultimately secondary to the abstract? Wouldn’t this amount 
to upholding an unbearable “sovereignty of the abstract”? Wouldn’t it 
imply a most awful, somewhat- nineteenth- century asymmetry between 
those who are capable of identifying the abstract — the really real — and 
those who are not?
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The suggestion that there are people who are bound by the concrete 
and people who have access — who have broken through — to the ab-
stract mirrors everything that is untenable about the self- understanding 
of one kind of modernism: while none of the authors I cite above is reduc-
ible to a technocracy of the abstract, there can be little doubt that there 
are echoes of just this technocracy in their works.
reply 2
What do I mean by “thought”?
My second reply emerges from a set of questions that were troubling 
me when I wrote up the first: Does the abstract actually exist? Are there 
really any underlying concepts, systems even, that one could identify as 
such?
My research led me to doubt that. As I see it, the abstract doesn’t pre-
date the concrete, on the contrary: the abstract is the product and hence 
the outcome of a study of the concrete. And all those who tend to the 
abstract as if it were the real thing, the actual condition of possibility — 
modernist technicians of the abstract, engineers of thinking — mistake as 
far as I can tell, the outcome of their research for a discrete object that had 
been silently waiting to be discovered.
This is not at all to say that there are no thoughts — or conditions of 
possibility — in everyday life. As a matter of fact, I conduct research to 
discover thoughts, to discover unarticulated presuppositions. Or to find 
myself in situations in which they become visible precisely because they 
no longer work.
However, I don’t think that these thoughts exist independent of the 
very scenes in which they can be observed. What is more, at least in my 
experience, everyday life is almost always animated by more than one 
thought. Often by contradicting ones: life is ambiguous.
Call it the irreducible exuberance of everyday living.45
The challenge of the kind of anthropology I try to practice, thus, is to at-
tend to the concrete and to stay, throughout, on the level of the concrete. 
It is this practice that I have in mind when I use the phrase “thinking about 
thinking/thought”: it is a mode of orienting oneself, of relating to things, 
of gradually learning to transform them into an object of reflection — of 
thought — while simultaneously refusing the leap into the abstract.
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From the perspective of the first answer, the concrete doesn’t matter 
much. It is secondary, derived from the real thing, that is, the abstract. 
Consequently, the fieldworker, once she breaks through to the abstract, 
can discard the concrete. If she has any use of it at all, it is only as an illus-
tration, that is, as an opportunity to render visible how the abstract orga-
nizes the concrete. From the perspective of the second answer, however, 
the illustration is all there is.
It is through the practice of thinking that one constitutes something as an 
object of thought, that one opens up the possibility of rendering visible 
the philosophical fragments that seem to organize the concrete (and that 
don’t exist independent of the concrete, even if they are not reducible 
to the work of the anthropologist). In my most audacious hours I call this 
practice an art — the art of establishing relations with things, including the 
human thing, including oneself, in the genre of thought.
Can one render visible the fragments of thought that are implicit in ev-
eryday life — that seem to animate or organize it — without ever desert-
ing into the abstract? Without ever leaving the terrain of the concrete? 
Can one arrange the concrete in such a way that the satisfaction to which 
the turn to the abstract aspires (but that it never achieves) arrives all by 
itself? Can one practice an anthropology of thought while rejecting the 
modernist sovereignty of the abstract? While, if in so many complicated 
ways, staying modern?
I think so.
Of course, nothing of what I write here suggests that one shouldn’t make 
abstractions. I certainly have indulged in the joy of abstraction many 
times.46 However, it means to be careful not to mistake the abstract for 
the real thing (which would mean to forget that the abstract isn’t any less 
concrete).47
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escaping (the already thought and known)
I am afraid that there is a misunderstanding.
In the previous pages I occasionally suggested that one reason for 
conducting research is to escape “the established,” “the already thought 
and known,” “the taken for granted.” Upon reflection, these formulations 
are somewhat unfortunate: they seem to convey the impression that one 
would already know, at the outset of one’s research, what the taken for 
granted is. And that is wrong.
The taken for granted is an outcome of research, not its starting point. 
Indeed, one most powerful motivation for conducting fieldwork/research 
is precisely the wish to produce the already thought and known — in order 
to be able to escape it. Research (at least for some), means to put one’s 
life on the line: it means to expose oneself, to hand oneself — one’s con-
cepts, one’s way of being, one’s way of orienting oneself — over to the 
unforeseeable chance events that make up fieldwork, hoping (waiting) 
to get derailed.
Fieldwork is a bit like the desire to find — or be found by — that which 
makes a difference; which cannot be subsumed without causing havoc; 
which suddenly or slowly makes visible our ways of thinking and doing 
as the merely taken for granted; which provokes a rupture, a rupture that 
produces an irreducible open (with the inevitable consequence that the 
taken for granted — or the open — is inseparably bound to/defined by 
the particular instance of the new/different one has accidentally become  
part of).
Differently put, the promise of research — its beauty — is the possibility 
that something one has thus far regarded as obvious — as so obvious that 
one could not possibly be aware of it — suddenly appears as problematic.
I add, first, that the fieldwork- based transformation of a given (one yet 
unknown at the outset of research) into an open question is hardly a linear 
process. I add as well, second, that fieldwork mostly doesn’t generate un-
ambiguous insights. The unforeseeable chance encounters fieldworkers 
tend to document in their notebooks, often don’t add up in easy ways and 
often leave things in a state of uncertainty.
Is it an event? Has something new occurred? If yes, then in what sense? 
And to what degree?48
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I add, furthermore, that it is precisely this uncertainty that the philo-
sophically inclined anthropologist after ethnos is after: She celebrates the 
non- linear quality of her findings — because she is eager to render things, 
the world and the human as we knew it, ambivalent. She wants to detect 
and expose their uncertainty, their instability. 
To the fieldwork-based anthropologist after ethnos, the mutation of 
certainty into ambivalence is a major outcome of her work.
Imagine the anthropology after ethnos, at least in its philosophically 
inclined variant, were a form of investigation — or better: an examination 
or exercise — that doesn’t aspire to the production of truth but rather to 
the ceaseless generation of questions: a surplus of questions that no one 





What if anthropologists were to not just break with ethnos — with culture, 
society, territory — but with “the human” as well?
Can one conceive of an anthropology cut loose from “the human”? Can one 
imagine an anthropology decoupled from the figure of “Man” as it was consoli-
dated in the second half of the eighteenth century and as it has since marked 
the condition of the possibility of anthropological research?1
What would such an anthropology after “the human” look like?
In what follows I struggle to provide a tentative answer — one among many 
possible answers — to this question. To be more precise, I attempt to provide 
a sketch of what one could call an anthropology “of” the human / after “the hu-
man” — a practice of fieldwork- based immersion that revolves around the dis-
covery of the unanticipated: ways of thinking, possibilities of living that escape 
“the human,” that cut through it, undermine it, dissolve it, render it useless.
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Not as an end in itself but rather as a means to release humans — the 
world — from “the human.”
How to come up with an anthropology that is anthropological not because it 
grounds its analysis in the already accumulated knowledge of the human — be 
it a variant of social theory or of cultural history — but because it brings into 
view instances that escape these groundings/accumulations?
The challenge is huge. At stake is not only a departure from culture and so-
ciety, that is, with the presuppositions that humans are cultural and/or social 
beings. No, at stake is the radical abandoning of each one of the categories that 
have over the last 250 years stabilized “the human” from within.
The body, gender, the subject, suffering, experience, sex, emotions, nature, 
symbols, meaning, politics — each one of these concepts was first articulated 
in the context of the big eighteenth- and nineteenth-century project of find-
ing human universals.2 And each one of them silently transports a definite 
conception of “the human” — a normative, explanatory definition of what hu-
mans “are.” Were one to ground one’s research in any of these universals, one 
would inevitably foreclose the very possibility in which an anthropology “of” 
the human / after “the human” hinges: the possibility that unanticipated lines 
of thought, of being human, of living can emerge, possibilities that are incom-
mensurable with “the human” (with the rather short list of existing definitions 
of the human that have made anthropology thus far possible).
Differently put, to begin one’s analysis with universals would deny — make 
oneself blind to — the very cracks in the real on which the anthropology “of” 
the human (after “the human”) is contingent.3
The challenge, thus, is to find ways to deanthropologize anthropology, to 
deanthropologize its concepts and methods. Not once and for all — but again 
and again. What if one were to understand anthropological research as the 
continuous, as the ceaseless deanthropologization of anthropology? A first step 
toward such a conception of anthropology, perhaps, is to write the history 
of — “the human.”
But what could be more obvious than the fact that humans are “subjects” or that 
they have “a body”?
Yet neither of these concepts is obvious. The term “subject” — from the Latin 
subiectum, from the Greek hypokaimenon — emerged as an epistemological con-
cept only in the seventeenth century and was meant to describe a human- specific 
(and - centric) way of seeing and experiencing and knowing the world (the line of 
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flight emerges with Descartes and goes from there to Hume and Diderot and even-
tually to Kant).
The body is slightly younger. The idea that humans “are” a body, that their exis-
tence is grounded in a feeling, sensing, haptic, living universal organism that has a 
logic of its own, emerged only in the 1750s (in the writings of Georg Ernst Stahl, who 
coined the term “organism”).4 And it took another century — and the emergence 
of anatomy, surgery, and physiology — till the body was indeed established as a 
physiologically integrated, living organism and till the surgeon W. W. Keen could 
confidently tell his colleagues at the international surgery conference in 1897, “Sur-
gery is the one and the same the world over. Whether in the frozen north or under 
the equator, in civilized America or barbaric Africa, be the patient white Caucasian, 
swarthy Negro, red Indian or yellow Malay, the same accidents and diseases assail 
him, the same remedies save him, identical operations cure him: a new remedy dis-
covered in Japan is equally efficacious in Philadelphia; a new operation devised in 
America is equally applicable in Egypt.”5
Could one expose the conceptual histories of these “human universals” — the 
subject and the body — in today’s world and watch them get derailed?6
t wo
One of the earliest, still tentative formulations of “the human” appeared in an 
article that Denis Diderot (1713 – 1784) contributed in 1755 to the fifth volume 
of the Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonnée des sciences, des arts, et des métiers, 
which he edited, together with Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717 – 1783), between 
1751 and 1772. 
“L’homme,” Diderot writes in the article “Encyclopedia,” “est le terme 
unique d’où il faut partir et auquel il faut tout ramener” (Diderot 1755).
The human is the unique term from which one has to begin and to which 
one has to return everything.
Diderot wrote his contribution to explain — and justify — why he and 
d’Alembert, together with the other members of their editorial collective, had 
organized their encyclopedia the way they did; it is as much a personal reflec-
tion as a justification of the massive project they embarked upon.7
It may seem, Diderot’s explanation goes, that the obvious response to the 
question of how to best organize an encyclopedia is nature, that is, it should 
correspond to the natural order of things. However, he goes on, nature and 
its many objects would hardly be able to provide any sense of order at all. Na-
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ture is nothing but a long, confusing list of individual entries — we would face 
an infinite ocean of things, endless, boundless, never to be exhausted. Any 
sense of order that one would establish would be haunted by the arbitrary: 
“L’univers ne nous offre que des êtres particuliers, infinis en nombre, et sans 
presqu’aucune division fixe et déterminée; il n’y en a aucun qu’on puisse ap-
peler ou le premier ou le dernier; tout s’y enchaîne et s’y succédé par des nu-
ances insensibles.”8
And anyhow, Diderot adds, nature by itself is boring and meaningless. What 
gives it meaning — what makes nature sublime and interesting — is “the human”:
Si l’on bannit l’homme ou l’être pensant et contemplateur de dessus 
la surface de la terre; ce spectacle pathétique et sublime de la nature 
n’est plus qu’une scène triste et muette. L’univers se tait; le silence et 
la nuit s’en emparent. Tout se change en une vaste solitude où les phé-
nomènes inobservés se passent d’une manière obscure et sourde. C’est 
la présence de l’homme qui rend l’existence des êtres intéressante (. . .). 
Pourquoi n’introduirons- nous pas l’homme dans notre ouvrage, comme 
il est placé dans l’univers? Pourquoi n’en ferons- nous pas un centre com-
mun? Est- il dans l’espace infini quelque point d’où nous puissions, avec 
plus d’avantage, faire partir les lignes immenses que nous nous propo-
sons d’étendre à tous les autres points? Quelle vive et douce réaction 
n’en résultera- t- il pas des êtres vers l’homme, de l’homme vers les êtres? 
Voilà ce qui nous a déterminé à chercher dans les facultés principales de 
l’homme, la division générale à laquelle nous avons subordonné notre 
travail. . . . L’homme est le terme unique d’où il faut partir, et auquel il 
faut tout ramener.9 
This is it, one of the very first programmatic formulations of an abstract, time- 
and- place- independent, in its ambition truly universal, category of “the human.”10
According to Diderot, “the human” must not be thought of as a part of 
nature. For the human is effectively set apart from the sad and silent scene 
of nature as the contemplating, thoughtful being that is capable of produc-
ing what no other being can produce: meaning. Indeed, Diderot consistently 
argues in almost all of his writings that what distinguishes humans from all 
other beings, what is constitutive of their distinction, is their capacity to en-
dow things with meaning. 
In the mid- eighteenth century, the implications of Diderot’s description of 
the human — of the conception of the human as it was upheld by the Encyclo-
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pédie — was as far- reaching as revolutionary (in the literal sense of the term): 
it suggested that whatever meaning one finds in the world, it is human made. 
And it implied that meaning, or the taken for granted, can be changed.11
If I referred to Diderot’s formulation as still tentative, then it is because he 
granted the natural world a self- evident epistemological existence of its own. 
For Diderot and his contemporaries, the natural world was composed of dis-
crete objects, each with its own properties and distinctions, properties and 
distinctions that (ever since Réné Descartes’ 1636 Discourse on Method) every-
one could see and know. Differently put, the natural objects, boring as they 
were, were epistemologically autonomous: they themselves, their properties, 
determined the knowledge humans could have of them.
A good thirty years after Diderot, Immanuel Kant’s (1724 – 1804) Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft questioned just this epistemological autonomy (Kant 1781). In 
the preface to the second edition of his book in 1787 he wrote:
Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere Erkenntnis müssen sich nach den Ge-
genständen richten; aber alle Versuch über sie a priori etwas durch Be-
griffe auszumachen, wodurch unsere Erkenntnis erweitert würde, gingen  
unter dieser Voraussetzung zunichte. Man versuche es daher einmal, ob 
wir nicht in den Aufgaben der Metaphysik damit besser fortkommen, 
dass wir annehmen, die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Er-
kenntnis richten, welches so schon besser mit der verlangten Möglich-
keit einer Erkenntnis derselben a priori zusammenstimmt, die über die 
Gegenstände, ehe sie uns gegeben werden, etwas festsetzen soll.12
Kant’s argument is subtle. He wasn’t a constructivist. His argument was not 
that all things are created by the human, that all things are, in their existence, 
contingent on the human. Instead the point he makes is that everything 
humans know is “constituted” by the a priori forms that, according to Kant, 
are the condition of the possibility of human knowledge. 
To Kant human knowledge was reflective not so much of things in the 
world but rather of the specific form of which human knowledge was capable.13
What humans get to know, thus, was never a thing in itself — an absurd 
phrase for Kant — but a thing constituted by the formal a priori conditions of 
human knowledge. To understand these “transcendental” a priori forms of 
knowledge was the project he set for himself in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft.14
Note the subtle distinction between “creation” and “constitution,” which escapes 
most of today’s constructivists. 
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Kant thus went much further than Diderot: where the Frenchman merely sug-
gested that all meaning was human made but still allowed for the objective, 
if boring, existence of natural objects to which humans could have unme-
diated access, Kant established the human as an universal epistemological — 
 transcendental — principle that could never really reach beyond itself. With 
Kant the human itself became the condition of the possibility of whatever hu-
mans can know about the world, no matter where and when they lived.
The consequence of Kant’s philosophy was that the only thing humans 
could ultimately be concerned with was — epistemologically speaking — in 
the last instance, the human itself. Kant was quite aware of this consequence 
and formulated it himself when he explained that, today, all of philosophy had 
become reducible to one question only: “What is the human?”15 
three
Around the turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, Kant’s recon-
figuration of the human (which had built on and departed from Hume who, 
in turn, had built on and departed from Descartes) gave rise to the massive 
decoding project of the human sciences in general and of anthropology in 
particular.
First came the learned societies (the Société des observateurs de l’homme 
was founded in 1799); then the philosophical- anthropological (Feuerbach and 
Nietzsche) and political- anthropological (Marx and Engels) critique; and even-
tually the new discipline called anthropology (the first museums and chairs of 
anthropology were created only in the 1870s).
While obviously many things have changed since the first, still fragile 
emergence of the human sciences in the early nineteenth century, it seems 
hardly an exaggeration to say that “the human” still, to this day, marks the 
condition of the possibility of the human sciences in general and of anthropol-
ogy in particular. Anthropology was invented as, and in many respects still 
is, the science of human reality — a reality defined in its scope by an abstract, 
in its aspirations universal (time and place independent) conception that first 
emerged in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century.16
Without the emergence of “the human,” there would be no anthropology, 
neither past nor present.
With just a little effort one could draw a line, multiply broken and yet recognizable, 
from the late eighteenth century to contemporary American anthropology. First, 
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there is the line from Kant, careful reader of Rousseau, to Herder (1744 – 1803), who 
had taken classes with Kant in Königsberg in the 1760s and who had formulated, 
in the 1780s, the project of a cultural history that was constitutive of German an-
thropology. From Herder the line continues to Adolf Bastian (1826 – 1905). Bastian 
had been among those few who institutionalized Herder’s anthropology in German 
universities. He was founding director of the Berlin Anthropological Museum and 
cofounded the Berlin Society for Anthropology. And he was perhaps the first to take 
up Herder’s challenge empirically: Bastian traveled the world for over thirty years 
and wrote over eighty books. Next the line runs to Franz Boas (1858 – 1942), who had 
been a student of Bastian’s in Berlin in the 1880s and who famously founded Ameri-
can cultural anthropology as a spin- off of Herder’s cultural history. Indeed, some of 
Boas’s early American texts read like English renderings of Herder, specifically of his 
Auch eine Geschichte der Menschheit (Herder 1774). From Boas, finally, the line leads, 
via his many students (most notably Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead) to Clifford 
Geertz (1926 – 2006) or Marshall Sahlins (1930 – ) — and from there to the present. 
What follows from this brief history of “the human” is that the general, ab-
stract concept of “the human,” understood as a category under which all hu-
mans of all times and places could be subsumed as if they were members 
of a single collective — “humanity” — can hardly be taken for granted. “The 
human” — just as well as the category of “humanity” — is not a universal, a 
timeless ontological category that has always existed. Instead it is a recently 
invented concept that emerged in Europe about 250 years ago and that became 
subsequently universalized.
Could one interpret this recentness of “the human” as an invitation for re-
search? Could one, for example, ask if there are, today, in the here and now, 
instances that are such that they logically — conceptually — escape (or exceed) 
the concept of “the human” as it emerged in the eighteenth century? Instances 
that release the human from “the human”? Could one meticulously map the 
new, unanticipated venues for being human — for living a life — they are open-
ing up?17
It is from these questions that the possibility of an anthropology “of” the 
human / after “the human” emerges.18
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four
If I stress here the contingency of anthropology on the emergence of “the hu-
man” that is because it is precisely this contingency that gives contour to the 
challenge of formulating an anthropology “of” the human / after “the human.”
How to depart from “the human” — celebrating the irreducible openness, 
the uncertainty, that emerges from this departure — without foreclosing the 
very possibility of, well, anthropology?19 How to practice an anthropology af-
ter “the human” without immediately succumbing to what one could call a 
mere replacement approach? That is, the substitution of “the human” by an-
other — supposedly better, in the sense of truer — epistemological foundation 
(the replacement of one form of closure/fundament, say culture, by another 
form of closure/fundament, say material semiotics—or ant [Actor-Network 
Theory] or radical alterity)?20
Can one practice anthropology as the ceaseless effort of deanthropologizing an-
thropology (and not just anthropology)? 
The answer I want to try out here — think of it as an experiment — is what one 
could call an analysis of movement / in terms of movement.
At stake in this experiment — in this kind of analysis — is the possibility of a 
study of conceptual mutations that is itself not grounded in an unmoved ana-
lytical Archimedean point that is external to the movement one studies (the 
human, dialectics, enunciation, ant, nature- cultures, performativity, affect, 
homini sacri, and many other candidates).
Put in a formula, the idea is to render visible ruptures and mutations of es-
tablished conceptions of the human (an analysis of movement) by way of bring-
ing into view how instances in the here and now derail and defy the normative 
conceptions of the human (or other things, really) that are silently transported 
by the analytical concepts on which anthropology thus far has relied (in terms 
of movement).
The form such an analysis of movement / in terms of movement would take 
is what I refer to as exposure: the exposure of oneself, of one’s analytical cat-
egories, of the established conceptions of the human that are built into these 
categories, in one’s fieldwork/research. The task would consist in immersing 
oneself into scenes of everyday life in order to let the chance events that make 
up fieldwork/research give rise to an unanticipated, unforeseen difference.
What I mean by “difference” is an observation — a recognition, a discovery, 
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a surprise that suddenly or slowly mutates a given into a question, that makes 
visible something one simply took for granted as contingent on a recent con-
ceptual history.
What is more, I mean a discovery of a space/a realm, the dynamic of which 
 — its speed, its velocity, its logic of composition — is no longer reducible to this 
conceptual history, that escapes it.
The challenge of this type of research, then, would be to use unanticipated 
fieldwork-based derailments of one’s analytical vocabulary — of the conception 
of the human this vocabulary transports — to bring into view that (and how) 
instances in the present outgrow the conceptual histories that have until now 
stabilized it. The challenge would be to bring into view singular openings and 
to understand them as an invitation to reinvent, just for the sake of one’s proj-
ect, the very condition of the possibility of anthropology (while avoiding the 
mistake of presenting this new/other anthropology as the one and only break-
through to the real; this would be a replacement approach).
Were one to conduct such an analysis of movement / in terms of movement, 
one would study the human, after “the human.”
five
The effects of the letting go of “the human” on research are most far- 
reaching — and at first overwhelming, almost deleterious. Once cut loose 
from the epistemic figure that until recently defined what anthropology is 
and can be about, anthropologists are free to venture into the world and to 
stray away — far- away — from human affairs and world making.
The explosion in scope is enormous — and exhilarating.
It is not that the anthropologist after “the human” wouldn’t care about humans. At 
stake is no anti- humanism (and one could anyhow argue that one powerful form of 
attending to humans is to turn away from them). No, the background to the depar-
ture from a focus on people, rather, is the methodological refusal to ground one’s 
analysis in the epistemological grounding principle the human has been ever since 
Kant.21
 But what then does an anthropologist “of” the human study?
She studies how human and non- human instances — or entanglements of 
both — exceed the categories that have grounded anthropology (the human sci-
ences) thus far. She studies the emergence of concepts, the ways in which their 
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emergence has reconfigured the real, the ways in which they have mutated 
over time. And she studies the here and now, curious to find instances that ex-
pose and derail the concepts that have not even been noticed as — concepts.22
Take, for example, something as (traditionally) far away from the human 
as bacteria. Such an anthropology of bacteria can take a multitude of forms; 
it can map the emergence of conceptual and experimental reconfigurations 
of bacteriology since the late nineteenth century (and show that the concept 
“bacteria” never was fully stabilized); it can show how bacteria effectively have 
produced and continue to produce the world, from their steady production of 
oxygen to their critical role in the nitrogen cycle to the absorption of co
2
: it 
can render visible and available the beauty of biogeochemistry; it can show the 
dependency of our hearts and our brains on microbial metabolites produced 
in our guts; it can insert, or expose, the human in the epistemic space(s) pro-
duced by bacteria and see if it gets derailed (and if so, how).23
Or it can tell the story of the gingko tree, hundreds of millions of years 
old; it can tell the story of its habitats, of its art of reproduction, of its many 
migrations, of its near extinction about 100,000 years ago, and of its grandi-
ose reemergence over the last two hundred years, when only a few trees were 
left: gingko, too, produces the world, it gives it a distinctive temporality and 
structure — a structure from the perspective of which humans are a side note 
at best.24 
What would it take to learn to think about humans from the perspective 
of the gingko? What concepts would one have to devise to achieve this? What 
understandings of the world / of humans would an anthropology of gingkoes 
allow for? Or an anthropology of wave patterns in the Pacific Ocean, of mat-
sutake, of frozen methane bubbles in the Greenland ice sheet, of cheese, of 
Ebola, of snails, of Hurricane Katrina, of the neoliberal social, l1 jumping 
genes, or of SpaceX?25
Would it be much of a provocation if one were to say that what becomes vis-
ible once “the human” has lost its evidence is what one could call the stunning 
conceptual poverty that has characterized anthropology throughout its roughly 
250- year- old history?
It is against this background of impoverishment that I celebrate what one could 




In closing I want to prevent two misunderstandings. 
First, the effort to work out a possibility for an anthropology after “the hu-
man” doesn’t imply that anyone “still” interested in things human is a hopeless 
relict of a past long gone. Rather, it is meant as an invitation to wonder, among 
other things, about how to bring into view things human without relying on 
the anthropological vocabularies that have silently organized thinking about 
humans and human life.27
Second, the anthropology “of” the human doesn’t let go of the human in or-
der to replace it with a better in the sense of truer or morally superior account 
of the world (the candidates are many, running from ant to mushrooms and 
from forests to insects). For the anthropologist “of” the human such a “replace-
ment approach” would ultimately amount to little more than a substitution of 
one kind of closure by another, where the challenge would be to maintain the 
open, to allow it to flourish. The irreducible openness provoked by the break 
with “the human” — when the real is released from the already thought and 
known — would be immediately exhausted by a new set of normative (foun-
dational) claims.28
An anthropology “of” the human / after “the human” is quite literally, has 
quite literally to be, research into the open.
It needs to be said: the open doesn’t exist. There is no open as such, a single, iden-
tical, in the sense of unchanging, ontological open that would stand behind all 
conceptually constituted reality, that one could know and then identify again and 
again. What I refer to as open is simply the nonteleological movement that reigns 
when an established form of knowing — of organizing — is undermined while no 
new one has yet emerged that would give it direction (a telos). The particular qual-
ity — form (if this is the right word at all) — of such a nonteleological movement is in 
each instance singular, depending on the formation that has been undermined, on 
the event that broke it open, on too many things to be mentioned here. It is in each 
instance singular, incomparable.  
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cataloguing
“How is your work different from the work of Paul Rabinow or Ian 
Hacking?”
The question was raised after I had presented a much earlier version 
of the previous chapter.
“Can you say more?” I asked back. “I think it would help me if I under-
stood where you see parallels.” 
“Well,” my listeners responded, “you said that you are interested in 
the human, in the emergence of new ways of thinking the human. And 
it seems to me as if this is exactly what the work of Hacking or Rabinow 
is about.”
I found the question remarkable. After all, it is by no means evident 
that someone would recognize that Hacking’s “making up people” and 
Rabinow’s “anthropos + logos” are related projects.
“This is a great summary of the work of Hacking and Rabinow,” I re-
plied. “But can you tell me why you think that my work is a version of 
theirs?”
It felt a bit odd to return the question yet again, but then, over the 
years I had learned that one way to respond to a question that one doesn’t 
fully understand and for which one has no good answer yet is to politely 
but persistently ask back, until one understands where the question is 
coming from. 
“Well,” the young man replied with impatience, “you seem to just map 
new ways of making up humans. And that was the innovation of Hacking 
and Rabinow. So is there any difference?”
“Now I see,” I said. “You think that I map, with Rabinow’s words, the 
emergence of new logoi of anthropos, or, with Hacking’s words, how peo-
ple make up people. You are absolutely right that I owe much to these 
thinkers. They were my teachers, and it was through their works that I 
learned to recognize a certain line that revolves around thought, about 
how it changes over time in often unanticipated, discontinuous ways. I 
also learned from them to relate such mutations to the human. They have 
both arguably shaped my thinking, as has my colleague Allan Young, who 
also should be mentioned here.”29
I tried to move to the next question, but the listener intervened.
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“Would you mind explaining where your work differs from these white 
men, if at all?”
The whole room laughed. 
“Oh well,” I began, “I had hoped I could trick you. See, it is odd for me 
to reply to your very intelligent questions. Everything I say is going to be 
held against me. But the long and the short of it is that I think that I have 
begun moving in another direction. I have no critique to offer. It is just that 
I think that over the last few years I have been interested in questions and 
possibilities that exceed the work of Hacking and Rabinow or, better, that 
cannot be addressed with the vocabulary they invented to address the 
problems that concerned them. Different problems, different conceptual 
challenges.”
Curiously, I looked at the young man who had insisted I reply. 
“It is very difficult to make you give a concrete answer,” he replied.
Again the whole room laughed.
“Oh,” the tape records me saying, not without a notion of self- defense, 
“but maybe I have no good answer. Or maybe I don’t want to have one 
because I don’t want to be critical of authors I admire. But if you insist, I 
think what I’ve learned over the last couple of years, partly from my re-
search, partly from reading works that explore the possibility of an an-
thropology of the natural, nonhuman world, partly from conversations 
with friends, partly from reading and rereading Foucault again and again, 
and partly from my nascent research in AI, has been that the generation of 
anthropologists and philosophers who have learned from Foucault have, 
implicitly or explicitly, preserved a version of nineteenth- century human-
ism. What I mean by this is that in their works they never exceed — nor 
did they try to exceed — the frame that the emergence of ‘the human’ 
has established.”
“How so?” the woman who had invited me to present my work now 
asked, obviously provoked by my reply.
“I knew I should not have gotten into this,” I replied with a sigh. “I think 
that Hacking’s work evolves around two related but separate themes, the 
emergence of new styles of reasoning, and the way such new styles of 
reasoning make up people. More specifically, Hacking is interested in how 
the emergence of new ways of ‘labeling people’ — of classifying them ac-
cording to new categories — results in people using these categories to 
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think of themselves (and/or of other people). The provocation of this ap-
proach is that some of the categories we have taken for granted today 
come into view as of rather recent origin. The project that emerges from 
this provocation is a history of the many different ways in which people 
could, over the course of time, think of themselves. Fair?”
My host nodded, as did most people in the audience.
“Where Hacking measures conceptual mutations with the ruler of 
reason, Rabinow works from amidst fieldwork scenes. But his question is 
related to Hacking’s. In Anthropos Today, for example, one can read that 
‘naming and analyzing the form of anthropos is the logos of one kind 
of anthropology. How to best think about the arbitrariness, contingency, 
and powerful effects of those forms constitutes the challenge of that type 
of anthropology.’ I think this overlap between Hacking and Rabinow is 
partly due to the fact that they both worked closely with Foucault. Also 
fair?”
Again my listeners nodded.
“Well, so I think that Hacking and Rabinow both stay within what one 
could call ‘the human framework.’ Who makes up people? Who creates 
new labels? The answer is people. And who creates, accidentally or not, 
new logoi of anthropos? Again, the answer is people (or assemblages 
made by people). So behind the change Hacking and Rabinow allow for, 
radical change to be sure, there is a somewhat unchanging anthropology 
according to which people make up people.30 So if you ask me for a differ-
ence, then I say that ultimately, were one to follow the lead of Hacking and 
Rabinow, one’s work would eventually assume the form of a catalogue. 
One would catalogue ways in which people make up people. Certainly 
such a catalogue would be extraordinary. It would be rich and curious, full 
of perplexing discoveries and observations. But it would also be a study 
of movement that doesn’t move. After all, behind every single change 
stands — the human.”
“So all the two can map are variations of the already known: they con-
stantly reproduce the world we are already familiar with,” the young man 
replied.
“This sounds too critical, as if they made a mistake. They didn’t make a 
mistake. Rather, Hacking and Rabinow addressed a different set of ques-
tions. One more neutral way of articulating the challenge would be to say, 
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imagine a Cartesian system, the x- axis of which is nature, and the y- axis 
of which is culture. Most of the human sciences allow for the continuous 
appearance of new dots within this fixed Cartesian system. They are en-
thralled by the inexplicable curves they discover, and celebrate diversity. 
And that is wonderful. So what happened is that I noted, and this is not 
very spectacular, that they always exempt the x- axis and the y- axis from 
all change. At first I wasn’t quite sure what to do with this observation. I 
found it very delimiting, but I also didn’t know how to break free. Gradu-
ally, then, the idea emerged that one way to get rid of these limitations is 
to expose the condition of possibility of one’s own work in one’s research, 
so that it can get derailed. One would need to put the whole Cartesian 
system as such at stake and see if it gets derailed. Wouldn’t that be very 
interesting? And I think that such derailments of ‘the human’ can occur in 
the human realm, as the seminal work of Stephen Collier or Jim Ferguson 
clearly shows. They both have mapped how the neoliberal social exceeds 
and undermines the “social” of the social sciences. And they have both 
taken up the challenge of rethinking, on the one hand, where the “social” 
of the social sciences came from, and, on the other, what a critical science 
that neither can nor wants to rely on the “social” of the social sciences any-
more could look like. But such derailments can occur as well in the non-
human, natural realm, which the work of Stefan Helmreich, Hugh Raffles, 
Nicolas Langlitz, Heather Paxson, or Anna Tsing shows.”
“These authors,” he suggested, “allow the real to exceed their con-
cepts, to liberate their analysis from the constraints that one’s concepts 
inevitably are.”
“Well, I would add that what you call constraints are only constraints 
given the particular kind of curiosity that these authors have found them-
selves confronted with. They cannot be constraints as such. If they were, 
then one would have broken through to a general truth. What I am inter-
ested in, though, is to get away from such breakthrough stories.”31
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antihumanism
I am hardly the first to ask how one could liberate the human sciences from 
the human. Louis Althusser (1918 – 1990) and Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984) 
asked this question fifty years before I did. However, there are major dif-
ferences between the projects of the two French intellectuals and the 
project I try to bring into view here. And one of these differences is par-
ticularly instructive.32
When Althusser coined the term “antihumanism” in his essay “Marx-
ism and Humanism” (1965), his aim was to trouble what was then a popu-
lar trend in French philosophy: the fusion of humanism and Marxism. To 
Althusser, the very idea that Marxism could be understood as a form of 
humanism was an intolerable betrayal of the critical insights of Marx. It 
is true, Althusser concedes, that the young Marx thought of himself as 
a humanist. But around 1845, he goes on, Marx made what was one of 
his most critical and far- reaching “discoveries”:33 that “the human” was a 
product of the bourgeoisie. The consequence of Marx’s discovery was that 
the assumption that history is made by humans, even if they don’t know 
it (because of their alienation from human nature), had become as unten-
able as the suggestion that the goal must be to return history to humans.34
Althusser’s ambition was to abstract a general warning from what he 
calls “Marx’s theoretical anti- humanism”: what his contemporaries had to 
understand was that any form of humanism is ultimately a representation 
of the understanding of the human of the dominant class of a society and 
hence must be rejected as idealism.
Any grounding of history in the human was a mistake. 
But how, then, to understand history? Althusser points to historical 
materialism, which he describes as Marx’s reply to his earlier humanism. 
The advantage of historical materialism was that it allowed for an analyti-
cal comprehension of history that relies not on the human but on histori-
cal modes of production, which exceed the human, which produce differ-
ent conceptions of the human.35
This was Althusser’s problem/ambition: to come up with a philosophy 
of history that was not grounded in “the human.”
Foucault described his own departure from the human as “the hard 
work of freedom” (1972, 13). In his Les mots et les choses ([1966] 1990) he 
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had shown just how recent the concept of “the human” was — and in its 
aftermath he found himself confronted with a challenge that was remi-
niscent of Althusser: how could one write history without relying on the 
eighteenth- century concept of “the human”?
Although Althusser had the comfort of relying on the authority of 
Marx, Foucault was as wary of Marxism as he was of humanism or, for 
that matter, all teleologies and transcendentals. The challenge he thus 
faced — and that he addressed in his L’archéologie du savoir (1969) — was 
somewhat more encompassing: Foucault had to come up with a whole 
new theory of history, of what it was and of how it could be analyzed.36
Foucault’s solution was discourse analysis. Where the bourgeois his-
torians understood history as grounded in a continuum — behind every 
event in time stands what he condescendingly called “the subject” — 
Foucault suggested to instead analyze “the structures of speech” that or-
ganize “discursive enunciations” of whole periods of time and that exceed 
the humans “who make these enunciations.”37
Take all the documents written in a randomly defined period, he sug-
gested, and anonymize them, so that you have one giant single text, a 
text with many origins that stretches out over centuries. Then analyze the 
structures that organize this single text, work out the grammar that si-
lently informs it (a grammar that, as it stretches across centuries and many 
authors, can never be reduced to any human subject or intentionality). 
More specifically, analyze if this grammar — which according to Foucault 
is constitutive of reality — at one point changes, if it undergoes a sudden 
unanticipated rupture that allows one to clearly demarcate a before and 
an after. 
Can you find any such “radical ruptures” (Foucault 1972, 5)?38
Foucault’s ambition was not only to work toward a new understand-
ing of history. He also hoped to provide new foundations — a new set of 
dehumanized (desubjectified) analytical categories that would replace 
the humanistic categories and that could serve, from now on, to produce 
knowledge “freed from the anthropological theme”: discourse, series, 
limit, thresholds, strategy, ruptures, displacement, enunciation, transfor-
mations. Indeed, The Archeology of Knowledge was Foucault’s new “gen-
eral theory” of history.39
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Arguably, this effort to ground a historical analysis in analytical vocab-
ulary free from “the human” (or “the subject”) continued to be a critical 
feature of Foucault’s thought when, in the 1970s, he introduced the con-
cept of a dispositif (in English often rendered as “apparatus”) as a kind of 
reaction to the somewhat exclusive focus on abstract epistemic structures 
of his earlier work (Foucault 1980). 
From the perspective of the kind of anthropology I try to bring into 
view here — an anthropology interested in how instances in the here and 
now escape the human and open up previously unknown possibilities of 
thought — the work of Althusser and Foucault (the Foucault of the late 
1960s / early 1970s) is as intriguing as it is unfortunate. It is intriguing in 
that their works effectively provincialize and problematize “the human”; 
it is unfortunate in that the form taken by their radical rupture with the 
“anthropological theme” (Foucault [1969] 1972, 17) was ultimately the ef-
fort to come up with new foundations that aspired to be as constitutive 
as the “transcendental human” had been (in Althusser’s case historical 
materialism, in Foucault’s discourse analysis).
One could speak of a replacement approach, insofar as both Althusser 
and Foucault replaced one closed form with another closed form.
If I called the work of Althusser and Foucault instructive, then it is pre-
cisely because their replacement approach brings into sharp focus the 
challenge one faces when one sets out to elaborate the possibility of an 
anthropology “of” the human / after “the human”: the one thing it can-
not afford is to close the openness that emerges when one releases the 
human — and anthropology — from “the human.” It cannot because it is 
exactly this openness that provides the condition of possibility on which 
its existence is contingent: the possibility that new yet unknown and un-
anticipated spaces of thought break open that exceed and thereby under-
mine the established ways of thinking and knowing.40
An anthropology “of” the human / after “the human” is not only quite 
literally research into the open; it is also an attempt to render visible and 
available the beauty of the open.
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a disregard for theory
One powerful implication of an anthropology “of” the human / after “the 
human” is a certain disregard — disrespect — for theory. By “theory” I 
mean the postulation of an explanatory scheme (usually in the form of a 
first principle) that is used to decode a particular phenomenon in general, 
world- explaining terms. It is a causal, coherently worked out hypothesis 
that offers explanations (a truth about the world).41
The reason for this disregard for theory is the observation that theories 
deny the possibility of the openness constitutive of the anthropology “of” 
the human: the recognition that the new/different is conceptually incom-
mensurable with the already thought and known. Theories already know 
(everything). A theorist — that is, someone who theorizes a particular in-
stance in order to explain — has to assume that, of course, she has the key 
to understanding the world. How else would the act of decoding that 
a theory offers — say in terms of social class or in terms of performance 
theory — be plausible?
But what if the thing one attempts to think through in terms of this or 
that theory, in its own dynamic, in its own singular conceptual configura-
tion, were such that it actually defies the theory used to explain it?
Let’s take social theory. 
What is so profoundly delimiting about social theory, if only from the 
perspective of the openness that is constitutive of the anthropology “of” 
the human, is that whatever phenomenon a social theorist will investi-
gate — it will be framed as “social.” Wherever one turns, all one finds is 
social struggle, social injustice, social suffering, the reproduction of social 
asymmetry, and so on. 
I am aware that such a formulation is provocative. However, my aim 
here is not to deny struggle, injustice, suffering, asymmetry. Rather, my 
aim is to point out that by labeling each one of these phenomena as so-
cial, one transports a closed definition of the human (as social, as living 
in society) that literally locks the human (the world) into a particular epis-
temological scheme that is as contingent as the things it is supposed to 
explain.
What if one were to focus one’s attention not only on struggles, injus-
tices, suffering, asymmetries — but also on the question of whether the 
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instances one studies are such that they escape the logic of the social 
as it first emerged somewhere between Adolphe Quételet (1827, 1835, 
1848) and Émile Durkheim (1893, 1895, 1897) in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, a logic that remains constitutive of most social 
theory? What if one were to take the social not as a breakthrough to the 
universal but as a provincial configuration of the human (of the real)? The 
implication would be that there might well be many instances that, in 
their own conceptual configuration and dynamic escape the constitution 
of the real (the human) as social. Just as well one could ask how one’s dis-
coveries escape the efforts by DeLanda (2006) or Latour (2005) to come 
up with new, and from their perspective better (in the sense of truer), 
conceptions of the social.
It is not that social theory would not be useful or interesting. What 
makes social theory — or any theory, really — into a problem, rather, is that 
it mistakes the provincial for the universal; that it reduces the yet unknown 
to a particular, provincial conception of things human (after all, it will be 
social); and that it denies the very possibility that things could be different 
(that new ways of thinking, knowing, and existing could emerge). 
The consequence, from the perspective of what one could call an an-
thropology of the open, is boredom in the face of the eternal repetition 
of a script — society.
Expressed in more general terms, built into theory (whether social or 
cultural or otherwise) is a kind of closure. A closure that denies the unde-
fined openness that is constitutive of the anthropology “of” the human; 
it denies the possibility that things could be otherwise than they are (or 
seem); that mutations of the possible might occur that we cannot grasp 
with our already established ways of thinking and knowing.
It is a bit as if theory were a prison, designed to prevent “the hard work 
of freedom” (Foucault 1972). 
Theories aspire to be timeless, whereas the philosophically inclined an-
thropology “of” the human is interested in precisely the timeliness of 
things (or how a given instance escapes the concept of timeliness). Theo-
ries are interested in the general and seek to describe the specific in gen-
eral terms, whereas the kind of anthropology I try to bring into view here 
is interested in precisely those aspects of the present that cannot be sub-
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sumed under the general. Theories provide causal schemas — first prin-
ciples such as society or culture — whereas the anthropologist of emer-
gent ways of thinking is interested in developments that escape these 
first principles, that set them in motion, that undermine them, that lead 
to new yet unexplored ways of explaining (which only the narrow- minded 
would want to ontologize). Theories determine analytical attentions (or 
sensibilities), whereas an anthropologist “of” the human attempts to find 
out if new forms of attention / new kinds of sensibilities are coming into 
existence.42
Theories might be good to think with; they may be fascinating, stimulat-
ing, eye- opening — something one has to know. And yet, the possibility 
of the anthropology “of” the human is, precisely insofar as it is research- 
oriented, informed by a profound disregard for — theory. When the task 
is to report on the emergent/different, when the goal is to document and 
capture the dynamic caused by singular events that escape the already 
established and thereby introduce motion in a field of knowledge, theory 
is hardly useful.
Sure enough someone is going to read this and argue that what I pres-
ent here is just another theory. But is it? I don’t think so. The purpose of 
these lines is to make escape a central aspect of research, that is, an in-
stance that escapes the already thought and known and thus allows for an 
unanticipated openness that ridicules any theory. With Félix Guattari and 
Gilles Deleuze (1994, 5), one could say that the aim of an anthropology “of” 
the human / after “the human” — of an analysis of movement / in terms of 
movement — is to capture the “always new.”
Could one make a distinction between “theory” and the “theoretical”?
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no ontology
Over the last ten years, since roughly the early 2000s, something quite 
extraordinary has happened in the human sciences. An unprecedented, 
unanticipated event has taken place: anthropologists have gradually ex-
panded their inquiries to the nonhuman, natural world.
It is difficult to provide an explanation for this expansion.43 In retro-
spect it may seem as if the possibility for an anthropology of the natural 
world was brought about by the early works of Donna Haraway and Bruno 
Latour.44 But upon closer examination, this is hardly the case. Haraway’s 
Primate Visions or Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern, for example, were 
written and read, respectively, as political and philosophical critiques of 
the nature/culture distinction — not as calls for an actual anthropology of 
insects (Raffles 2011) or mushrooms (Tsing 2015).
It thus seems as if a new, in many ways unanticipated, venue of re-
search emerged in the early 2000s. A genealogy of this emergence would 
have to gesture to Michael Pollan’s The Botany of Desire (2001), which was 
arguably one of the first attempts to think about humans from the per-
spective of plants and bumblebees; to Donna Haraway’s The Companion 
Species Manifesto (2003) — which indeed was so new and different at the 
time (an event) that when it was first published few people knew how 
to read it — and her When Species Meet (2008); Stefan Helmreich’s Alien 
Ocean (2009); Hugh Raffle’s Insectopedia (2011); Heather Paxson’s The Life 
of Cheese (2012); Anna Tsing’s The Mushroom at the End of the World (2015); 
Kath Weston’s Animate Planet (2017); it would also have to refer to the of-
ficial presentation, in cultural anthropology, of a new subdiscipline called 
“multispecies anthropology” (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; see as well Kirk-
sey 2014a, 2014b). And it would have to mention that around 2012, amid 
the critique and excitement provoked by the study of multispecies en-
counters, a line of research constituted itself that has become known over 
the last few years as ontology. The reference here is, on the one hand, to 
work coming out of science and technology studies (sts), most famously 
Annemarie Mol (2002), with Bruno Latour and John Law in the back-
ground, and, on the other hand, to a line of more classical modern eth-
nography that emerged from work in the Amazon. Here the reference is 
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mostly (but not exclusively) to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2014), Philippe 
Descola (2013), and Eduardo Kohn (2007).
Among anthropologists, this coming together of an anthropology of 
nonhuman species or of multispecies encounters (both of which are very 
much after ethnos) and classical modern ethnography under the rubric of 
ontology has received a lot of attention (on blogs as well as in journals). It 
has even been argued that anthropology is undergoing an “ontological 
turn,” which is changing what anthropology is about and how it is prac-
ticed (Holbraad 2009; Paleček and Risjord 2013; Holbraad et al. 2014; Reyes 
2014; Kohn 2015).
As ontology seems to partly revolve around an effort to break with 
“the human,” and thus around the topic of the previous chapter, it seems 
prudent to indicate that the project I have sought to outline moves in a 
direction radically different from the project of the ontologists, and why 
this is so. I offer six observations.
OBSERVATION 1
My first observation introduces a distinction. In my reading, anthropologies 
of nonhuman species or of multispecies encounters and ontology are two 
somewhat different projects. I am not saying there is no overlap (see Kirksey 
2012, 2014), but where many multispecies anthropologists focus on what 
one could call the anthropological effects of a given nonhuman species 
(of how they put human exceptionalism in question) or on the encounters 
of different species (and the new possibilities for thinking about living to-
gether that such encounters open up), the ontologists are busy articulating 
a new general theory of the real as such, of its actual ontological structure.
While many of the multispecies authors are interested in undermin-
ing the nature/culture distinction that has stabilized the anthropological 
exceptionalism on which anthropology has largely been based, ontolo-
gists are interested in correcting an error: their ambition is to replace the 
mistake of the moderns with a theory adequate to how the world actually 
“is” (hence, ontology). Somewhat inevitably, then, the ontologists are cel-
ebrating their work as a breakthrough to the truth (a breakthrough often 
presented as a moral remedy). Such a celebration is absent from (most) 
multispecies anthropology; it doesn’t need it.45
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OBSERVATION 2
Why “ontology”?
In an essay on the history of the idea that knowledge has a history, 
Georges Canguilhem (1966) argues that the term “epistemology” was 
coined in 1854, by James F. Ferrier, to mark a departure from ontology. 
In the early nineteenth century, Canguilhem writes, it had increasingly 
become clear that the knowledge produced by the sciences radically es-
caped the ontologies philosophers had worked out over the previous 
centuries. A first and somewhat immediate effect of this escape was that 
the taken- for- granted world — the natural cosmos of which humans were 
a part — collapsed (Canguilhem locates this event in the second half of 
the eighteenth century). A second effect became evident only gradually, 
when the steady emergence of new knowledge (especially in physics) 
time and again rendered established knowledge obsolete: the recogni-
tion that all knowledge about the world is methodologically mediated 
and grounded in conceptual presuppositions that are potentially under-
mined by new discoveries. According to Canguilhem, Ferrier introduced 
the term “epistemology,” then, precisely to bring into view this conceptual 
instability of scientific knowledge. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century knowledge began to have a 
history — insofar as it was recognized as being contingent on (if not reduc-
ible to) humans (for a similar argument, see Rheinberger 2010).
Canguilhem’s observations are instructive insofar as the opposition 
between ontology (a somewhat closed natural cosmos) and epistemol-
ogy (the breaking open of this cosmos) is a recurrent theme in the writ-
ings of the ontologists. It is just that while Canguilhem happily sided with 
epistemologists (he celebrated the indeterminacy of the world after on-
tology), the ontologists, as their name suggests, positioned themselves 
as critics of epistemology.
Take, for example, Annemarie Mol’s The Body Multiple (2002), a study 
of how physicians with different clinical expertise (anatomy, internal 
medicine, radiology, etc.) in a Dutch hospital know and speak about 
arteriosclerosis.
The problem with “epistemology,” Mol writes in the preface to her 
book, is that it “is concerned with reference: it asks whether representa-
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tions of reality are accurate” (2002, vii). Epistemology, in other words, is 
implicitly suggesting a distinction between nature (composed of discrete, 
human independent objects or diseases, such as arteriosclerosis) and hu-
mans (who discover and know these objects/diseases). To Mol this distinc-
tion between nature and the human is an untenable reproduction of the 
great divide that is constitutive of modernity, a great divide that needs to 
be overcome and left behind.
What is Mol’s alternative? 
Her answer is: Practices. The background to this alternative is a dis-
covery she made in the course of her fieldwork in a Dutch arteriosclero-
sis clinic. Following patients from one ward to another, Mol at one point 
noted that the ways in which different medical experts know and speak 
about arteriosclerosis not only differ wildly — but that they also don’t add 
up to anything coherent. “A plaque cut out of an atherosclerosis artery is 
not the same entity as the problem a patient with atherosclerosis talks 
about in the consulting room, even though they are both called by the 
same name” (Mol 2002, vii).
Epistemologists, Mol concluded, are obviously misguided. They hold 
on, wrongly, to the idea that there is an objective reality out there.46 What 
“is,” one could summarize Mol, depends on the different practices in place 
to know. And as practices differ in various places (even in a single clinic), so 
does reality. Hence the title of her book, The Body Multiple.
“This is the plot of my philosophical tale,” she summarizes her argu-
ment, “that ontology is not a given in the order of things, but that, instead, 
ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in 
common, day- to- day, practices” (6).
Ontology, then, is the study of the ontological productivity of practices.
The background to Mol’s ontological critique of epistemology is a 
set of arguments first presented by Bruno Latour.47 In his Pandora’s Hope 
(1999), Latour had insisted that microbes didn’t exist before Pasteur in-
vented them. 
“Did microbes exist before Pasteur? No, they did not exist before he 
came along” (145).
Latour’s aim was provocation. He set out to mock all those naturalists 
who assumed that Pasteur had discovered a discrete natural entity that 
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was sitting under his microscope, with a name tag around its neck that 
said “microbe,” patiently waiting to be discovered.
As an alternative to such a neat nature/culture distinction — humans 
discovered the natural thing microbe — Latour invented a whole differ-
ent way of thinking. What we have to learn, he explained to his readers, 
is that “the word ‘substance’ doesn’t designate what ‘remains beneath,’ 
impervious to history” (1999, 151). Rather, the term “substance” — or be-
ing — refers to “what gathers together a multiplicity of agents into a stable 
and coherent whole” (151).
Latour’s point is not that microbes are a human invention or a mere 
reflection of human practices. He doesn’t say that Pasteur invented them 
from scratch. Rather, Latour suggests that what Pasteur refers to as mi-
crobes was impossible without a whole set of tools and actors on which 
they remain contingent: the microscope, Pasteur himself, the nascent 
public health movement, the Academy of Science, and many more.
Microbes, for Latour, are a node in an actor network on which they are 
contingent. They would not be without it — even if they are a constitutive 
part of it (this is a paradox that Latour has never sufficiently addressed: 
his alternative to epistemology remains as referential as epistemology). 
Or, in Latour’s words, “Substance is a name that designates the stability of 
an assemblage” (1999, 151).48
Mol seems to have taken Latour’s hilarious provocation literally — and 
thereby she deprived Latour of his ironic edge (to say that Latour’s argu-
ment is ironic doesn’t imply that he isn’t serious). It is as if she humorlessly 
insists on an argument that Latour organized as a flirt — that microbes 
don’t exist. Latour, grand maître of flirtation, was busy bringing about a 
situation in which one cannot decide whether or not he really means what 
he says. It is this openness on which the power of his argument depends. 
Mol, however, is decided: there is no such thing as microbes (or arterio-
sclerosis) independent of the practices in place to know microbes.
Ontology began as a dehumorization of Latour’s work.49
What Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Philippe Descola, and Eduardo Kohn 
share with Annemarie Mol is the reference to Latour’s critique of epistemol-
ogy, to his effort to radically abandon the nature/culture divide and think 
of the whole world in terms of actor networks and nature- culture hybrids.
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The suggestion on behalf of the anthropologists here seems to be that 
Latour is right: that the split between humans (culture) and nature was a 
terrible mistake; that the societies anthropologists have studied have (al-
ways) known this (or, in any case, never have made the mistake); and that 
these societies — or at least their anthropologists (ethnographers) — can 
therefore teach us how to think of the world beyond the great divides that 
haunt the moderns.50 
It is a bit as if Latour provided classical modern ethnography with a 
platform for presenting its own work as relevant to contemporary debates 
in STS and the human sciences more broadly.
What all the ontologists share, then — Latour, Mol, Viveiros de Castro, 
Descola, and Kohn — is a rejection of the joy of the irreducible openness 
(of the liberation) that is implicit in Canguilhem’s celebration of episte-
mology. To various degrees, their project is to reestablish ontology over 
epistemology. And, thus, however implicitly, to reestablish the finiteness 
of the world (an ontology, even one that allows for difference/newness, 
can allow for difference/newness only insofar as it can be explained in 
terms of a general theory of being).
Call it a closure.
OBSERVATION 3
It seems to me as if one can distinguish three different lines of ontology. 
In my observation, neither one of these lines breaks with “the human.”
First, there is the sts line, which emerged with Annemarie Mol and was 
later promoted by John Law; Bruno Latour has consistently flirted with 
this line (see, for example, Law and Lien 2013; for a critical review on ontol-
ogy in sts, see Woolgar and Lezaun 2013; and Lynch 2013).
Is Mol’s ontology after “the human”?
On the contrary. When what arteriosclerosis is — or whether it is at 
all — is completely contingent on how humans talk about it or enact it, 
then arteriosclerosis is, ultimately, a human invention. Mol’s ontology thus 
amounts to a most radical anthropocentrism (what is more, it amounts to 
a dramatic overestimation of the significance of humans, an overestima-
tion one could describe as key feature of modernity).51
Can as much be said of Latour’s redefinition of “substance”? 
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I am inclined to think so. Of course, I am aware that there is no natural 
thing called a microbe, that microbe is a concept. Or, as Latour has bril-
liantly argued in Science in Action (1987), a list of propositions. However, 
there is a subtle but far- reaching difference between saying that microbes 
qua substance (however ill- defined) didn’t exist before Pasteur — that 
they were created by him ex nihilo — and the suggestion that for humans 
microbes didn’t exist, that what microbes are, for humans, depends on 
a complex set of experiments and tools and policies, that “microbe,” of 
course, is a human word (and hence a mere contingency), and that given 
this dependency of human knowledge of microbes on tools and concepts 
microbes are inherently unstable entities (call it the distinction between 
creation and constitution).
The art of not being explicit doesn’t solve the problem of reference: 
It therefore seems as if neither Latour nor Mol escapes the anthropocen-
trism that they problematize.52
The second line of ontological research emerges from the works of 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Philippe Descola and could be called, in 
accordance with their self- descriptions, “comparative ontology.”
Both Descola and Viveiros de Castro have repeatedly sought to define 
anthropology proper as the study of how societies (including Western so-
ciety) construct the ontologies in which they are entangled. For example, 
Descola has consistently suggested “that conceptions of nature are so-
cially constructed” and that anthropology should understand itself as the 
“comparative” study of these “socially constructed ontologies” (Descola 
1996a, 82; 1996b; 2010a; 2010b; 2013; 2014). Similarly, Viveiros de Castro has 
argued that the task of anthropology is to compare the different ways in 
which societies “construct” the ontological worlds in which they are en-
tangled, and to use these comparisons as a tool for translation, that is, to 
render different societies and their ontologies — to the degree that this is 
possible — comprehensible to one another (for example, see Viveiros de 
Castro 2004a, 2004b, 2014; see also Holbraad et al. 2014).
To both, the unit of analysis, in line with classical modern ethnogra-
phy, are societies, understood as somewhat discrete, autonomous units 
(ethnoi).
At the center of the work of both Descola and Viveiros de Castro is a 
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“discovery” that they have derived at, independently it seems, via their 
comparative ventures: while Western societies are human- exclusive — 
non – humans have no space — most (all?) non- Western societies have in-
tegrated nonhumans into their social world.53
It is on the basis of just this “discovery” that they have come to affirm 
Latour’s critique of modernity: as the exclusion of nature from human so-
ciality cannot be observed anywhere but in the modern West, it must be 
but one big mistake.
Conclusion: we have never been modern.
Arguably, this second line of ontological research is as little after “the 
human” as Mol’s (or Latour’s). Nor, for that matter, is it after ethnos. After 
all, it is humans that construct their worlds, whether they allow animals 
and plants to be part of them or not.
I reiterate that the concept of society is a distinctively modern one, 
invented to bring into view the uniqueness (in Diderot’s sense) of the hu-
man. A yet to be written history of how society emerged as a quintessen-
tial — taken for granted — anthropological concept, would have to focus 
on at least three critical events.
First, in the decades leading up to the French Revolution, the ancient 
legal concept of societas was reconfigured by French authors as a revo-
lutionary tool: the argument was that what is constitutive of a political 
unit is not the king and his court but rather society (which at that time 
simply meant the society of all those who held legal positions vis- à- vis the 
king). Second, after the French Revolution, humans were reconstituted as 
something they had never been before: social beings (note the difference 
between the aristocratic concept of sociality and the social). When, in the 
context of industrialization and the arrival of the first cholera epidemics 
from India, the French government charged statisticians to investigate 
patterns of poverty and disease, they discovered that where one was 
born, in which segment of society, determined one’s life: what education 
one got, what job one was likely to have, how early one would marry (and 
whom), how many children one would have, what diseases one would 
suffer from, how long one would live. Third, based on social statistics, the 
idea emerged — the reference here is largely to Émile Durkheim — that so-
cieties really are organism like entities with a life of their own: individual 
human lives only seemed to be a matter of individual choice or free will. 
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In reality they were simply reflections of the structure and life stage of a 
given society. Durkheim’s conclusion, famously, was that if one were to 
understand anything about the human, one would need a new kind of 
science, a social science, that would explore the social grounds constitu-
tive of human exceptionalism.
Differently put, between the 1750s and the 1890s society and the so-
cial emerged as a radically new conceptual comprehension of the hu-
man — and of politics — one formerly unknown, one that marked (and still 
marks, despite its historical contingency) the condition of the possibility 
of the social sciences.
Of course, one could argue that the emergence of an anthropocentric, 
human- exclusive conception of society is simply a peculiarity of modern 
Western societies (whatever “West” might mean). But wouldn’t such an ar-
gument silently reintroduce the concept of society as it has been constitu-
tive of social anthropologies throughout the twentieth century, that is, as 
the invariable universal that allows a comparison of multiple ontologies? 
Indeed, wouldn’t such an argument ultimately reintroduce the sugges-
tion that humans — as members of society, as social beings — construct 
the (natural) worlds in which they live?
Instead of answering, I quote Descola (2013, xx):
Anthropology is faced with a daunting challenge: either to disap-
pear as an exhausted form of humanism or else to transform itself 
by rethinking its domain and its tools in such a way as to include in 
its object far more than the anthropos: that is to say, the entire col-
lective of beings that is linked to him but is at present relegated to 
the position of a merely peripheral role; or, to put it in more conven-
tional terms, the anthropology of culture must be accompanied by 
an anthropology of nature that is open to that part of themselves 
and the world that human beings actualize and by means of which 
they objectify themselves.
Humans actualize nature, use it to objectify themselves. How they do so 
differs from society to society.
Comparative ontology is hardly a move after “the human.” On the con-
trary, it is (1) entirely contingent on / complicit with the modern plot, and 
(2) simply a continuation of the old social anthropology as it first emerged 
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in the early twentieth century in France and the United Kingdom — with 
all of the distinctive features of “the human” as maker of the world. If what 
the world “is” is contingent on how human societies construct it, then 
what is this if not a reproduction of the anthropocentric epistemology 
that first emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century?54
The last line of ontology — the reference here is largely to Eduardo 
Kohn — is perhaps the most theoretically ambitious: Kohn’s thought- 
provoking work revolves around the effort to articulate a theory of the 
ontological structure of the world as it exists as such. 
Kohn’s suggestion is that the natural world, the things of which it is 
composed of, have meaning as such, independent of the human. Indeed, 
he is adamant that plants and animals and clouds and the wind think, 
just like humans, and that each one of these natural instances is an active 
meaning producer, just like humans. In his work, which draws on his field-
work in the Amazon, Kohn seeks to come up with a conceptual vocabu-
lary that would allow modern humans to learn anew how to discover, to 
understand, and to live in this meaningful world that is, as Kohn puts it, 
beyond the human. 
It seems to me as if this last line is not after “the human” either. On the 
surface of things, it may seem as if it goes further than the other two lines. 
For example, one could argue that Kohn, insofar as he brings the nonhu-
man as such into view, as independent of humans, succeeds in decou-
pling anthropological analysis from its focus on the human. However, the 
nonhuman actors about which Kohn writes seem all too human. Indeed, 
the vocabulary on which Kohn’s universal ontology of the world beyond 
the human relies — its condition of possibility — is rather provincial: his ac-
tors, humans and nonhumans alike, all come across as actors and mean-
ing producers, and are all described in terms of the eighteenth- century 
vocabulary a rather small set of European authors invented to establish 
human exceptionalism.
Differently put, Kohn’s project to make visible the ontological qual-
ity of the nonhuman world as something in itself consists simply in the 
effort to expand the terms invented to set the human apart from the 
natural world to the natural world. The consequence could be described 
as a total “humanization” of the world (or as a radical universalization of 
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“the human”); it leaves the eighteenth- century concept of “the human” 
unproblematized.55
Kohn’s universalization of “the human,” thus, is entirely contingent on 
(leaves in place) the anthropological discourse with which the anthropol-
ogy “of” the human / after “the human” seeks to radically break.
His ontology is not after “the human.” It is just beyond “the human.”
(Occasionally it even seems as if Kohn’s ontology privileges the human. 
For is it not humans who discover and articulate the ontological structure 
of the world?)
OBSERVATION 4
The perhaps most radical difference between an anthropology “of” the 
human / after “the human” and ontology is that the latter is, from the 
perspective of the former, a replacement approach. A central theme of 
the anthropology “of” the human is to break with “the human” — and to 
then maintain, to foster, the openness that emerges from this rupture and 
the indeterminacy — the many different, noncumulative, perhaps mutu-
ally exclusive indeterminacies — that emanates from it. A challenge that is 
built into this project is the courage to withstand situations of irreducible, 
nonteleological openness. To not close them: to enjoy them. 
One could speak of a principle of radical disquiet, of ceaseless movement. 
The aim of ontology is the inverse: the challenge it faces is to explain 
how the world “is.” The challenge is — explicitly (Kohn, Latour) or implicitly 
(Descola, de Castro) — to advance a general ontological theory of how the 
world is built and to then think of the human as integrated into this world.
What is more, if ontologists critique the human — or nature/culture 
 — then because it was “wrong,” a mistake of an erroneous modern past, 
which needs to be corrected in the name of the truth (implying that they 
have broken through to the ontological structure of the world).
Latour is exemplary here. He effectively argues that the distinction be-
tween nature and culture has, insofar as it runs diagonal to how the world 
is, destroyed the world. Modernity, for Latour, amounts to a major mistake 
that urgently ought to be corrected. How? We all ought to learn to think 
in terms of Actor- Network Theory (ant).
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Ontology thus appears (or stylizes itself), however implicitly, as a 
breakthrough to the truth. As such it doesn’t produce any openness at 
all — or only in an ontological sense, that is, by predefining what open-
ness means in this world (even when it elaborates a concept of openness, 
it provides a definition of this openness and thereby — destroys it).
Let me add that occasionally, this new, better truth is morally charged: 
The suggestion is that “the human” has brought about the Anthropo-
cene — and environmental pollution and mass species extinction — and 
that we humans now need to learn is to live beyond the human, to live in 
accordance with the natural world we are part of (see especially Descola 
2013 and Kohn 2015, who both argue that in the age of climate change we 
moderns ought to learn how to live from societies who have not sepa-
rated humans from the natural world). 
This seems like a naïve return of eighteenth- century conceptions of 
the noble savage — a positive rearticulation of the classical theme of the 
philosophy of history: that the faraway, small- scale societies (from a Eu-
ropean perspective) that anthropologists have traditionally studied are 
closer to nature than the modern European societies who have liberated 
themselves from the contingency of nature (see Lorraine Daston’s brilliant 
2004 critique of the moral authority of nature argument). 
Along with this moral undertone often goes the celebration, on be-
half of the ontologists, of some original (haptic) wisdom that the primitive 
has preserved and that the moderns (cool, rational, technicized, alienated 
from nature) have forgotten or lost (even though the haptic is arguably a 
modern concept). 
It is occasionally difficult to avoid the impression that the ontological 
turn is a turn to (or return of) early twentieth-century primitivism: As a 
modernist celebration of the premodern, understood as the solution to 
the problems of modernity, ontology is a proper part of the epoch it so 
vehemently critiques.56
Let me add that multispecies anthropology often falls into a similar primi-
tivist trap: just as classical modern ethnographers studied strange and 
exotic others — the “primitive,” the “savage,” with their seemingly inex-
plicable rituals — multispecies anthropologists study strange and exotic 
animals and their seemingly inexplicable (but endlessly curious) behavior. 
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And as the “primitive” was once invented — or instrumentalized — by eth-
nographers to put the taken- for- grantedness of our own, Western lifestyle 
in question, so today the animal is used to question our self- description 
as “human.” What is more, just as every ethnographer once had her tribe, 
so each multispecies anthropologist has her animal or plant. There might 
be a focus on animals rather than on humans, but in a curious — problem-
atic — turn, animals (or plants) often seem to assume the role formerly re-
served to “the primitive”: as a moralizer of the (Western, modern concept 
of the) human.57
OBSERVATION 5
Why ontology at all? Isn’t the concern with “being” one of the Western 
obsessions par excellence?58
One could, for example, ask if there have been languages that don’t 
have a word for being. Or forms of living in the world that escape the 
conception of being, which itself tends to inevitably introduce a form of 
universalism. Isn’t being just another category that orders the world in a 
particular way?
If one wanted to address the question of radical alterity — my refer-
ence here is to Elizabeth Povinelli’s work on the “otherwise” (2014, 2016) 
wouldn’t one then need to venture “after” ontology? Rather than articu-
late an (however alternative) ontology? The challenge would be to build 
“derangements” without referring to “the plane of existence” (Povinelli 
2014). 
I think, for example, of Emmanuel Levinas’s vehement critique of on-
tology as violence in Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence (1981). Or of 
Gilles Deleuze’s radical departure from all ontologies.
“Philosophy,” Deleuze suggested in a conversation with Claire Parnet 
(1977, 56), “is encumbered with the problem of being.” Everything, he la-
ments, revolves around “the verb to be.” His alternative was to instead 
focus on relations. The goal, he told Parnet (ed.), is to show that “relations 
are an autonomous sphere, distinct from . . . existence.” What is more, we 
have to learn to see that “relations are external to their terms!. . . We have 
to make the encounter with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, 
undermine being, topple it over. Substitute the and for is. A and B. The  
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and is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends 
all relations, the path of all relations, which make relations shoot outside 
their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything 
which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole. The and as extra- 
being.”59 Deleuze insists that it is naïve to assume that a multiplicity — 
a thing — “is defined by its elements. What defines it [instead],” he insists, 
“is the and, as something which has its place between the elements or 
between the sets. and, and, and. . . . Things do not begin to live except in 
the middle.”
I wish to state clearly that I have no interest in deriving a program from 
Deleuze, let alone in ontologizing his philosophy of the and.
If I quote Deleuze’s reflection, it is solely because the French philos-
opher problematizes the focus on “being” — and, hence, the obsession 
with ontology — to such a degree that the focus on being loses its self- 
evidence, with the consequence that it becomes possible to wonder out 
loud if there are actually escapes from being: escapes to be found through 
the surprise- producing practice called fieldwork/research.
Could anthropologies after ethnos free the human — the world — from the 
grip of the verb “to be”? Could anthropologists learn to think in terms of 
the middle? Without making the mistake of ontologizing relations?60
What is at stake in asking these questions is not the call for a new gen-
eral theory of relations (or, even worse, an ontology of relations). What is 
at stake, rather, is to expose and question the verb “to be” and to thereby 
open up possibilities for inquiries that are not focused on being (not even 
in terms of becoming or in terms of a historical ontology); inquiries that 
are not conducted to authorize truth claims in terms of being/becoming; 
inquiries that are sensitive to what one could, perhaps, call the always sin-
gular, always irreducible difference between “things” and “being.”61 
It might be that every and is different — so that any ontology of the 
and would fail. Always. So that the task would be to expose oneself and to 
explore the precise forms of these failures. Endlessly.
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OBSERVATION 6
It matters to me to cut loose — to differentiate and to liberate — the study 
of the nonhuman, natural world from the hegemony of ontology. Why? 
Because I wish to maintain the incredibly dynamic openness that the ex-






Most anthropologists take it for granted — and it indeed sounds obvious — that 
fieldwork and ethnography are really synonyms: to be an anthropologist is to 
conduct fieldwork, and to conduct fieldwork is to conduct ethnography.
I am interested in the historicity of this taken- for- grantedness.
When did it become obvious that doing fieldwork meant to do ethnography? 
And why? What event — or what series of events — led to the self- evident equation 
of fieldwork with ethnography? Can one write the history of this self- evidence?
If I raise the question concerning the relation between fieldwork and eth-
nography, it is not least because I am curious about what one could call the 
possibility of “fieldwork after ethnos” (and after “the human”). I wonder what 
happens to fieldwork when anthropologists no longer study ethnos or conduct 
ethnographies? What is the role of fieldwork — if any — when cut loose (liber-
ated) from the study or society and/or culture?1
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Differently put, I am interested in the fragility of the equation of fieldwork 
with ethnography. And my aim is to exploit this fragility.
t wo
Let’s begin with conceptual history. Where do the terms “ethnography” and 
“fieldwork” come from? When do they first appear? Who used them? To what 
ends? 
The term “ethnography” appeared in the late eighteenth century to intro-
duce a new subclass of geographical research. Probably the first to use the term 
was Gerhard Philipp Heinrich Normann (1753 – 1837), a German Staatswissen-
schaftler and statistician. Normann suggested that geography came in one of 
three forms: mathematical geography, physical geography, or political geogra-
phy. Ethnography he defined as a subclass of political geography.2
I thus note that the term “ethnography” was originally introduced to refer 
to a practice — a curiosity — that belongs to the broad field of natural history.
The term “fieldwork” is of much more recent datum. With respect to an-
thropology it was first used (in a systematic sense at least) in the early twen-
tieth century, in the writings of British social anthropologists — I notably 
found the term in the writings of Bronisław Malinowski (1884 – 1942) and his 
students — who sought to methodologically ground ethnography.
“Fieldwork” emerged as a qualifier of “ethnography.”
What event, though, or what trajectory of events, led Malinowski and his 
students to argue, with vehemence, that the only proper form of ethnography 
was fieldwork? And what did they mean by “ethnography,” what by “fieldwork”?
My research led me to think that the condition of the possibility for the en-
counter between ethnography and fieldwork was prepared gradually, in com-
plicated, haphazard, and unintentional ways, in the period between the late 
1890s and the early 1920s.
There was nothing straightforwardly obvious about this encounter. The 
concept of fieldwork- based ethnography wasn’t a future anticipated in the 
past — a vanishing point that teleologically organized the history of anthropo-
logical research and that eventually resulted in a breakthrough to the truth. 
On the contrary, it was an unanticipated — a sweeping — event, one for which 
many contemporaries were unprepared, one that radically reconfigured what 
anthropology in theory and practice was about.
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three
Up until the late nineteenth century, anthropological research came in roughly 
one of two forms — expeditions to (from a European perspective) faraway lands 
or the largely home- based reconstruction of various features of the early his-
tory of what was then called “mankind.”3
Expeditions. In its modern sense as “journey undertaken by a group of people 
with a scientific or explorative purpose,” the term “expedition” emerged only 
at the turn from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century.4 Initially, it re-
ferred to voyages undertaken with an interest in discovering unknown lands 
for economic purposes (think, for example, of the travels that led to the Brit-
ish East India Company).5 Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, 
the term was increasingly used for scientific explorations, specifically for the 
cartographical mapping of coastlines and geographical surveys of the flora 
and fauna of unknown regions of the earth. The exemplary reference here 
is to Captain Cook’s voyages in the Pacific Ocean (1768 – 71, 1772 – 75, and 
1776 – 79).6 At the turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, Eu-
ropean expeditions then shifted focus and targeted primarily South Amer-
ica (think Alexander von Humboldt) and inner Africa (think David Livings-
ton). And in the late nineteenth century, finally, the North and South Pole 
were explored (recall that Franz Boas, in 1883, went to Baffin Island as a 
geographer).7
What form did anthropological knowledge production take during these 
expeditions?
Usually the expeditions included young scholars and artists trained as bot-
anists or physicians — figures such as Johann Foster (1729 – 1798) and Georg 
Forster (1754 – 1794), members of Captain Cook’s second voyage, and heroes of 
von Humboldt and Boas — who became curious about the “savages” and began 
documenting aspects of their lifestyle. The form this documentation took was 
the one they, as zoologists and botanists, had available: they sketched (and oc-
casionally also measured) the physiognomies of the people they visited, just 
as they sketched the plants and birds they encountered; they draw up maps 
of the architecture and of the villages; they collected, mostly in an unsystem-
atic, random fashion, material goods and myths and songs; and, occasionally, 
they also captured people and sent them home for further examination and 
exhibition.8 
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Reconstruction. Next to the expeditions, there were the armchair reconstruc-
tions of the early history of mankind. It is interesting to compare the authors 
of these reconstructions — for example, Robert Latham (1812 – 1888), John 
McLennan (1827 – 1881), Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815 – 1887), Friedrich Müller 
(1834 – 1898), and Henry Maine (1822 – 1888) — with the collectors who joined 
expeditions.
If the latter were overwhelmingly naturalists, trained in botany or zoology 
(or science more generally), then the former were overwhelmingly philolo-
gists, experts in the interpretation of ancient texts and artifacts (or philologi-
cally inclined jurists, who studied antiquity to understand the early legal or-
ganization of society). 
It is not that the philologists didn’t travel. However, their professional trav-
els did not lead them to small islands in the Pacific Ocean. As experts on an-
tiquity — in the nineteenth century almost synonymous with “expert on the 
early history of mankind” — they voyaged to Greece or Rome or Egypt or Per-
sia. And in their efforts to reconstruct various features of the ancient world, 
from myths to marriage rules (from property rights to political systems), they 
got interested in the savages as a group of people that would allow them to 
understand the prehistory that led from a somewhat animal- like existence 
to antiquity — and thus began to turn to the collections of texts and artifacts 
provided by the naturalist travelers. Several among the philologists also de-
veloped an elaborate correspondence with missionaries and salesmen spread 
out across the British Empire (one could easily write a media- history of early 
British anthropology: showing how anthropology was contingent on a tightly 
knit network of correspondence that unfolded alongside the extraordinary in-
frastructural expansion of British Royal Mail over the course of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century).
Although brief, my sketch of the emergence and development of forms of an-
thropological knowledge productions allows me to draw two conclusions.
First, beginning in the late eighteenth century, with the success of Captain 
Cook’s voyages, one can see the gradual emergence and consolidation of what 
was an anthropological curiosity in its own right (as the emergence and quick 
spread of the term “ethnography” shows). 
Second, even though anthropology emerged as a curiosity in its own right, 
at the end of the nineteenth century, it had still not emerged as an autono-
mous, distinctive genre of knowledge production; it had not yet differentiated 
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itself, either methodologically or conceptually, from natural history on the one 
hand (zoology, botany, geography), and universal history on the other.
Thus the form anthropology took by the 1890s was ethnography. And the 
term “ethnography” referred to either the collection of artifacts in the tradi-
tion of naturalism or the interpretation of artifacts in the tradition of philol-
ogy. While the philologists partly drew on the work of the naturalists, the two 
forms of expertise were largely set apart from one another. 
The event that would prepare the possibility for this nineteenth- century 
conception of anthropology — of ethnography — to break open was yet another 
expedition: the 1898 – 99 Cambridge expedition to the Torres Strait.9
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The Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Strait was designed 
and directed by Alfred C. Haddon (1855 – 1940), a zoologist who specialized in 
marine life forms. In the late 1880s, Haddon, at that time professor of zoology 
in Dublin, had joined an expedition that aimed to explore the flora and fauna 
of the area between New Guinea and Australia referred to as the Torres Strait. 
His specific task was the study of life around coastal coral reefs. It was while 
standing knee- deep in the ocean collecting algae that Haddon became curious 
about anthropology (Haddon et al. 1935, xi):
I was in close contact with the islanders, especially when dredging and 
collecting algae. Naturally, when opportunity offered, I spoke with them 
about their past and soon found that the young men knew extremely 
little about it and always referred me to the old men. I had previously 
found that none of the Europeans in the island knew or cared anything 
about the customs of the natives. . . . I therefore considered it my duty to 
collect as much as was possible . . . , so I induced the old men to come in 
the evenings and talk about old times and tell me their folk- tales.
After his return to the United Kingdom, Haddon began writing anthropology 
papers — and sought to convince colleagues of the necessity of a carefully 
planned scientific expedition that would systematically study the life and 
customs of the islanders of the Torres Strait. Haddon was plagued by a sense of 
urgency: he had no doubt that civilization would destroy the ancient societies 
forever, and his plan was to collect their folk tales, take pictures of their 
rituals, record their songs, film their ceremonies, and systematically collect 
material artifacts.10
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In 1898, Haddon finally found a donor, and the expedition took off. Aside 
from Haddon, the crew was composed of Sydney H. Ray (1858 – 1939, a phi-
lologist) and Charles Seligman (1873 – 1940, a physician who studied native 
medicine), as well as William Halse Rivers Rivers (1864 – 1922), William Mc-
Dougall (1871 – 1938), and Charles S. Meyers (1873 – 1946) (three physicians 
and psychologists who were charged to study “the mental characteristics of 
primitive people”; Meyers also documented native instruments and music), 
and Anthony Wilkin (1871 – 1901, an archeologist).
On the one hand, the voyage to the Torres Strait was little more than yet 
another nineteenth- century expedition. Haddon had designed the journey as if 
it were a botanical or zoological trip: the aim was to survey and to collect — to 
collect specimens that one could arrange and rearrange back home, thereby 
carefully reconstructing the early evolution of mankind.
On the other hand, the expedition was a most powerful departure from 
its predecessors: while almost every other scientific expedition of the nine-
teenth century was focused on a broad set of naturalistic curiosities, from car-
tography to astronomy, from botany to ethnography, Haddon had organized 
his voyage exclusively around anthropological questions: the salvaging of the 
disappearing culture of the primitives. A hardly ever noticed but retrospec-
tively far- reaching consequence of this exclusive focus was the transfer of a 
vocabulary initially developed for studies in natural history to anthropology. 
Indeed, it was only with the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the 
Torres Strait that, however implicitly, the assumption emerged that anthropol-
ogy was a “field science” — a field science in its own right, independent from 
natural history.11
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Among the younger members of Haddon’s team, the experience of “the field,” 
coupled with the exclusive focus on anthropological questions, led to an aware-
ness of how far off were the speculations of the philologists (and jurists) about 
primitives. Charles Seligman and Rivers in particular stressed upon their return 
to England that any future anthropology had to be understood as a field science, 
that is, it had to be grounded in firsthand empirical research experience.
Differently put, they sought to ground the reconstructive efforts of the phi-
lologists and lawyers in the expedition- based knowledge of the field.
As if to prove their point, both Seligman and Rivers, independently from 
one another, undertook a whole series of further anthropological researches.
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Seligman first worked in New Guinea, as member of the Daniel Ethnographi-
cal Expedition (which resulted in his Melanesians of British New Guinea, 1910), 
and then, together with his wife, Brenda Seligman, undertook government- 
sponsored survey studies of Ceylon (The Veddas, 1911) and the Sudan (The 
Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan, 1932).12
While Seligman’s work remained much indebted to nineteenth- century 
conceptions of ethnography — he may have stressed “the field,” but the field 
mattered only insofar as it allowed for the empirically saturated classification 
of “races” and the comparison of customs — Rivers’s continued anthropological 
research led him to articulate a whole new set of questions.
During the Torres Strait expedition, one of Rivers’s tasks had been to study 
the prevalence of color blindness among the islanders. Curious about heredi-
tary patterns, he asked his interlocutors about their genealogical relations and 
thus discovered, more by chance than by design, the extraordinary richness of 
the islanders’ kinship vocabulary.13 Confronted with the suggestion that people 
had several fathers and mothers, he worked out for himself a genealogical 
method that allowed him to reconstruct “blood ties” versus “affiliation” and 
“adoption” (his terms).14 When in 1901 and 1902 he worked among the Todas 
(living in the Nilgiri Mountains of Southern India), Rivers, sensitized to and 
curious about the rich relational vocabulary of non- Western people, recog-
nized the significance of kinship ties for understanding what he called “the 
system of relations” that seemed to silently organize who was responsible for 
the different elements of a given ceremony (The Todas, 1906).15
Could he draw up this system? And thereby explain the structure of the 
life of the Todas?
Perhaps one has to pause for a moment to appreciate how form- giving Riv-
ers’s “discovery” has been: his recognition of the organization of the whole 
of social life in terms of kinship in 1901 – 2 is one of the key moments in the 
history that would eventually lead to the emergence of classical modern eth-
nography, understood as the fieldwork- based study of a single society (ethnos) 
and its internal social structure.16 As long as customs were specimens to be 
collected and shipped home, an island- hopping expedition was an adequate 
form of anthropological research. However, once customs were windows onto 
the lived enactment of the structure that silently organized the living together 
of individuals, a new, and in the early twentieth century yet undefined and 
unknown, form of research was needed.
Rivers was acutely aware of the need for methodological innovation. He 
knew that merely stressing the importance of “the field” was not enough. 
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What was needed, in addition, was a new definition of what anthropology 
was about.
Rivers’s most explicit effort to provide such a definition was his contribu-
tion to the edition of the Notes and Queries issued by the Royal Anthropological 
Institute in 1912. There he first affirmed that the goal of anthropology is, ulti-
mately, to collect data that would eventually allow one to understand the early 
history of mankind (Rivers would always hold on to this nineteenth- century 
conception of anthropology).17 But he then went ahead and wondered out loud 
if this overall goal wouldn’t require carefully studying single societies and the 
system of relations that organize them, so that one could then later conduct a 
comparative study of their structure of organization. Indeed, Rivers not only 
recommended to future anthropologists that they study one society at a time 
but also encouraged them to study how the natives who belong to these socie-
ties actually see the world.
In a passage that (still) reads like an avant- garde program of experimental 
research, he wrote (I quote at length), 
Above all, never neglect a statement volunteered by a witness indepen-
dently. . . . Leave the main path of the inquiry and follow this side track. 
If the volunteered statement is obscure or even quite unintelligible, so 
much the better; it may and probably does mean that you have been 
put on a track which will lead to something absolutely new and unsus-
pected, while your main path was probably leading to some goal already 
more or less understood and foreseen. . . . To many it will be repugnant; 
the person with an “orderly mind” who believes in probing one subject 
to the bottom before turning elsewhere and cannot suffer interruption 
in his train of thought, will miss much. He will probably complain bit-
terly of the difficulty of keeping the people to the point, not recognizing 
that the native also has a point, probably of far more interest than his 
own. Further, such information is of very great value as evidence, for it 
is certain to follow the native categories of thought.18
In the early 1920s, two young anthropologists who had worked with Seligman 
and with Rivers in particular presented the first empirical studies of a single 
society.
Alfred Reginald Radcliffe- Brown’s (1881 – 1955) The Andaman Islanders (1922) 
was thoroughly indebted to Rivers’s systems approach. Radcliffe- Brown pre-
sented his study — which was grounded in repeated, expedition- like trips to 
“the field” — as an almost mathematical inquiry into social organization typi-
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cal of a group at the very beginning of the history of mankind, at a time when 
neither government nor property were yet known.19
Bronisław Malinowski, though much influenced by both Seligman and Riv-
ers, radically broke with the vision of anthropology upheld by his teachers.20 
He presented his Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) as the beginning of 
an altogether new kind of anthropology, one that was grounded in what he 
called “fieldwork” and that aimed to provide a description of the “inner life 
of a society.”21
Malinowski styled his work as a sweeping departure from the nineteenth 
century. He ridiculed the island- hopping of the naturalists and in particular 
the armchair speculations of the philologists (and lawyers). Their speculations 
on this myth or that ritual, he explained to his perplexed readers, tell us more 
about the authors who offer them than about the actual life of the primitives.22 
Instead of speculating, the task of the “ethnographer” was to carefully study 
the role that a given custom or myth or material artifact played “inside” of a 
given society. Everything the natives did, Malinowski insisted, had its “func-
tion” or “meaning.” And the only way to understand this meaning (function) 
was to conduct “fieldwork,” that is, to learn the language, to take part in the 
everyday life of the natives, living among them, in their midst, “without other 
white men.” The challenge was to immerse oneself in “the imponderabilia of 
everyday life” and to abstract from them the “underlying ideas” that organize 
the actions of the primitives.23
The significance of Malinowski for the history I try to write is that he — 
and with him his many students who conducted “fieldwork- based ethnogra-
phy” — succeeded in decoupling “ethnography” from both evolutionary specu-
lations and speculative reconstructions of the early history of mankind. His 
alternative was the inseparable correlation of ethnography — defined and prac-
ticed by him as the description of the inner life and organization of a society — 
and fieldwork. 
Differently put, Malinowski invented — in a sweeping coup — what became 
self- evident in the course of the twentieth century: that anthropology is field-
work is ethnography.24 Most critical for this becoming self- evident was the 
first cohort of Malinowski’s students, who made ethnography — fieldwork — 
the state- of- the- art method of anthropology. The reference is to Raymond Firth 
(1901 – 2002), Audrey Richard (1899 – 1984), Hortense Powdermaker (1896 – 
 1970), Isaac Schapera (1905 – 2003), Edward E. Evans- Pritchard (1902 – 1973), 
and Meyer Fortes (1906 – 1983), among others.25
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And Radcliffe- Brown?
If Radcliffe- Brown likened anthropology to a natural science busy describ-
ing social structures in the abstract, Malinowski likened anthropology to the 
arts — the challenge was to immerse oneself in the everyday life of a particu-
lar group; to discover, by way of attending to their conversations and habits, 
the “underlying ideas” that structure the natives’ lives; and to then learn how 
to vividly describe, as a novelist describes (as a painter paints) the life of the 
primitive in such a way that the underlying ideas are rendered visible in the 
concrete — without rescue into the abstraction.26
If Radcliffe- Brown had taken from Rivers the interest in social evolution 
and systems of relations, then Malinowski took from Rivers the suggestion 
that “the native also has a point” — and that this point was implicit in his ac-
tions. For Malinowski, “the final goal, of which an ethnographer never should 
lose sight,” was “to grasp the native point of view, his relation to life, to realize 
his vision of his world. We have to study man, and we have to study what con-
cerns him most intimately, that is, the hold which life has on him.”27
Do I really mean to suggest that anthropologists did not conduct fieldwork prior 
to the 1920s? No, if by “fieldwork” one merely means that someone has lived for a 
limited amount of time elsewhere and has written about her observations. Yes, if 
by “fieldwork” one means the disruptive methodological conception of research 
that emerged over the first two decades of the twentieth century and that forever 
changed what anthropology is about.28
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What has been the effect of the emergence, since the late 1990s, of anthropolo-
gies after ethnos on the conception of “fieldwork as ethnography” as it was first 
articulated in the 1920s?
Differently put, what new, what other concepts of fieldwork have emerged 
from, say, studies of immunosuppressants (Lawrence Cohen 2001), Anony-
mous (Gabriella Coleman 2013), neoliberal city planning (Stephen Collier 
2011), marine microbes (Stefan Helmreich 2009), influenza (Celia Lowe 2010; 
Carlo Caduff 2010, 2015), Chernobyl (Adriana Petryna 2002), open- source 
code (Christopher Kelty 2009), Matsutake (Anna Tsing 2015), life in vitro 
(Hannah Landecker 2000, 2002), bioprospecting (Cori Hayden 2003), aids 
(João Biehl 2007), cheese making (Heather Paxson 2012), monkeys (Nicolas 
Langlitz n.d.), curation (Tarek Elhaik 2016), basic income grants (James Fer-
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guson 2015), cinema (Anand Pandian 2015), and censorship (William Maz-
zarella 2013)?29
While it is difficult, and also unwarranted, to provide a single answer to 
the question of what fieldwork after ethnos is about — too wild, too untamed, 
are the still nascent fields of the anthropology after ethnos — it seems that 
one aspect many of the above- cited studies are concerned with is “difference 
in time.”
In my schematic rendering, if anthropology in its form of classical modern 
ethnography was interested in difference in space — in distant others, their al-
ternative social structure and cultural logic — then many of the anthropologies 
after ethnos seem to have replaced this classical interest in spatial difference 
with an intense curiosity about difference in time.
No longer does the anthropologist after ethnos ask “How is it elsewhere?” 
Instead she wonders out loud if something new/different has occurred — an 
event that set in motion a given domain of the real, that changed it, mutated 
it beyond recognition, an event that challenges the constitution of the real as 
we know it as well as the conceptions of the human that lay dormant therein.30
What is the effect of this interest in “difference in time” on the spatial 
category of the field? Why and to what ends does one conduct fieldwork when 
one is no longer conducting ethnography? What notion of the field, what 
concept of anthropology as a field science — if any — has emerged from the 
multitudinous, fieldwork- based studies of difference in time?31
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In my observation, the anthropology interested in difference in time — in 
“events” and “the emergent” — is as radically a field science as has been the 
anthropology interested in difference in space. It upholds, like its more clas-
sical sister variant, the primacy of the field, the field’s particular potential to 
lead astray, to profoundly derail the research questions one has laid out before 
one entered the field — and to thereby produce surprise.32
Fieldwork, for both classical modern ethnography and the anthropology 
after ethnos, is a powerful derailment machine, an opportunity to use the ac-
cidental as a tool for unanticipated discoveries.
However, where research into that which is only emerging differs from 
fieldwork as we know it — where it has provoked a powerful mutation of the 
idea of a field science, of what it is and what it is after — is that derailment is 
set to radically different use.
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For the more classically oriented anthropologists, that is, for those primar-
ily interested in spatial difference (how people live elsewhere), the concept of 
derailment (most often) refers to the accumulative experience that one’s own 
presuppositions — including those one did not even know about — are differ-
ent from those made by the group of people one studies. The methodological 
significance of this experience is its enabling character — it enables the an-
thropologist to become (often through serendipitous accidents) aware of the 
presuppositions others make.
It follows that anthropologists usually assume, first, that a different set 
of underlying ideas organizes the lives of others (which implies that these 
“other ideas” — even if they are nowhere explicitly articulated — objectively 
exist out there, almost in the form of discrete entities to be discovered), and 
second, that derailment amounts to a kind of rerailment, a being rerailed to 
precisely those ideas that organize the culture or society (or the social or cul-
tural phenomenon) one studies.
Rivers’s above- quoted suggestion to follow “volunteered statements,” even 
if they “lead astray,” is a case in point: according to Rivers, this being led 
“astray” is a sure path to the discovery of “the native’s categories of thought” 
(one could also mention here Malinowski’s [1922] talk about “underlying 
ideas” or Geertz’s [1973] suggestion that unarticulated “scripts” organize the 
native’s life).
The significance of an anthropology interested in difference in time — in 
the conceptual turbulences provoked by the new/different — is that it has radi-
cally broken with both these assumptions. To be more precise, it has decoupled 
derailment — the loss of orientation that results from the recognition that one’s 
presuppositions don’t work — from the idea of a rerailment. For where one in-
quires into that which is only emerging (or not even that yet), into that which 
comes into existence only at the moment of fieldwork, into that which is such 
that it escapes the already thought and known, there can be, strictly speak-
ing, nothing one could be rerailed to. Research into the emergent is, quite lit-
erally, research into the open (even if the open occurs in very concrete fields 
and forms).
Like a well, the new/different springs forth, bifurcates in all directions, is 
explorative, perhaps wild, almost certainly chaotic and incoherent; it likely has 
not yet given rise to a broad stream in a stable riverbed — and maybe it never 
will, for it may just as well ooze out and disappear. 
The very aim of studying events that open up a difference in time is quite 
literally to capture the openings, the bifurcations, the troubles, the jumping 
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forth, the new causes. At stake is to capture “instances of escape,” that is, situ-
ations in which the established breaks open. At stake as well is a continuous 
derailment by the unexpected ways and forms the new takes. Consequently, 
fieldworkers interested in the emergent are unlikely to be rerailed — for their 
goal is to be gripped by instances of derailment.33
Would it be a gross exaggeration, then, to suggest that the focus on “differ-
ence in time” has cut fieldwork loose from ethnography? And that the unan-
ticipated consequence of this liberation has been that fieldwork has emerged 
as something in itself?
Today, fieldwork is no longer just a means to get at something that is more 
or less independent of it — the “underlying ideas” that supposedly structure the 
native’s life. Instead it is an artful — experimental — technique at the core of 
which are accidents that have the power to disrupt the taken for granted. To 
be more precise, that have the power to open up unanticipated, still emergent 
spaces of marvel and surprise for which no one has words or concepts yet.
In chapter 1, I used the term “philosophical” — or “philosophically inclined” — 
anthropology. As I see it, the cutting loose of “fieldwork” from “ethnography” opens 
up a whole new set of possibilities for encounters between anthropology and 
art: Would it be saying too much to suggest that the possibilities of an empirically 
grounded, fieldwork- based philosophy I try to bring into view with this book — its 
focus on the accidental, its ventures into the irreducibly open, its curiosity about 
emergent forms, its celebration of movement / in terms of movement, its inter-
est in escapes — offers a multitude of unanticipated interfaces between art and 
anthropology (between [some] artists and [some] philosophically inclined anthro-
pologists)? Or that, on the level of technologies, vast, yet- to- be- explored venues for 
conversations and collaborations open up?34
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There has been the occasional critique that when anthropologists entered 
labs, clinics, urban planning offices, and advertisement companies, and thus 
moved closer to cultural studies, science and technology studies, feminism, 
and theory- and history- inspired modes of inquiry, the power of the field got 
abandoned and eventually dried up.
I find such an argument utterly misleading. One may certainly argue that 
the rise to dominance of an anthropology of things modern has outgrown clas-
sical conceptions of the field. Who would doubt that? But it would be spectacu-
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larly wrong to assume that the process of outgrowing traditional conceptions 
of fieldwork as ethnography has implied the end of fieldwork.35 In fact, I would 
argue that the exact opposite has been the case: since the 1990s the practice 
of fieldwork has proliferated in hitherto unknown ways. Anthropologists have 
transformed countless sites into fields that were once thought to be far beyond 
the scope of the discipline.
In short, over the last twenty years or so fieldwork has not disappeared — 
instead anthropologists have spectacularly expanded the possibility of con-
ducting fieldwork. Indeed, in many ways, fieldwork — fieldwork itself — is more 
alive and well today than ever before. 
Perhaps it has never been so exciting and extraordinary, never been so curi-
ous and creatively challenging to practice a field science as it is today.
Do I seriously mean to suggest that when one studies rituals in India, one studies 
space, but if one studies science in Monterey, one studies time? Am I not, thereby, 
however implicitly, reintroducing the old nineteenth- century European equations 
of spatial with temporal difference? Worse, am I not suggesting that those “still” liv-
ing in or bound by “space” have not yet entered “history,” that is, “time?”
I don’t think so. The point I seek to make is that many of the anthropological 
studies that have been published since the early 2000s — whether focused on ritu-
als in India or science in Monterey — did not so much ground in a spatial curiosity 
(How is it in India? How in California?) as in a temporal curiosity: what kinds of rituals 
has the Partition introduced to India? What new conceptions of evolution has the 
microbiology conducted in Monterey opened up?
What defines the focus of the study is less (not primarily) place than — a differ-
ence in time.
84 chapter three
assemblages (or how to study difference in time?)
If the analytical vocabulary anthropology provided traditionally to its 
practitioners was designed to bring into view spatial differences, and if 
at least some anthropologists have broken with this focus on difference 
in space and replaced it with an interest in difference in time — then what 
new kind of analytical tools and concepts have these anthropologists of 
temporal difference come up with?
How can one bring into view — how can one analytically, through field-
work, get a hold of — difference in time?
There are obvious candidates for answering this question. For exam-
ple, over the last two decades anthropologists have in particular used the 
concept of the “event” and “the emergent” to capture temporal differ-
ences.36 Equally prominent have been the concept of the “contemporary” 
or of “the recent past and the near future.”37 Here, however, I want to focus 
on an altogether different concept, “assemblages.”38 
My reference is less to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(whose use of the term agencement in Mille plateaux Brian Massumi once 
translated as “assemblage”) than to a fragment from a conversation be-
tween Bruno Latour and Michel Serres.39
How come, Latour wants to know from Serres, you treat long- dead 
authors as contemporaries?
“In order to say contemporary,” Serres replies, “one must already be 
thinking of a certain time and thinking of it in a certain way. . . . So, let’s put 
the question differently: What things are contemporary? Consider a late 
model car. It is a disparate aggregate of scientific and technical solutions 
dating from different periods. One can date it component by component: 
this part was invented at the turn of the century, another ten years ago, 
and Carnot’s cycle is almost two hundred years old. . . . The ensemble is 
only contemporary by assemblage, by its design, its finish.”40
The ensemble is contemporary only by assemblage. 
Implicit in this formulation is an entire heuristic vocabulary for thinking 
about time in general and about difference in time in particular. Serres, 
however indirectly, suggests that any one moment in time, every instance 
of a here and now, ought be thought of as a temporal composite — as a 
form composed of different (disparate) elements moving in time. Almost 
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as if he were saying, “Imagine the present as a punctum, a snapshot of 
the configuration between independent, freely moving elements at a 
given moment. Imagine further that each one of these elements has its 
own history, its own line of flight, its own speed, and that the connections 
between different elements, in itself perhaps a chance event, structures 
what is possible to think and say.”
To speak of an assemblage, one thus could say, is to relate to the pres-
ent — or some tiny part of it — as if it were a form- in- motion composed of 
a set of different elements (these can be concepts, practices, institutions, 
machines, technologies or people and other things). One could analyze 
each element of this form- in- motion separately (where it came from, how 
it developed). One could trace their individual histories, the speed with 
which they traveled (some are presumably faster, others slower), the as-
semblages they were part of in the past (and maybe still are), and the 
relations they formed. Or one could analyze the history of the relations  
between elements, that is, how they built up over time, how they changed, 
how they became denser or looser, or how the arrival of a new element 
reconfigured all relations and thereby gave the assemblage a new, unan-
ticipated dynamic. One could also analyze the rate(s) at which individual 
elements — or the entire assemblage — mutate.
Take, for example, avian flu.
What a curious — and deadly — assemblage, composed of a long list 
of heterogeneous elements: viruses (as such), poultry farms, the history 
of domestication, biology, birds, migration routes, nesting grounds, riv-
ers and lakes, humans, veterinarians, public health, drug companies, and 
so on.41 
Arguably, the migration routes of birds and drug companies have 
hardly ever been thought of as related, nor have the straightening and 
regulation of rivers and poultry farms. And yet, the hopping of a virus 
between different species connected these — and many more elements 
than I list here — into a closely knit and intricately entangled assemblage 
that is constitutive of avian flu.
In the case of avian flu, thus, the emergence of an assemblage where 
before all there was were loosely (if at all) related lines of flight amounts 
to a massive event.
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Disclaimer.
If I ponder Serres’s reflections here, it is not because I think “Michel 
Serres got it right.” Frankly, I don’t know — and also don’t care — if Serres 
got it right. What interests me here is not truth but rather possibility: the 
possibility of abstracting from a chance formulation — the ensemble is 
only contemporary by assemblage — a heuristically useful analytical vo-
cabulary for an anthropological study of temporal difference.42
What follows are three brief (and tentative) entries that elaborate on 
what I mean by “heuristically useful.”
First, the heuristic value of the concept of an assemblage is that it 
brings the present — understood as a moment in time — into view as 
composed of con- temporary elements (an assemblage), each with its dis-
tinctive moment of origin (some older, some more recent), each moving 
at a different speed — with different kinds of velocity — in different direc-
tions (and each element could be decomposed itself into an assemblage 
of sorts, made up of different kinds of elements, with different origins, 
and so on). 
One primary effect of this rendering of a given moment in time (the 
here and now) as composed of moving elements is that it makes available 
to anthropologists an exuberantly rich vocabulary that is usually associ-
ated with the field of art, from music to painting to photography: compo-
sition, pace, movement, configuration, line of flight, directionality, dynam-
ics, mutation, and speed.
One can now, for example, listen to Bach’s Art of Fugue and begin 
to wonder — qua anthropologist of the here and now, qua de- and re- 
composer of the movements that make up the present — how one could 
single out among the many elements (each an instance of movement) one 
has listed in one’s notebook just two in order to show how they cease-
lessly circle one another, thereby producing the distinctive rhythm of (one 
segment of) life today.
Or one can look at the photography Étienne- Jules Marey — each a 
snapshot of movement, of the unfolding of time captured as motion — 
and wonder what one can learn, for example, from his rendering of the 
flight of a seagull for the analysis of different time lines of the elements 
of an assemblage.
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Or one can look at the paintings of Paul Klee, who continuously de-
scribed his art as an analysis of the ceaseless, inexhaustible movement 
and becoming implicit in plants and animals, in humans and things — as 
the practice of isolating the elements of this movement/becoming and 
of recomposing them into possible and yet unknown figures, figures that 
no one had ever seen.
Once one operates, on a heuristic level, with the term assemblage a 
whole new (and largely unanticipated) set of analytical vocabularies for an 
analysis of movement/in terms of movement becomes available.
What would it take to come up with a compositional analysis of the 
present? With a decoding of lines of flight in a tonal analysis? With a ty-
pography of possible kinds of movement? With an art history of the forms 
relations can take?43
Second, the concept of assemblage leaves behind the figure of “the 
human” and along with it what I have called (chapter 2) the “anthropocen-
tric epistemology” on which anthropology had been built.
fig. 3.1 Johann Sebastian Bach, Art of Fugue, 1751. What can one learn, as field- working 
anthropologist concerned with instances of time composed of lines of flight, from Bach 
about analyzing assemblages? Could one translate the velocity of the different kinds 
of elements of an assemblage into a melody? H. and Fr. Rungs Music Archive, Royal 
Danish Library, Copenhagen. 
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Take avian flu again: humans, birds, nesting grounds, laboratories, gov-
ernments, migration routes, rivers, livestock, viruses, culling machines — 
are these vertical slices of the real, to borrow a phrase from Sandra Hyde 
(2007), human or nonhuman? Are they natural or cultural?44 
Or take swine flu (substitute birds with pigs); or mers (camels); Ebola 
(bats); or sars (palm civets and/or raccoon dogs).45
Who is the author of these configurations?
Anna Tsing’s suggestive answer to this question is that assemblages 
are by and large chance assemblies that exceed any form of human inten-
tionality. Assemblages, consequently, are marked by “patterns of uninten-
tional coordination.” They are “open- ended gatherings” which potentially 
become “happenings” (as when, for example, a virus hops from birds — or 
pigs, camels, bats, palm civets — to humans).46
The assemblage concept — a bit like Althusser’s reinterpretation of 
historical materialism and Foucault’s dispositif — cuts anthropological in-
quiry loose from the exclusive focus on the figure of “the human” as well 
as from its exclusive attention to “human world- making.”47
fig. 3.2 Étienne- Jules Marey, Analysis of the Flight of a Seagull, 1887. Could one equally 
transform the line of flight — the time line — of an element of an assemblage into a 
linear series of photos — or of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs, texts? Etienne- 
Jules Marey/Dépot du Collège de France, Musée Marey, Beaune, France.
fig. 3.3 Paul Klee, Drüber und Empor, 1931. Brush on paper on cardboard, 61.5 × 48.7 
cm. This drawing nicely serves to illustrate the idea of an assemblage as a moving 
form, composed of different — and differently related — elements, each of which can 
itself be disassembled and recomposed. Drüber und Empor. Above and Aloft. Zentrum 
Paul Klee, Bern, Switzerland.
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Three, the assemblage concept allows one to differentiate an anthro-
pological, fieldwork-based inquiry into temporal difference from the 
mode of inquiry called history of science.
A study of conceptual movements in the here and now often relies on 
concepts derived from the history of science, most prominently “rupture” 
and “discontinuity.”48 While these concepts can no doubt be helpful, more 
often than not they are a burden to anthropologists for two reasons.
First, the historians of science who invented the concepts “rupture” 
and “discontinuity” — most famously Gaston Bachelard and Georges 
Canguilhem — were working on the past. That is, they already knew that 
the conceptual breaks they studied had accumulated — gradually or  
suddenly — into major events in the history of science (that is, for the most 
part, why they studied these breaks/ruptures). The anthropologist who 
works in the here and now doesn’t have the comfort of hindsight. On the 
contrary, immersed in the chance encounters of fieldwork, there is no way 
for her to know whether the indices of movement (of change) she care-
fully captures in her notebooks are eventually going to be significant in a 
wider, more general sense.
Second, the concepts “rupture” and “discontinuity” were invented by 
historians and epistemologists to bring into view somewhat totalizing 
events: a rupture (or a discontinuity) serves to identify a breaking point 
that allows one to divide a story into a clear before and after. Again, the 
anthropologist of the here and now, working amid the chaos of fieldwork, 
can never quite know whether or not the changes (the movements) she 
seems to have found amount to a full scale rupture (or event).
If thinking in terms of assemblages — if relating to the present in terms 
of assemblages — is useful, it is not least because it allows to differenti-
ate the study of movement from the study of ruptures (rupture — or  
discontinuity — is not the only form movement can take); it allows one 
to bring into analytical focus movements that unfold below the radar of 
those looking for ruptures — movements that can be interesting and curi-
ous for a whole variety of different reasons. 
For example, a study of an assemblage might be less interested in a 
full- blown rupture than in the transfiguration of a single element of an as-
semblage and the almost undetectable changes in connections between 
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elements that silently change what counts as true or that change the dy-
namic of a whole assemblage without an overt rupture ever occurring.49
Or such a study might be interested in decomposing a taken- for- 
granted truth in an assemblage that never stands still; it might be an effort 
to document the small lines of mutations that continuously but silently 
alter the elements of an assemblage that, on the surface of things, seems 
unchanging and stable. It might as well be an effort to detect how the ar-
rival of a new element reconfigures the pattern of connectivity that seems 
to have governed an assemblage thus far.
Of course, a rupture (discontinuity) can still be the outcome of an-
thropological research — but for a study to be successful or interesting, 
it doesn’t have to be.50
Take (one last example) the difference global health makes.
From the late 1940s to the late 1990s, world health was organized in the 
form of international health (ih). ih was grounded in the old eighteenth- 
century assumption that humanity comes in the form of a family of na-
tions (each nations made up of one society, people, Volk), and that each 
nation has a government, which is responsible for the well- being of its 
society. Consequently, ih was composed of national populations, of na-
tional governments, and of international institutions, notably the who 
(and, since the 1970s, of emergency ngos such as msf).51 For half a century, 
IH was a relatively stable assemblage (though arguably none of the defin-
ing elements ever stood still). In the late 1990s, however, a whole new set 
of institutions and actors dedicated to world health emerged and began 
to speak of global rather than international health: private foundations, 
philanthropies, ngos, and private- public partnerships, many of which po-
sitioned themselves as alternatives to the who. Most famous among them 
are the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Malaria no More, Label Red, the 
cugh, the ihme, and the Clinton Foundation.52
Has the emergence of Global Health been a rupture? Is there a clear- 
cut distinction between a formation called gh and a formation called ih? 
Have the institutions constitutive of ih been rendered obsolete by the 
emergence of gh?
Hardly. The assemblage concept allows one to avoid the either/or logic 
of the rupture concept and to instead focus on how the emergence of new 
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elements decentered elements that were formerly central (think of the ef-
fect of gh on the who) or how they reconfigured the connections between 
elements that defined what was possible and thereby gave rise to new 
venues of action (think of the emergence of private- public partnerships).53
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not history
Isn’t anthropology after ethnos a form of history, then? A history of the 
here and now?54
Precisely not.
A historian, by disciplinary default, will understand the present as a 
historical moment — even if the here and now is a moment of change, of 
turbulence. As history is for her the unfolding of time, and as nothing can 
exist outside of time, everything that is must be thought of as the product 
of history.
An anthropology after ethnos is not dismissive of history — and yet, 
it has radically broken with what one could call a historical mode of rea-
soning (which doesn’t mean to say that it cannot make use of this mode). 
How so?
Well, insofar as the aim of an anthropology after ethnos is to focus on 
that which escapes the already established — which escapes the possibili-
ties implicit in the already thought and known — its focus is precisely not 
on history but on those aspects in the here and now that escape it, that 
cannot be explained by it.
Differently put, anthropology after ethnos is concerned with the un-
anticipated spaces of marvel and surprise that an incidental departure 
from the past opens up (and the reason it is unanticipated is precisely 
because it conceptually escapes the spaces of possibility that had histori-
cally structured the present up until now).
Take, for example, the idea of a “history of the present.” Foucault’s am-
bition, when he developed the history of the present, was to show how 
unlikely our contemporary categories of thought were until very recently, 
how much needed to happen to make them plausible, and, indeed pos-
sible. He was concerned with the present — he wanted to relieve the here 
and now of the already thought and known — but his intellectual tools 
where those of a historian: Foucault brought today into view as a product 
of yesterday.
To the anthropologists after ethnos, things look quite different: where 
Foucault writes the history of the present, the anthropologist after ethnos /  
interested in difference in time is interested in precisely those aspects of 
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the here and now that escape the present of which Foucault has been 
writing the history. There is a vast gap, an abyss, between the field of his-
tory and the field explored by the anthropology after ethnos.
If one were to equate history with the timely, that is, with that which 
has existed in time, then the actual is not that which exists outside of 
time, as if it were an eternal realm, but the untimely. And this is precisely 
the challenge of the anthropology of the actual: to get at things untimely.
I cannot refrain from pointing out another powerful difference between 
the history of the present and the anthropology after ethnos: perhaps 
both seek, in their distinct ways, to liberate the present from the past. But 
can the historian of the present ever move beyond, well, the present? That 
is, can she ever depart from the categories of thought of which she writes 
the history? To ask the question is to answer it: the limit of the history of 
the present is that it remains part of the formation it problematizes. 
Not so with the anthropology after ethnos: as a fieldwork- based mode 
of inquiry, it is focused on that which escapes the present understood as 
product of the past; it moves forward, it leaves behind, it explores new, 
unanticipated spaces of possibility that are still nascent, emergent, not 
yet — and perhaps never — stabilized.55
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epochal (no more)
“You say you are interested in temporal differences. But if you sort time 
into a before and an after, then isn’t it going to amount to a claim of ep-
ochal divides?”
The frequency with which I was asked this question, or some version 
thereof, has been a powerful reminder of just how sensitive anthropolo-
gists are to any interest in “difference in time.”
How come?
On the one hand, there is the general implausibility of any sharp ep-
ochal ruptures — of the suggestion that clear- cut fault lines set apart con-
ceptually coherent epochs from one another.
On the other hand — and for the discipline much more form giving — 
 the reservation against epochal arguments is explained by the critique 
of the many ways in which anthropology has been contingent on and 
complicit with philosophies of history that have explained spatial differ-
ences (how people live elsewhere) in terms of a linear understanding of 
human history as progress (they still live in our past). The reference here 
is to Frantz Fanon (1961), Kathleen Gough (1967), Gerard Leclerc (1972), Talal 
Asad (1973), Bob Scholte ([1973] 1999), and Diane Lewis (1973); to Edward 
Said (1978), Johannes Fabian (1983) Fritz Kramer (1977), Dipesh Chakrabarty 
(2000), and Gayatri Spivak (1987, 1990). Through these critiques an acute 
political problematization of the articulation of any temporal differences 
has become a feature of anthropology.
What I have described as fieldwork- based anthropology after ethnos 
is deeply informed by both of these critiques. 
First, if one thinks of the present in terms of assemblages — of con-
temporaneity — and if one thinks about change in terms of the nonlinear, 
multifaceted temporal movements (plural) of the various heterogeneous 
elements that make up any assemblage, then how could one maintain 
the illusion of the epochal? That is, the assumption that there are clear- cut 
ruptures that divide the world au total into a clear- cut before and after?
The mutations of the possible that an anthropology interested in tem-
poral differences brings into focus have nothing of the grandeur of the 
epochal. No wave that washes away a face drawn in the sand at the edge 
of the sea — and then everything is different.
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Second, at stake in a fieldwork- based anthropology after ethnos is 
hardly the establishment of a philosophy of history — neither in terms of 
the temporal mediation of spatial difference (the localization of people 
who live differently from us in our past) nor with respect to the consolida-
tion of a unified schema of the history of humanity (from the state of na-
ture to the present). What is at stake, instead, are instances of temporal dif-
ference that disrupt the conceptual presuppositions that have rendered 
possible given fields of knowledge — not least the field of history (or the 
history of humanity) itself.
Provocatively put, rather than establishing histories, the anthropology 
of temporal difference exposes and thereby undermines — as an end in  
itself — the very condition of possibility of any history. A bit as if the an-
thropology of temporal difference were a revolt against the conceptual-
ization of temporal difference as history. 
4
on the actual
(rather than the emergent)
Philosophy always arrives too late. . . . As the thought of the world,  
philosophy appears only in the period after the actual. . . . When philosophy  
paints its grey in grey, then a configuration of life has grown old, and cannot be 
rejuvenated by this grey in grey, but only understood; the Owl of Minerva  
takes flight only as the dusk begins to fall.
hegel, Philosophy of Right
one
Could one argue that, today, the limits of philosophy — its coming too late, its 
undifferentiated grey in grey — define the potential of anthropology? Precisely 
insofar as anthropology, or at least the anthropology after ethnos, understands 
itself as a study of — as the thought of — the colorful explosions of the actual?1
In closing, I want to address this question by offering a sketch, still tenta-
tive, of one particular variant of an anthropology after ethnos — the anthro-
pology of the actual.2 
What, exactly, do I mean by “the actual”?
Perhaps the best way of taking up this question is to belittle it, to keep it 
small. At stake is no ontology (nor, as Hegel had it, a philosophy of history). 
Whether the actual exists or not, whether it is or isn’t a reality sui generis, is 
of no relevance. At stake in my sketch is not a substantive argument about 
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the world. At stake, rather, is the attempt to bring into view a particular kind 
of anthropological inquiry, one that isn’t grounded in an effort to get at how 
things really are but rather in a particular way of relating to things in motion 
(in the register of the actual).3
I approach my challenge in the form of a theft: like a thief, I silently enter 
the work of a small set of authors and steal from them formulations — unre-
lated fragments of thought — that, if arranged in certain ways, allow me to 
bring into view what I mean by “the actual.”4
What matters is neither hermeneutics nor disinterestedness. What matters, 
rather, is the subtle art of decontextualization and appropriation.
t wo
I begin with the writings of Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984). 
In a late article, “Qu’est ce que les lumières?,” Foucault notes that Imman-
uel Kant had a somewhat curious concept of the Enlightenment. To make his 
point, Foucault concentrates on an essay the German philosopher sent to the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift, a periodical that in 1784 had encouraged its readers to 
submit essays that would answer the question “Was ist Aufklärung?” In this es-
say, Foucault explains, Kant defined the Enlightenment as “neither a world era 
to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the dawn-
ing of an accomplishment.” Instead the question — What is Enlightenment? — 
was taken up by Kant as a question of pure actuality: “La question,” Foucault 
writes, “concerne la pure actualité.”5
Though what does Foucault mean by “pure actuality”?
Kant, Foucault elaborates, was trying to understand the present in its own 
right and in its terms, that is, in its actuality. What this means, he goes on to 
say, is that Kant wasn’t “seeking to understand the present on the basis of a 
totality or of a future achievement” (Foucault 1984, 34), as if they were part of 
a bigger whole of which it was unaware — or as if it were merely an instance on 
the way to a predefined future. Instead, Kant interpreted the present as an exit 
(Ausgang) — perhaps a better translation would have been “departure” — from 
everything that has been. Kant, Foucault writes, was “looking for a difference: 
the difference today makes with respect to yesterday” (34).6
For Foucault, then, the actual is the difference the present makes. To bring 
the actuality of the present into view, to show that and in what precise form 
it differed from the singular formation that reigned before, this was the chal-
lenge Foucault had set himself. At least that’s what he said in 1984.
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Foucault offers little more than a first, almost clumsy, and in any case in-
sufficient sense of what “the actual” could mean. An opportunity to change 
this — to broaden and simultaneously refine the concept of the actual I seek 
to elaborate — I found in the writings of two authors who have never used the 
term in any conceptual way but in whose works one can hear resound, like 
one can hear an echo resound, Foucault’s notion of a pure actuality: Gaston 
Bachelard (1884 – 1962) and Georges Canguilhem (1904 – 1995).
What if one exposes Foucault’s notion of the actual in the works of Bach-
elard and Canguilhem?
A central theme of Bachelard’s work was what he referred to as the “epis-
temological rupture” that set apart everyday conceptions of the real from the 
scientifically real.7
Up until the early twentieth century, Bachelard argued — in well over twenty 
books — that the real was either understood as constructed (Bachelard called 
this school of thought “idealism”) or as (“materialism”). However, in the early 
twentieth century, specifically with Einstein’s sketch of the theory of relativity 
in 1905 and the subsequent formulation of quantum physics, a conception of 
the real emerged that radically escaped the two established philosophical un-
derstandings of the real. Quantum physics, according to Bachelard, produced 
knowledge not of things as they exist in nature (he spoke of a “continuity of 
substance”) but of things that were constituted by thought and made material 
by experiments (his favorite example of what he called “reified theorems” were 
isotopes produced by the cyclotron and then identified by mass spectrometry). 
In his words: “The trajectories which allow us to separate the isotopes in the 
mass spectrometer don’t exist in nature; one has to produce them technically. 
They are reified theorems.”8
If Bachelard repeatedly stressed that the knowledge of quantum mechanics 
defied both materialism (primacy of matter) and idealism (primacy of ideas), 
that was because he was adamant that the history of science was a kind of 
philosophical effort to document the formation and contemporary state of the 
human mind: Bachelard considered it his task to ceaselessly map shifts and 
discontinuities in the conceptual and experimental constitution of the real. 
This task implied the challenge of rendering visible how the new outgrew the 
already established and thereby opened up a need for new concepts and modes 
of understanding.9
Canguilhem, concerned with biology rather than with physics, radicalized 
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and multiplied Bachelard’s rupture concept. Where Bachelard was ultimately 
concerned with one rupture only — the rupture provoked by the new scientific 
spirit — Canguilhem argued that discontinuity was a general feature of the 
growth of biological knowledge.
Progress, for Canguilhem, was possible. However, progress was not a linear 
process, “a mere increase in volume, achieved by adding new insights to the al-
ready known.” Instead, progress came in the form of epistemological ruptures. 
A new knowledge, according to Canguilhem, is new precisely insofar as it is con-
ceptually incommensurable with the logical coherence that organized previous 
knowledges. Thus the new will inevitably undermine a taken-for- granted- truth, 
will transform it into a relic of a time when we did not yet know.10
Consequently, Canguilhem regarded the history of knowledge as one of 
fractures, of new beginnings, of novel entry points, each of which was a radical 
cut, introducing a sharp incommensurability that equaled the emergence of 
a new, hitherto unknown constitution of one region — or domain — of reality. 
He found himself most intrigued, he wrote (2005, 53), with “times in which 
scientific progress is exploding, blasting traditional epistemology.”11
What is the effect of the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem on our concept 
of the actual?
If looked at from the perspective of the two historians of science, it appears 
that Foucault’s notion of a pure actual retained a sense of epoch. Even though 
Foucault departed from the philosophy of history, the differences he brought 
into view — he spoke of modernity, of reason, of Man — were of a rather grand 
scale and had a rather longue durée: Foucault was concerned with Western 
reality as such — and his “actual” was a somewhat coherent temporal period 
(modernity) that came into existence in the form of an epistemic event/rup-
ture between 1780 and 1800 and unfolded, if in complicated ways, up until 
his time.
Almost the inverse is the case for Canguilhem. Not that he — or Bachelard — 
wasn’t concerned with Western reality. However, the ruptures Canguilhem or 
Bachelard brought into view were of a smaller scale and more region- specific. 
What was breaking open was not a new period of the Western world, the ad-
vent of a new configuration of reality, but rather a fracture in one or several 
categories of knowledge constitutive of a particular domain of the real. 
At stake is no longer one grand rupture occurring at the end of the classi-
cal age, the detonation waves of which we still can feel, waves that gave form 
to our bodies and the categories of our minds (or to the very concepts of body 
and mind). At stake, rather, is a multitude of regional fissures and fractions.12 
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Canguilhem and Bachelard, then, regionalize reality and thereby multiply 
the ruptures — the events. 
A consequence of this regionalization and multiplication is that the actual 
no longer exists in the singular but in the plural. It still refers to the breaking 
open of what was — but this “open” now no longer refers to the difference a 
somewhat coherent temporal period makes; rather, it refers to the multiple 
regional instances of the breaking open of the real, the blasting open of novel 
spaces, past and present, each one an elsewhere or elsewise, escaping estab-
lished ways of thinking and knowing, and constituting new ones.
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I embark on the last chapter of my nonlinear theft tour as I turn, with the help 
of Canguilhem, to Henri Bergson (1859 – 1941) and Gilles Deleuze (1925 – 1995).
Perhaps the most powerful way of circumscribing the notion of fractures 
Canguilhem has offered was his scathing critique of the search for precursors. 
“The inclination to search for precursors, to find and celebrate them,” he re-
marked in a talk to fellow historians of science (2005, 34), “is a sure indicator of 
the incapacity of an epistemological critique.” It is a sign of incapacity precisely 
insofar as the possibility of looking for a precursor — that is, for someone who 
already knew what we only know now — was apparently dependent on the cur-
rent state of knowledge of a given field. At a previous time, when other truths 
reigned, one would have written a different history, would have assembled a 
different line of precursors. Hence, the task of the epistemologist was not to 
look for precursors — because there are no precursors — but to document how 
a new discovery, that is, the emergence of a new truth, inevitably amounted 
to a rupture with the established understanding and arrangement of the past.
Canguilhem’s critique of the precursor is reminiscent of Henri Bergson’s 
critique of the concept of “the possible.”
Most philosophers assume, wrote Bergson (1946, 25), “that . . . the possi-
bility of things predates their coming into existence,” as if “the possible were 
present throughout, waiting, like a ghost, for the hour of its appearance.”
According to Bergson, this was naïve. It was naïve, first, because it missed 
the factual, the continuous emergence of the genuinely new, that is, of the 
phenomena that undermine and escape what was, at a given time, considered 
“possible.” It was naïve, as well, because it missed the fact that “our ordinary 
logic is a retrospective logic; it cannot help but project the presently real, re-
duced to possibilities, into the past” (Bergson 1946, 26).
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The reason I turn to Bergson here is that, in sharp contrast to the episte-
mologists, his critique of the possible did not lead him to a philosophy of rup-
tures (as if one formation of the possible would be replaced by another, differ-
ently structured one). He was not unsympathetic to Bachelard’s work — they 
were contemporaries — and yet he ultimately viewed his epistemology as a half 
movement in thought: it is not “the fixed placed side by side with the fixed . . . 
that is real,” he wrote in a passage that reads as if directed toward Bachelard, 
“on the contrary, it is the flux, the continuity of transition, it is change itself 
that is real” (1946, 15).
For Bergson, the epistemologists focused too narrowly on the emergence 
of new formations. All they cared about was the succession of logically in-
commensurable epistemological units. They could go back and forth between 
them, could explore and explain their incommensurability — but they had never 
managed to discover that these formations were not formations but rather 
snapshots of ongoing, ceaseless movement. For Bergson, theirs was a staccato 
philosophy of movement. Though he aimed for more: couldn’t one think of 
movement as such? Movement rather than ruptures?
I abandon Bergson here — his ultimately ontologizing effort to think of 
movement as the real is of no relevance for my endeavor — and instead turn to 
Deleuze, who has taken up Bergson’s critique of the possible, without follow-
ing the philosophy of the élan vital. 
It is telling, for example, that where Bergson contrasted the possible with 
“the real,” Deleuze dropped the real and instead contrasted the possible 
with — the actual. In many of his writings Deleuze explained with vehemence 
that he doesn’t care much about philosophers who are interested in the pos-
sible, meaning that the possible is already inherent in things as they are, that 
he rather is interested in those who contemplate the “actual,” a term that he 
used to refer to the open — the movement — that becomes visible when an old 
possible is set in motion, when a new, unanticipated possibility emerges.13
Deleuze, contrary to Bergson, did not try to think of movement — the 
actual — in the abstract. Rather, he was a philosopher of the concrete — the ac-
tual cannot be found independent of those situations in which a concrete for-
mation is breaking open, in which the elements constitutive of a possible are 
entering a period of movement.
The task of the philosopher, for Deleuze (and for Félix Guattari) was to 
capture something of this movement, and to render it visible even in a stable, 
on- the- surface- of- things unmoving formation. The challenge was to capture 
something of the actual.
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Bergson and Deleuze allow me to modify the concept of the actual in an im-
portant way. For Foucault — and through him, for Canguilhem and Bachelard — 
the actual came into view as the difference a new formation has introduced 
vis- à- vis an older one. The actuality of a new formation consisted in its logi-
cal — or epistemic — incommensurability with the previous formations, in its 
breaking open a new space of thought. 
After Deleuze (and with Bergson and Guattari), the actual still refers to 
ruptures/events — but these ruptures/events are now decoupled from the rise 
of a successor formation. In fact, the event is no longer the falling apart of a 
formation itself, nor is it the emergence of some new formation, but rather it 
is the becoming visible of a radical openness, a radical sense of movement that 
reigns, perhaps only briefly, when what has seemed possible is undermined, 
when the world as we knew it breaks open and nothing new yet appears in 
the place of the old.
Call it irreducible openness. Call it ceaseless, inexhaustible movement. Call 
it, with Guattari and Deleuze (1994, 5), the “always new.”
five
And anthropology?
An anthropology of the actual would be a mode of inquiry grounded in the 
effort to capture instances of — the actual. It would conduct fieldwork — would 
immerse itself in the world — to find out if (some of) the categories that or-
der our knowledge, that are constitutive of the human and the nonhuman 
as we know it, are breaking open, with the effect that the human and/or the 
nonhuman lose their coherence. And it would describe such fieldwork- based 
instances — such episodes — for the sole purpose of capturing something of 
the indeterminable movement that reigns in such moments of irreducible 
openness.
The challenge of conceiving of such an inquiry into the actual is to come 
up with an altogether different kind of anthropology, an anthropology that is 
not — strictly speaking — concerned with the production of knowledge (be it 
ethical or existential). Nor with concept work. Not that the anthropology of the 
actual shies away from knowledge (or from concept work). It doesn’t. In fact, it 
is very much concerned with knowledge — with the possibility of knowledge 
and how these possibilities change, mutate, get reconfigured, or get dissolved. 
But precisely insofar as the anthropologist of the actual would immerse herself 
in scenes of everyday life to find instances of nonteleological movement — 
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of change, mutation, reconfiguration, dissolution — the knowledge it produces 
does not itself refer to any stable, object- like formation out there that could be 
known.14 Rather, its knowledge comes in the form of recognitions, of open-
ings, of surprises, of discoveries, of derailments.15
Its objects of analysis are instances in which objects dissolve (or mutate).
The anthropologist of the actual is not interested in discovering things as they really 
are (or as they are elsewhere). Instead she conducts fieldwork to discover instances 
in which the assemblages that have been unwittingly constitutive of things are sud-
denly exposed and fall apart into the bits and pieces out of which they had once 
been assembled.
Could one get a hold of these bits and pieces while they are in motion? Before 
they are reassembled in any (coherent) way?16
Likewise, the anthropology of the actual doesn’t shy away from inventing con-
cepts. But the concepts it invents are not the generalizations on which others 
could then build their research, which they could develop further, so that grad-
ually a conceptual foundation for scientific investigation would be provided. 
Rather, its concepts are meant to capture something of that which escapes.
Its concepts aspire to be — quoting Guattari and Deleuze’s felicitous phrase 
again — “always new.”
A negative way of interpreting the kind of anthropological endeavor I 
sought to outline here is to call it a limit approach: it exposes its concepts of 
knowledge, of thought, of living in order to indicate their limits. 
A positive way of circumscribing the anthropology of the actual would be 
to say that fieldwork as exposure gives rise to observations — to anecdotes, 
observations, surprises, discoveries — that enable the researcher to move be-
yond the mapping of limits and antinomies and to capture the order of things 
themselves in motion, to capture movement, the play of movement at work.17
An observation.
The actual is a plurale tantum; it comes in many forms, none of which is reduc-
ible to any other one. The actual, like movement — or the open — does not exist in 
the abstract, independent of what is moved. It is a relational, not an ontological, 
mode (functional, not substantive). Consequently, the actual — as if it were some 
universal realm behind or inbetween things — does not exist. Every claim in that 
direction would be a time- and- place- specific abstraction that would sooner or later 
be set in motion.
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Hence, my description of the anthropology of the actual as a relational mode 
of inquiry.18
six
In its focus on the nonteleological, the anthropology of the actual radically dif-
fers from the broad formation of the anthropology of the emergent. Both kinds 
of projects — the study of the actual and the study of the emergent — might fo-
cus on scenes of conceptual turbulence. However, they immerse themselves in 
these scenes to radically different (though not necessarily incommensurable, 
potentially even complimentary) ends. 
In a way, the actual is implicit in the emergent — but the emergent is incom-
mensurable with the actual. 
Those interested in the emergent are intrigued by the gradual (or sudden) 
emergence of a successor formation. In sharp contrast, the anthropologist of 
the actual is indifferent to the emergence of a new stable form, whether one 
calls this new form a “dispositif” or an “apparatus,” whether one speaks about 
infrastructure or the construction of new technical systems or the rise of a 
novel actor- network or — I could go on.
It is not that these approaches would not be interesting. And yet, for those 
who care about the actual, all these approaches have one flaw — their research 
is (however implicitly) teleologically structured. The anthropologists of the 
emergent conduct research in order to identify the final formation that will 
eventually — emerge. Thus, they are (remain) blind to movement as such, to 
nonteleological movements that reign when old concepts no longer work, that 
render words and things instable. For all those interested in successor forma-
tions, movement itself, movement as such, movement for movement’s sake 
does not matter. It is mere noise one can ignore.
But what if the goal were to capture movement as such? Movement for 
movement’s sake?
A sensibility for the actual opens up an analytical space — and project — 
where those interested in the emergent see and find nothing. Or, to be more 
precise, analytical spaces and projects, in the plural.
Thus the task of the anthropologist of the actual is not to get a hold of the 
coming into existence of a new formation, call it the putting in place of a new 
possible (of new concepts, of new categories of knowledge and thought, new 
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orders of words, things, and the human) — but rather to capture something of 
the open that reigns when an old formation crumbles, to capture movement as 
such (as an end in itself) or, differently put, words and things that are émouvé. 
One could increase the distance between the actual and the emergent even 
further. 
Isn’t it precisely one of the most powerful findings of the anthropology 
of the actual that, at least to date, no concept, no category, was ever stand-
ing still? Isn’t it one of its major observations that movements — noise — occur 
not only when an old possible breaks open? That even a given possible is, 
underneath the surface, moved? And isn’t it precisely one of the aims of the 
anthropology of the actual to render visible such movements in the apparently 
unmoved? The untimely in the timely?
From the perspective of the anthropology of the actual, then, the interest 
in the emergent is (potentially) caught in an eternal structure- antistructure- 
structure schema that can give rise only to a chronicle of successor formations. It 
is a residue of the epochal and thus, ultimately, of a linear philosophy of history.19
seven
What effect does a sensibility for the actual have on the anthropologist?
The question may seem odd and yet, the practice of attending to the actual 
has powerful consequences. 
For example, from the perspective of the actual each and any concept, each 
and any category, comes into view as fragile — as potentially but a fleeting, 
temporary formation, the product of a regional history of thinking and know-
ing that is constitutive of the things it thinks and knows, a history that will 
sooner or later fail in the face of this or of that event.
The consequence is that the anthropologist of the actual cannot — though 
let me say that no one ought to be reducible to one kind of anthropology only, 
actual or otherwise — engage in the production of knowledge that naively mis-
takes the things constituted by one’s intellectual presuppositions for things 
objectively existing out there. From the perspective of the actual, the things 
“out there” are not really things out there but constitutions made possible by 
an order of thought, and with each mutation of this order of thought the things 
it made possible will mutate as well.
These things include the human thing.
Likewise, the anthropologist of the actual cannot — no longer — participate 
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in the effort to foster general analytical concepts that would then, once and for 
all, guide inquiry and eventually allow building the house of truth.
Culture (or the cultural), subjectivity (or the subject), society (or the so-
cial) — these are not facts about but (contingent) constitutions of the human. 
There is nothing obvious about these concepts, nothing necessary. There have 
been different ones before, and it is likely that others will follow.
The anthropologist of the actual can no longer naively work with them, as if 
they were a given. She cannot, because for her, the critical distance opened up 
by the actual — the space of the untimely in the timely — has become the con-
dition of the possibility of genuine anthropological work, that is, of the work 
of thought on thought, conducted — by way of fieldwork/research — in order 
to find instances of the breaking open of the established, in order to capture 
something of the movements constitutive of this openness. 
She has become blasé by timeless concepts. She has become blasé — one 
grand ennui — by concepts that are blind to their own timeliness.
Governmentality, biopolitics, subjectivity, life itself, technologies of the 
self, the social, apparatuses, the body, nature or nature cultures, bare life, suf-
fering, flexibility, homo sacer, neoliberalism, people — I could go on.
She cannot help but look at these concepts as opportunities to provoke — as 
invitations to tease, to wonder out loud, to undermine, to conduct research to 
find and render visible the actual, that is, that which upsets these concepts, 
and renders them, ultimately, useless.
And politics?
For the anthropologist of the actual every political program (just like every 
moral doctrine and every theory of knowledge) will lose the giveness it has for 
those who commit to it. Her activism is not timely — but untimely. The way forward, 
for her, is to withdraw from participating in these programs and to instead map the 
contingencies that gave rise to them, the events, surprises, and discoveries that es-
cape them and set them in motion, and will eventually undermine them. The way 
forward, for her, is to find movement, to be found by it, to release it, to set in motion.
Could one call this kind of anthropological inquiry political?20
Provocation is a side effect of the joy of liberation the anthropology of the ac-
tual amounts to. A provocation to all those who practice the human sciences 
(anthropology) in the name of the irrefutable, of knowledge, of certainty, of 
the breakthrough to the truth.
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the new/different 
 (of movement/in terms of movement)
Throughout this book, or so I recognize in retrospect, I wrote of the new 
or of the new/different.
Why?
One of the many reasons for writing this book has been my curiosity 
to see if I couldn’t cut loose “the new” from any linear comprehensions 
of time.
It was my ambition to decouple the new/different from the epochal 
and thus from linear philosophies of history (and progress). I wanted to 
provincialize (and pluralize) the new (make it domain specific), to set the 
study of the new apart from the study of history (or historical progress), 
and to differentiate the actual from the emergent (to desubstantiate the 
new into the actual).
What is more, I wanted to elaborate the possibility of a radical new, that 
is, a new understood as the unanticipated breaking open — suddenly or 
slowly — of a space of thought, of a possibility of being in the world that 
escapes the already known, a possibility so radically different — new — that 
no one could plan or foresee its emergence.
I wanted to construct a conception of the new that would defy all ef-
forts to scale it up, to capitalize on it, to colonize it, to know it. 
I wanted to allow for the emergence of a concept of the new that 
would convey the sense that everything could be different. 
And I wanted to elaborate a notion of the new that opens up the pos-
sibility of (ceaseless) escape.
What is the science adequate to the new/different, to escapes?
The answer I have tried out — with as much hesitation as excite-
ment — has been “an analysis of movement/in terms of movement.” The 
reason for this suggestion is that a form of research that puts at stake 
its own analytical concepts — the codings of the human and of the real 
they silently transport — in one’s fieldwork, and that makes the derail-
ment of just these concepts and codings the focus of its inquiry, is that 
it doesn’t require to be ontologically grounded. On the contrary, it is 
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grounded in the curiosity if that which is taken to be ontologically true 
is set in motion.
Differently put, it cares less about “the truth” than about the pro-
duction, by way of exposure and escape, of a surplus of possibilities of 
truth — a surplus that no administrator of the already achieved and ac-
complished can ever exhaust.
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why and to what ends (philosophy, politics, poetry)
“I very much like your insistence on an anthropology of the actual and the 
manner in which you spell out what it is not,” a senior colleague wrote to 
me after she had read through the manuscript. “I also like how the actual 
is not, if handled appropriately, scalable, or open to colonization. One 
overriding concern I had though was what does one ‘do’ with the actual; 
the fissure?”
Indeed, why does one practice an anthropology of the actual? And to 
what ends?
Here is a list of seven efforts to engage these two questions. Some of 
my replies blur the line between the why and the how — but, you see, 
when it comes to practical matters, the why and the how are difficult to 
differentiate.
One
You ask me for the “why.”
It is not that I don’t understand or appreciate. Rather, it is that I wonder 
whether the why question can really be addressed to the anthropology 
of the actual. I would like to doubt it. I would like to doubt it, first, be-
cause the why question ultimately is a utility question. It wants to know 
“What is it good for?” In my understanding, however, the anthropology 
of the actual is a refusal to be useful — is an effort to render visible non-
teleological movements that are irreducible to any form of utility. I would 
like to doubt it as well, second, because the why question implies that 
the anthropology of the actual would be a means toward an end, an end 
presumably outside of the stakes of the actual. But what if the anthropol-
ogy of the actual had no ends outside itself? If it were self- sufficient? If 
there indeed were ends, if the anthropology of the actual were a mere 
tool, then wouldn’t this imply that there are constants? And wouldn’t that 
imply reinserting the actual — the irreducibly different — into a horizon 
organized by the already known? For surely, the end must predate one’s 
inquiry, an inquiry conducted to achieve an end. No, the anthropology of 
the actually cannot be a mere tool — or it ceases being an anthropology 
“of the actual.”
The actual — or the anthropology thereof — cannot be instrumentalized.21
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Two
I think of the anthropology of the actual as a practice of curiosity — if of a 
peculiar kind of curiosity. If curiosity is usually assumed to be an expres-
sion of the will to know, then the curiosity constitutive of the anthropol-
ogy of the actual isn’t concerned with knowledge at all. It doesn’t ask in 
order to find out. Rather, it is content with asking. Indeed, it is a curiosity 
that is not interested in answers at all but rather in questions, in the pro-
duction of a surplus of questions no one can exhaust; it is a boundless, 
ceaseless curiosity directed at everything, including itself.
Three
The third entry in my list of replies describes the anthropology of the ac-
tual as a philosophical exercise (p, not P; thought concrete, not abstract). 
An exercise that consists in tracing how accidents — or the unanticipated, 
the unexpected, the unforeseen — set in motion (some of) the philosophi-
cal presuppositions that have silently (unnoticeably) constituted the real, 
with the consequence that what the real is changes. The goal of these 
philosophical exercises (plural), however, is not to determine what the 
new, emergent configuration of the real is — but rather to capture what 
one could call “pure becoming,” that is, becoming as such, becoming that 
is not yet on its way to becoming some “thing.”
(I add that it seems to me untenable — and ultimately self- deceptive — 
 to assume one could exempt one’s own analytical vocabularies from the actual.)
Four
The anthropology of the actual is an ethical practice.
How shall I live? What can I do?
Imagine the human were a space of possibilities — a space defined by 
possible relations, to oneself and others — constituted and stabilized by 
philosophical presuppositions inscribed in and transported by concepts, 
practices, and infrastructures that often (but not necessarily) lie far away 
from the human. Couldn’t one say then that each time the unexpected 
sets in motion one or several of these presuppositions, the space of pos-
sibilities constitutive of the human is set in motion as well? With the con-
sequence that who or what one is or can be is changing?
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Five
As I see it, the anthropology of the actual is a form of politics. Indeed, 
attending to the actual is for me a radical political practice, a practice of 
freedom (of escape). My reference here is foremost to Michel Foucault. 
With Foucault, I am concerned with how to expose and escape power/
knowledge — that is, instances in which (not only) humans are subjected 
to a knowledge that is seemingly uncontroversial but that is, like all 
knowledge, contingent and hence inherently instable. This is why I stress 
the nonteleological, “the always new” (Deleuze and Guattari), the irreduc-
ibly different.
There is this aberrant idea in the human sciences that only the knowl-
edge of the natural sciences — or of governments, philanthropies, NGOs, 
administrators — makes for power/knowledge. I consider this absurd. The 
categories of critique — political or moral — are by no means external to 
the actual, on the contrary. The challenge thus becomes how to articulate 
critique while not excluding the terms — the conditions of possibility — 
constitutive of critique.
Six
I think of the anthropology of the actual as fundamentally a practice of 
poetry. If not in terms of form then at least in terms of the sensibilities its 
object demands: the challenge is to attend to that which undermines util-
ity and defies ends — call it the irreducibly different, ceaseless movement, 
the nonteleological, that which escapes (I say “if not in its form” because I 
do not want to exclude the possibility of writing about the actual in iam-
bic pentameter, classical hexameter, or the free use of lines).
The anthropology of the actual is concerned not with the prose of the 
world but with its poetry — and its poetic aim is to render visible instances 
of the invisible.22
Seven
The last but by far the most important entry in my list of responses is joy.
To immerse oneself in the concrete, to attend to the actual, to find (and 
make use of) lines of escape — gives rise to an intense feeling of joy, a feel-
ing that is increased if it is shared with friends.23
5
coda
(a dictionary of anthropological commonplaces)
one
When I first began thinking about writing this book, I developed the habit of 
collecting sentences that seemed indebted to the conception of “the human” 
that emerged in the late eighteenth century. The background to this venture 
off into the world of collectors was a curio j5sity I had harbored for a long time.
What actually holds the vastly diverse fields ploughed by anthropologists 
together as “anthropological”? Was there perhaps a small set of conceptual 
presuppositions about “the human” that organized the vast majority of stud-
ies independent of their actual field? Could I draw up a list of these “scripts”?
Think of it as part of my strategy for finding possibilities of “escape.”
For a long time — years — I was reading anthropology books of different 
ages, concerned with wildly different things, from meaning construction in 
rituals to design, from city planning to social suffering. And as I read, I found 
myself increasingly struck by how little variation there seemed to be: anthro-
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pology seemed to me to be one big conceptual machine in which one could 
feed pretty much anything and in the end it would always print a similar pic-
ture of “the human.”
I could not help but think of my list of scripts — with reference to Gustave 
Flaubert (1821 – 1880) — as a dictionary of exhausted, long- worn- out anthropo-
logical commonplaces.
What intrigued me about this association was not the bored arrogance with 
which Flaubert turned to his contemporaries. To the French author, his dic-
tionary was not just a collection of platitudes, of empty, long- anachronistic 
wisdom that somehow maintains the illusion of significance. First and fore-
most, it was a document of general human stupidity. Flaubert used the diction-
ary as an opportunity to elevate himself above this stupidity. I have no interest 
in such self- elevation — none. As anyone who reads a single line of my work can 
tell, my work is by no means free of commonplaces (indeed, I don’t know how 
to leave commonplaces — or scripts — fully behind). And second, not a single 
study I read was reducible to what the French author called le grand ennui.
If, despite my critique of Flaubert, I found it useful to draw a parallel be-
tween my list of anthropological commonplaces and Flaubert’s dictionary, it 
was only insofar as it allowed me to make visible what increasingly seemed to 
me a problem: the disarming poverty of the epistemic figure of “the human” 
on which anthropologists, including myself, have been relying for so long.
Differently put, Flaubert provided the possibility to bring into view what 
I still think of as the poetic and political challenge of breaking — by way of 
fieldwork/research — with the scripts that have structured anthropological 
research.
The ambition would be to break the scripts that structured research by way 
of exposing them in one’s fieldwork — by way of creating the condition for the 
possibility of derailment (research as exposure).
I admit that, on a bad day, I easily could get frustrated by the repetition of 
assertions I had already read a thousand times (in my own work as well as in 
the work of others). Some of my notes lament that anthropologists seem un-
aware of their own condition of possibility, a condition deeply provincial and 
thoroughly problematic. To make things worse, many authors seemed to take 
for granted “the human” as the irrefutable truth that must be defended if hu-
man dignity is to be maintained.
But then, all too often my sense of despair was simply a reflection of the 
predicaments I ran into in my efforts to find ways to cut loose anthropology 
from “the human.” 
coda 115
Though on good days I was overflowing with excitement.
It was because of this mixture of despair and excitement that I decided to 
write a chapter — chapter 2 — that exposes the historicity of this figure of the 
human. And it is partly because of this sense of despair that I decided to pub-
lish a short selection from my dictionary.
Think of it as one last (one more) act of provocation: as my effort to enroll 
you in my restless search for escapes.
t wo
To allow for a sense of anonymity, I replace mentionings of places with ptis 
(the place that I study) and references to things studied with ttis (the thing that 
I study).
“In this book I show that the ttis is culturally constituted.”
“All of this amounts to saying that the disease I study is really a cultural 
category.”
“The effects of ttis on society are far from settled.”
“This book asks Is society investing in the right things?”
“Society is obsessed with the ttis.”
“I study the effect of the ttis on society.”
“We need to pay attention to the unknown consequences of the ttis on 
society.”
“Humans are social beings, live in societies.”
“This book shows that science not only produces particular types of 
knowledge . . . but also leads to normative and politically charged ways of 
intervening.” 
“I study how the ttis changes everyday notions of biological and social 
life.”
“Social scientists should attend to the norms, values, and politics that are 
wrapped up within the ttis.”
“I argue that translational challenges are not only technical but also social, 
involving negotiations about meaning, form, and value.”
“I argue that personalized medicine is deeply intertwined with techniques 
of knowledge and power.”
“This is a book about the ttis. More specifically, this book is an ethno-
graphic study of the ttis in the ptis.”
“I analyze how the ttis works in the ptis. I focus on everyday life and 
show the ttis acquires a certain political meaning.”
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“The aim here is to politicize the everyday world.”
“Although seemingly neutral, a careful and critical study of the ttis shows 
that it unwittingly reproduces inequalities.”
“What I present in this book, then, is an ethnography of the premise that in 
the ptis the ttis is political in a way that is particular to the ptis. My argu-
ment here is that ttis is a cultural theorem for explaining relations between 
people, things, and politics in the ptis.”
“In this book I ask How are things made to mean?”
“Furthermore, I ask how meaning construction helps shape the social 
world.”
“What most prior books on the ttis have passed over too quickly is the na-
ture of the ttis as a cultural phenomenon, as assemblage of actors, practices, 
forms, and ideologies that all sit at the very core of what Nelson Goodman calls 
ways of world making.”
“In most instances the ttis is a locally contingent and culturally elaborated 
process of production, a background scheme organizing the ways in which 
things are made.”
“What we need now is a critical anthropology of the ttis, that is, ethno-
graphic projects that articulate the cultural imaginaries and micropolitics that 
delineate the ttis’s promises and practices.”
“What we need to study is the ongoing production and reproduction of 
social worlds.”
“This transformation . . . is far from neutral. It has produced a culture of 
fresh social inequalities.”
“I bypass the field of reason and seek to open an understanding of the hu-
man in terms of affect.”
“This book is an ethnographic examination of the ways in which the ttis, 
in the ptis, generates and relies upon inequalities, even as it strives to end 
them.”
“A central aim of this book is to interrogate the practices and politics of 
the ttis through an exploration of the interplay between science, technology, 
and inequality.”
“I argue against the idea that disease is a freestanding biological phenom-
enon that exists separately from the social world.”
“I reject the notion of science as autonomous from social relations.”
“I insist on rigorous social contextualization of entities that are often taken 
for granted as objective, natural phenomena.”
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“At stake in the ttis is biopower — the control of bodies and populations 
through forms of management and administration.”
“Even benevolent efforts to govern or improve social welfare must be theo-
rized as forms of symbolic violence or therapeutic domination aimed at culti-
vating docile, self- disciplined bodies.”
“What is at stake in my anthropology is primarily a concern with the poli-
tics of suffering and inequality.”
“Human suffering and scientific knowledge have over the past three de-
cades been deeply interdependent.”
“By focusing on the sociotechnical construction of bodies and maladies, 
anthropologists are raising crucial questions about the practice of science in 
an unequal world.”
“Anthropology is increasingly interested in questions of power and knowl-
edge production.”
“Human nature is fundamentally political.”
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 one last question
“One last question,” she says. “Why, given that you break with the human, 
do you continue to speak of anthropology? I mean, why speaking of an-
thropology at all?”
I had found myself confronted with the question several times before. 
Most often it had been posed in somewhat legal — in disciplinary — terms. 
A bit as if I needed to be reminded that what I described as anthropol-
ogy had little to do with the discipline of anthropology and that, besides, 
there was no obvious reason for the discipline to accommodate the proj-
ect I was outlining. Why, thus, would I speak of anthropology? Was I en-
titled to use the phrase?
“I am not sure what the stakes of the question are,” I begin a hesitant 
reply, “but very generally speaking, I speak of anthropology not for disci-
plinary reasons but simply and perhaps naively because I am interested in 
things human, in how the human is, at different times, in different scenes, 
constituted, in how spaces of possibility within which we comprehend 
ourselves, in how the terms we have available to think about ourselves, 
are mutating over time. This is to say, my goal has not at all been to reject 
a curiosity about things human. What interests me is the possibility of 
decoupling this curiosity about things human from ‘the human,’ from the 
conceptualization of humans in terms of ‘Man,’ from the comprehension 
of the world that this comprehension transports.”
“I understand that,” she says. “And I don’t care about the disciplinary 
all that much. Though maybe we should?”
“Maybe it is where we are coming from. Obviously my writing is in-
flected by my training, for better or worse. But I also think of the kinds 
of questions I cannot help but wonder about as, well, postdisciplinary.”
“Anyhow, what concerns me is that your response sounds too facile. It 
conceals what seems to me to be at stake. It is not just that you let go of 
‘the human’ or of ‘Man.’ You also want to let go of the idea that there is a 
distinctive human realm, or aspect of reality, no? And that is why I wonder 
if it makes sense for you to speak of anthropology at all?”
“But this idea of a separate, unique human realm, this is inseparably re-
lated to the effort to articulate ‘the human,’ no? I mean, it was only with the 
effort to articulate a general, time- and- place- independent concept of the 
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human that the idea of a unique human realm emerged and that this idea 
got consolidated. Why begin one’s anthropological research with wild on-
tological claims about what the human is even though we know about the 
historicity and contingency of these claims? Why would one take these 
claims as a foundation? Wouldn’t that be a form of self- deception?”
“Let me ask with more precision. In my reading, you set out to break 
with the very certainty on which anthropology is built: that sometime 
in the eighteenth century we discovered that behind all the diverse life 
forms stands ‘the human.’ You undermine that certainty — and thus the 
legitimacy of anthropology — but you continue to talk about anthropol-
ogy as if there were no problems at all. And that needs to be clarified.”
“You say ‘certainty,’ but it is not certainty at all. I mean, not at all. Now, 
you may say, well, what is certain? And my response would be, well, then 
let’s think about what happens when one lets go of certainty? Could one 
ground anthropology — not the discipline but the curiosity — in uncer-
tainty? That is exactly what interests me.”
“Ignorance.”
“The appreciation of ignorance is a starting point. As a matter of hon-
esty, as an epistemic virtue. This is also what I hold against ontology. The 
reason I don’t want to begin with ‘the human,’ or why I don’t want to 
ground anthropology in the idea that there is a separate, a distinct human 
reality that requires its own discipline — anthropology — is not that I want 
to problematize the human in the name of some bigger whole that we 
forgot, some bigger whole of which humans in reality are part and from 
the perspective of which one has to think of the human. Say, nature or the 
cosmos. That would simply mean to replace one self- deceptive certainty 
with another one. No, the reason I don’t want to start with ‘the human’ is 
that I want to ground my research not in an answer — but in a question, 
in boundless questions. In a way, this is the theme of After Ethnos, even 
though I could not have articulated it this way when I set out to write it: 
Is it possible to come up with a sketch, however modest and tentative, 
of an anthropology that is devoid of ontological groundings? Devoid of 
a substantive concept of the human (this is human reality, this is how it 
is composed, this is how it needs to be studied), devoid of ontological 
conceptions of the world (this is how the world is structured, and this 
is the place of the human in the world), devoid as well of an anthropo-
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centric epistemology that grounds everything in the human? And the by 
and large heuristic key terms of what my sketch of a non-ontology- based 
anthropology is are “exposure,” “the new/different,” “escape,” “mutation,” 
“thinking about thinking,” “analysis of movement in terms of movement,” 
and “the actual.”
“I would say that anthropology, the formation from which you break 
away, was not devoid of curiosity. But from the perspective you open up, 
I guess its own condition of possibility — what I called its certainty — was 
exempted from this curiosity.”
“That is how I see it, I think. And I would say that beginning with igno-
rance allows curiosity to expose the taken for granted in particular. In a 
way, what I am interested in is the possibility of a science of things human 
that revolves around surprise, around the unexpected. And what I mean 
by ‘surprise’ or ‘the unexpected’ are findings that emerge from research as 
exposure that cannot be explained in terms that we have thus far relied on 
when speaking about the human. Almost inevitably, then, these findings 
are going to make visible something thus far taken to be true about hu-
mans as a presupposition. So that an answer is mutated into a question.”
“But you see that what you describe under the term ‘anthropology’ 
is very different from how anthropology has been understood? In fact, it 
runs diagonal to it.”
“Because it refuses to ground anthropology in a substantive concept 
of the human?”
“And, in a way, because it has no real ontological ambitions.”
“It has no ontological ambitions because it revolves around exposure 
or the unknown rather than around the effort to stabilize the already 
known. It cannot help but distrust any ontology.”
She nods. 
“How would you describe,” I ask, “this radical curiosity about things hu-
man? I know of no better term for this curiosity than ‘anthropology,’ no?” 
notes
on anthropology (free from ethnos)
1. My understanding of “classical modernity” is indebted to Peukert (1987) and Licth-
blau (1996), who both give a brilliant portrayal of the philosophical- conceptual events 
that marked — and unsettled — the period between roughly the 1880s and the late 1920s.
2. The phrase “poetic and political” is a reference to the subtitle of Marcus and Clif-
ford (1986).
3. The exemplary early reference here is to Dell Hymes’s Reinventing Anthropology 
(Hymes 1974), originally published in 1972, with essays by, among others, Gerald Berre-
man, Eric Wolfe, Bob Scholte, and Laura Nader. On the pre- 1970s critique, cf. especially 
Bunzl (2005).
4. The various critical and revisionist programs went off in different, partly incom-
mensurable, directions and favored radically different visions of anthropology, of what 
it should be about, and of which political stance it should take. For a partial attempt to 
provide an over view see Rabinow et al. (2008).
5. Both classic modern ethnography and classic modern art (and also classic modern 
architecture) emerged in the late nineteenth century, reached a high point in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, and disappeared after wwII (while remaining a major 
reference until the 1970s).
6. For two excellent studies, see Michael Harbsmeier (1985) and Justin Stagl (1995).
7. See, for example, Kramer (1977) and Fabian (1983).
8. Exemplary efforts to introduce a historic dimension into ethnography were offered 
by Eric Wolf (1982), Renato Rosaldo (1980), and Richard Price (1983).
A major intellectual background to such historically informed ethnographies has been 
Marx’s idea of “weltgeschichtliche Tatsachen.” Wallerstein has translated this into a 
world system theory (Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986). Today this is present not 
only in the idea of multiple modernities in postcolonial theory but also in the new genre 
of Weltgeschichte; cf. Bayly (2003) and Osterhammel (2009).
9. Cf., for example, (Tedlock 1979, Crapanzano 1980, Dwyer 1982, Rosaldo 1980, 
Marcus and Clifford 1986, Clifford 1989). I would also like to mention here the seminal 
Tsing (1993). 
The “experimental” refers here to Marcus and Fischer (1986).
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10. Marcus and Clifford (1986, 241). Of course, anthropologists worked “at home” 
before. One thinks, for example, of Warner (1949a, 1949b), Warner and Lunt (1941), 
Warner and Low (1947), Warner and Henry (1948). But these anthropologists at home 
worked under the classical paradigm, with the analytical tools of the discipline, even 
where they adapted them to local circumstances (Warner studied anthropology at 
Berkeley, under Lowie and Kroeber, got his anthropology PhD at Harvard, and was a 
Prof at Chicago, working alongside Radcliffe- Brown, to whom his work was thoroughly 
indebted). It did not lead to questioning the old and inventing a new toolkit. It did not 
lead, on the level of questions asked, to a conceptually or methodologically new or quali-
tatively different project.
11. For example, feminist ethnographers began to study the biomedical construction 
of women (Martin 1987, 1994; Rapp 1988, 1990) and the ways in which new reproduc-
tive technologies challenged established concepts of kinship and gender (Collier and 
Yanagisako 1987; Strathern 1988, 1991, 1992a, 1992b; Franklin 1997; Edwards et al. 1999; 
Weston 1991); critical medical anthropologists documented the significance of culture 
for understanding the biology of disease (Lock and Gordon 1988; Lock 1993; Kleinman 
1988; Lin and Kleinman 1988) and pointed out silent correspondences between medi-
cine and Western political hegemony (Scheper- Hughes 1992); and anthropologists of 
science documented how the seemingly universal is locally produced and inseparably 
entangled with broader political and economical developments (Gusterson 1996; Rabi-
now 1989, 1996a, 1999; Traweek 1988).
12. Today, this new kind of anthropology is often referred to as “the anthropology of 
the contemporary.” The phrase “anthropology of the contemporary” was first introduced 
by Paul Rabinow in 1999 and has since been further elaborated by him, see Rabinow 
(2003, 2008).
13. See (Marcus 1995; Gupta and Ferguson 1997a, 1997b; M. Fischer 1999, 2004; Rabi-
now 2003; Bornerman 2007; Cerwonka and Malkki 2007; Rabinow et al. 2008).
14. See Rabinow et al. (2008) and the reviews thereof, e.g., (Salazar 2009, Formoso 
2011, Foley 2011, Krauss 2011, Trujillo 2011, Poktonjak 2010). See as well the Experimen-
tal Futures book series at Duke edited by Joe Dumit and Michael Fischer and the very 
interesting article by Anand Pandian (2012), “The Time of Anthropology.”
15. I am grateful to Fritz Kramer and Ronald Niezen for many clarifying conversations 
on this subject.
16. I write this in German here with reference to Immanuel Kant. On Kant’s anthro-
pology, see Foucault (2008a); on the context of Kant’s question, see Brandt (2014) and 
Zammito (2002).
17. Brilliantly argued by David Schneider, whose “culturalization” of nature and society 
has later been taken up, on the one hand, by Collier and Yanagisako (1987) and, on the 
other, by Marilyn Strathern (1992a). Authors such as Stefan Helmreich (2003) — in conver-
sation with the work of Donna Haraway (1991, 1997) — have developed this further.
18. The terms of analysis, from the cultural point of view, therefore, must be inter-
pretative ones — either derived from philology or from semiotics, from hermeneutics or 
deconstructivism.
Let me add that, of course, social and cultural anthropology are not mutually exclu-
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sive. Meaning centered approaches may well be coupled with societal questions. And 
such a coupling has in fact often — and very productively — been achieved.
19. What has led to this problematization — to this departure from anthropology in its 
form of ethnography — has been the taking serious of an insight that as such perhaps isn’t 
“new” but that gains “new” significance in the context of the conceptual reorientation 
characteristic of contemporary anthropology: that the discipline’s established ways of 
posing and answering the question concerning the human — Was ist der Mensch? — are 
anything but evident. Universals, as Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze noted in 1994, 
don’t explain anything, they need to be explained.
I regret that I cannot rehearse here the philosophically important efforts to question 
the centrality of “der Mensch” for philosophy. Most important references for me have 
been Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958); Martin Heidegger’s Die Zeit des Welt-
bildes ([1938] 1950) and his Brief über den Humanismus (1947); Michel Foucault’s Les mots 
et les choses ([1966] 1990) and his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (2008). In general 
one has to mention here the French critique of subject philosophy — the antihumanists 
as they were (wrongly so, I think) called — Lévi- Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Foucault, Der-
rida, Deleuze, and Guattari.
20. For a related, complementary effort to differentiate anthropology from culture — 
 or to imagine an anthropology after culture — see Lila Abu- Lughod’s article “Writing 
Against Culture” (1991). The occasion for her essay was provided by the publication of 
Writing Culture. Infamously, the volume edited by Marcus and Clifford in 1986 had ex-
cluded feminist critiques. Abu- Lughod, pointing out that she writes from the perspective 
of “feminists and halfies,” brilliantly showed that the culture concept inevitably relies on 
an essentialization of difference, a difference between self and other that is organized 
in terms of temporal distance and political asymmetry. The fact that Writing Culture 
excludes the perspective of feminists and halfies, she writes, allowed it to hold on to a 
politically and epistemologically problematic concept.
See as well Donna Haraway’s critique of the culture concept in her “Cyborg Mani-
festo” ([1984] 1991) and Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000).
21. For anthropological thoughts on Avian Flu see Rees (2010a); Caduff (2010), Lowe 
(2012). For a philosophically inclined anthropology of the Internet, see especially Kelty 
(2009).
22. On yeast biology see Roosth (2009), on insects see Raffels (2011), on dogs see 
Haraway (2003, 2008), on Avian flu see footnote 21, on hiv see Biehl (2007), on adult 
neurogenesis see Rees (2010b, 2015c, 2016).
23. In this respect the philosophically inclined anthropology of the contemporary dif-
fers from the German tradition of philosophical anthropology. Where the latter looks to 
the sciences in order to answer the question of Man, in order to philosophically synthe-
size the answers science gives, so that a coherent comprehension of the human emerges, 
the latter looks to various sciences — and other fields — to see where new ways, implicit 
or explicit, of posing the question or of answering it emerge; the former is a question- 
based approach, the latter answer- based.
24. The reference here is to Michel Foucault (1985) The Use of Pleasure, vol. 2 of The 
History of Sexuality.
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25. Of course, one may say that ethnography — where it was concerned with the  
native point of view rather than with society and culture — has always been a philosophi-
cal enterprise. That it has always undermined the self- evident, always opened up con-
crete new spaces of thought (see my interviews with Fritz Kramer in Kramer [2005]). I  
comply — but think (1) that the terms of possibility that have organized ethnography 
have become impossible to maintain. I think as well (2) that what I have called a philo-
sophically inclined anthropology continuous to be informed — if in broken, never easy, 
always complicated and troubled ways — by the interest in differences on the level of 
thought that has been central to one line of classical modern ethnography: though where 
classical ethnographers have turned toward faraway life forms the anthropologist after 
ethnos studies what one may loosely call the emergent. The differences that come into 
view is less spatial than temporal (see chapter 2 of this book). Arguably, the reintegration 
of the spatial into the temporal is one — not the only one and perhaps not the central 
one — of the great challenges of the anthropology after ethnos: how to empirically travel 
the terrain of questions formerly left to classical ethnography after the end of classical 
ethnography? The best example I know is Kramer und Marx (1993).
To highlight the coming into existence of a philosophically inclined anthropology, 
then, is not so much an expression of disregard for the interest in spatial differences 
between life forms, in what has been called “the native point of view” (even though it 
grounds in a radical break with the presuppositions that have made this interest possible 
in the first place).
I am particularly grateful to Johannes Quack for many discussions of this question.
26. Let me add here that precisely insofar as it opens up a space beyond the answer- 
based anthropology of modern ethnography it is, despite the fact that it asks how hu-
mans are thought and known, not anthropocentric (in that it doesn’t ground its inquiry 
in an anthropocentric epistemology; see chapter 2).
27. I am ashamed that I learned of Tim Ingold’s thought- provoking effort to differenti-
ate anthropology from ethnography only when my manuscript was already through the 
copy- editing state. My work would have been better — more refined — had I been familiar 
with Ingold’s work when I began the writing process.
While our work differs significantly, there are interesting parallels.
As I understand it, Ingold doesn’t attempt to cut loose — to free — anthropology from 
ethnos. His project isn’t the exposure of the answers — culture, history, society — on 
which anthropology has relied on (and along with it the vast majority of the human sci-
ences). Rather, Ingold refuses the reduction of anthropology to ethnography.
Ethnography, to Ingold (2016, 1), is a science and as such a knowledge or data produc-
ing project: It reduces the world in which we live and with which we are inseparably 
interwoven (Ingold 2011) to “data” to be collected, interpreted, “and fashioned into 
authoritative knowledge.” Ethnography, as he sees it, is “compliant with the protocols of 
normal science.”
If the practice of ethnography as science is problematic to Ingold (2014; 2016, 1) then 
because its effect is a “rupture,” is a “division between the real world (…) and the world 
of theory,” that is, the world as it is produced by science (note how this parallels Gaston 
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Bachelard’s 1934 account of science — except that Bachelard celebrates the poetry of 
science).
Anthropology, on the other hand, is the study of the real world — and as such has the 
power to “heal the rupture” (ed.). Anthropologists, so Ingold (2016, 4), “should be lead-
ing a campaign against the very idea that the world presents itself to human science as a 
standing reverse of data for collection.”
To me, Ingold’s critique of “normal science” and the comprehension of the world 
it produces is reminiscent of Heidegger’s account of the worlds in which we live. Hei-
degger, in part II of Being and Time, suggests that everyday human life is not compre-
hensible in terms of modern science. It is not comprehensible, in fact, as long as one 
thinks of humans as subjects and of things in the world as objects. Rather, we have to 
understand the everyday as an unfolding in which humans and things are seamlessly 
interwoven in forms of processes and or habits. Heidegger’s term Zeugs — translated as 
Equipment — provides an example: an artisan doesn’t think of a tool as tool he uses to 
achieve this or that end. Rather, the artisan finds himself integrated — in thought, action, 
being — together with his equipment, in an unfolding process.
The concept of the world that emerges from ethnography as science, Ingold seems to 
suggest, is destructive — because it is wrong. And anthropology, understood as curiosity 
of the conditions of human life in the world, has the power — and the obligation — to 
correct the error.
Despite the obvious differences that set apart Ingold’s anthropology from the philo-
sophically inclined anthropology after ethnos (after the human) that I have sought to 
render visible here, there are joyful parallels. For example, we share the insistence — the 
observation — that the real exceeds the concepts and theories and scripts we operate 
with: it escapes them, undermines them, breaks them open. And we both are busy at-
tempting to outline a comprehension of anthropology as the fieldwork- based effort to 
attend to just these escapes. As Ingold (2016, 2) nicely puts it: Fieldwork “frees us from 
the limitations of standpoints or perspectives and causes us continually to question what 
previously we would have taken for granted.”
I am over- joyed about Ingold’s disregard for theory, about his refusal to practice an-
thropology as a script based study of authoritative knowledge (Rees 2016 is effectively  
an effort to render visible the poetics of science, see as well Manoukian 2017, http://
somatosphere.net/2017/08/on- plastic- reason- by- tobias- rees.html, accessed on February 
5, 2018). It is just that I am troubled by his “ontological commitment” (2016, 5) to “the 
world” as the really real. Anthropology, or so Ingold at times sounds, has figured it out: 
it has broken through to the truth and now has to act as the guardian of this truth — and 
as its defenders. He asks anthropologists to acknowledge “our debt to the world for what 
we are and what we know (2016, 5).”
I have no such ontological commitments. And I get suspicious wherever someone 
claims to speak in the name of truth, scientific or moral: My work is an effort to release 
the world — humans — from the already thought and known and I think it is important to 
refuse the effort to articulate what I have called the open in form of a theory or concept 
or account (neither being nor becoming): Each such account ultimately is a closure. A 
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critical tool of the anthropology after ethnos thus is the ceaseless detection of that which 
escapes — even when it comes to accounts of the open. The effort is to reconstitute irre-
ducible (human) uncertainty.
See as well Ingold (2017).
28. According to Durkheim and Mauss, primitive societies were, in their survival, con-
tingent on extreme social adhesion, on the valuation of the society over any individual 
interest — and such adhesion was greatly facilitated by the absence of social differentiation. 
The consequence of the absence of social differentiation — of this survival strategy — was 
that primitive thought was obsessed with social structure, that is, kinship, and that kin-
ship structures were the only means they had available to order the world that surrounded 
them: nature thus was organized according to kinship principles (Durkheim 1912).
29. The best book on Levy- Bruhl is Keck (2008).
There is little literature on the discovery of society as a French event. However, see Pe-
ter Wagner’s splendid essay on the rejection of the term “society” by German Staatswis-
senschaften “An Entirely New Object of Consciousness, of Volition, of Thought” (1999).
30. One could also list here the sole American anthropologist of the first half of the 
twentieth century who actively participated in this debate, Paul Radin. His book The 
Method and Theory of Ethnology was a powerful critique of Lévy- Bruhl — and his Primitive 
Man as Philosopher was his response. Interestingly, Radin asked John Dewey to write a 
preface: in a way, Dewey’s pragmatism was to Radin what Wittgenstein’s ordinary lan-
guage philosophy was to British social anthropology. From Frédéric Keck I learned that 
Dewey in turn learned from Lévy- Bruhl. Apparently, Dewey’s How We Think was partly 
echoing Lévy- Bruhl’s How Natives Think.
After World War II, Clifford Geertz’s cultural anthropology, relying on Susan Langer’s 
rendering of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Form (heavily indebted to Lévy- Bruhl) could 
be understood as a contribution to the discussion on “primitive thought.” However, neither 
Geertz nor, later, Marshall Sahlins was concerned with thought or the categories of mind. 
Instead Geertz was concerned with “scripts” and Sahlins with “cultural categories.”
31. A set of qualifying remarks:
(1) Of course, one could list others. But “completeness” is not my aim: I merely mean 
to make visible a pattern and to provide a list of the most prominent names.
(2) What about Michel Foucault? I think Foucault defies the pattern: he is not a 
philosopher of the human but an empirically inclined, historically oriented 
researcher.
(3) I leave aside here the crossover area between philosophy and psychology.
(4) If one’s ambition were to be exhaustive, one would also have to mention the sig-
nificance of Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy for Evans- Pritchard’s 
implicitly critical reply to Rivers’s suggestion that the primitive cannot think in 
the abstract.
(5) And one would have to mention Paul Radin’s still extraordinary Primitive Man as 
Philosopher (1927). While the significance of Wittgenstein for British social an-
thropology has frequently been alluded to, the relevance of Dewey for American 
anthropology has hardly been recognized. See footnote 25 above.
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32. For example, the study of primitive thought is primarily a reflection of the philoso-
phy of modernity, a philosophy that divided the whole of humanity into the nonmoderns 
(primitives, potentially incapable of rational thought) and the moderns (grounded in 
rational thought). And the effort to render visible the universal existential and moral 
grounds of what it means to be human has been contingent on the emergence of a 
general, time and place independent concept (abstraction) called “the human,” that 
emerged in Europe between the 1630s and the 1830s (see chapter 2).
33. Arthur Kleinman, Michael Jackson, and Veena Das, introduction to The Ground 
Between (2014), footnote 1.
34. The reference is to Fassin’s essay “The Parallel Lives of Anthropology and Philoso-
phy” (2014).
35. The reference here is to the emergence of medical anthropology (Kleinman), to 
research on social suffering (Kleinman, Lock, and Das), and to the recent call (Fassin) 
for a moral anthropology.
36. I am greatly indebted here to many conversations with Paul Rabinow (see in par-
ticular Rabinow 2003).
37. One could even say that this kind of philosophical anthropology has no more need 
for philosophy as such; it has begun to understand itself as an empirical philosophy of a 
sort; it is interested in the philosophical fragments that, as concepts, structure the nitty- 
gritty domains of life, philosophical fragments that never stand still, that mutate, some-
times faster, sometimes slower, that ceaselessly break open new grounds.
38. “Or, comme dit Pline, chacun est à soi même une très bonne discipline. Ce n’est 
pas ici ma doctrine, s’est mon étude.” Yet, said Pliny, each one of us is a very good  
challenge for ourself. This is not my theory. This is my exercise. Michel de Montaigne. 
Essais.
And as exercise, anthropology produces an anti- crisis ethos — or calm (Roitman 2013).
39. See my “As if Theory is the only Form of Thinking and Social Theory the only 
Form of Critique” (Rees 2011) and as well the forthcoming edited volume Anthropology 
bsst (Beyond Society and Social Theory) that I am currently working on. I also refer to 
Strathern 1988.
40. I think of the always- new subtitle that George Marcus and James Clifford gave to 
Writing Culture.
41. If I hold on to this term that is partly because this practice of thinking about thought 
is reminiscent of a millennia- old practice described by authors such as Paul Rabbow and 
Pierre Hadot — and so brilliantly rendered contemporary by such authors as Michel Fou-
cault or Katja Vogt.
42. It is just this incapacity for abstracting thinking, Rivers added (1900:82), that 
made him devise the genealogical method: “The great value of the genealogical method 
is that it enables one to study abstract problems, on which the savage’s ideas are vague, 
by means of concrete facts, of which he is a master.”
43. See (Rivers 1900, 1910; Lévy- Bruhl 1910, 1922, 1926, 1952; Evans- Pritchard 1929, 
1933, 1937, 1940; Durkheim and Mauss 1902; Durkheim 1912; Mauss 1931, [1938] 1950; 
Lévi- Strauss 1962; Bachelard 1934, 1938, [1949] 1966, 1953; Canguilhem 1994, 2000, 
2005; Foucault 1966, 1969).
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44. Of things? Yes, of things: for what, ultimately, is the real if not some undifferenti-
ated mass, some say? So that whatever we identify as thing is actually constituted by the 
system of thought by which we, without knowing it, live.
Some even go as far as suggesting that the system determines what, at a given time, is 
possible.
45. And no one has helped me more to understand this than Fritz W. Kramer.
46. I think of Piet Mondrian’s abstract — but entirely concrete — renderings of 
Cézanne.
One could, perhaps, as well refer to Tim Ingold (2017).
47. Another, complimentary line of thinking about thinking has been recently ren-
dered visible brilliantly by Stefan Helmreich in “Election’s Reverb: An Interview with 
Stefan Helmreich” accessible at https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1011- election- s- reverb- an 
- interview- with- stefan- helmreich. Helmreich points to Donna Haraway’s phrase “think 
we must” (2016, 12), and to Marilyn Strathern (1992), Benjamin Wurgaft (2015), and 
Virginia Woolf (1938).
48. Fieldwork often requires follow- up research: years of reading, spent in libraries or 
archives, of nitty- gritty reconstruction.
“of” the human (after “the human”)
1. According to Anna Tsing, “ ‘Man’ does not mean humans, but a particular kind of 
being invented by Enlightenment thought and brought into operation by modernization 
and state regulation and other related things”; quoted in Haraway et al. 2016, 7.
2. Even if most anthropologists allow for change — the emergence of new forms of 
bodily experiences, of new forms of politics, of subjectivity, and so on — their conception 
of change is such that it ultimately holds on to the universals that make their analyses 
meaningful: the body, politics, subjectivity, and so on.
3. As Michel Foucault asked in one of his lectures (Foucault 2008b:3), “How to allow 
for an analysis that doesn’t ground in universals?”
4. The term “organism” first appears in Stahl (1695). For an excellent overview on how 
it further developed, see Cheung (2008).
5. W. W. Keen quoted in Schlich (2016). It may sound counterintuitive, but most 
languages that have been recorded by anthropologists seem to not have had a classical 
concept of the body, understood as an anatomical or physiological universal that marks 
the basis of all human existence. They may have words for the torso, legs, arms, or skin; 
indeed, often they have several words for “skin,” as in “skin that protects” or the “skin 
that is injured.” But they don’t have an abstract concept of the body as such, that is, of 
the abstract and universal body independent of an individual, as it emerged in Europe 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The best introduction is still Bruno Snell’s 
The Discovery of the Mind, published originally in German as Die Entdeckung des Geistes 
(1946). 
6. An anthropology “of” the human/after “the human” opens up the past — by liberat-
ing it from historical studies that are organized by recent concepts unwittingly treated as 
universal — as well as the present (and the future).
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7. This is, according to Diderot, the purpose of an encyclopedia: “Le but d’une en-
cyclopédie est de rassembler les connaissances éparses sur la surface de la terre, d’en 
exposer le système général aux hommes avec qui nous vivons, et de le transmettre aux 
hommes qui viendront après nous” (Diderot 1755).
8. I quote Diderot according to the online version of the original edition of the  
Encyclopédie (last assessed on February 1, 2018), http://encyclopédie.eu/index.php 
/science/1111734492- philosophie/1219172107- encyclopedie. 
9. Diderot, Encyclopédie, http://encyclopédie.eu/index.php/science/1111734492 
-philosophie/1219172107-encyclopedie.
10. The literature on the concept of “the human” and the concepts in place to stabilize 
it is sparse. A beginning was arguably made by Foucault’s The Order of Things ([1966] 
1990). The German philosopher Odo Marquard published a short essay on the emer-
gence of the concept “anthropology” in the history of European thought (Marquardt 
1973). Heidegger’s “The Age of the World Picture” ([1938] 1977) was arguably a critical 
reference for both of them. Bits and pieces for a history of the human can be found in 
Koselleck (1979, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2010).
11. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the distinction between nature and “the 
human” as Diderot explicitly formulated it was the most significant tool for the inven-
tion of “the human” in mid- eighteenth- century France. Take, for example, Rousseau’s 
Discours sur l’inégalité (Rousseau 1755). In this book, written in 1754 and published in 
1755, Rousseau not only offers a critique of civilization in the name of nature, but by 
suggesting that the emergence of human civilization can be traced to the very moment 
when humans ceased being part of the natural world, he also constructs one of the first 
universal histories of “the human.” Or take Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs et les esprit des 
nations, which was first published in 1756 (Voltaire [1756] 1829). One of the key organiz-
ing principles of Voltaire’s history of the French nation from the days of Charlemagne to 
his time was the distinction between nature and civilization. And, if the suggestion that 
history begins at just the moment when humans leave the natural cosmos behind was 
still implicit in his Essai, then the opposition between the natural world and the human 
world had become one of the key arguments of his La philosophie de l’histoire (Voltaire 
1765). This latter work expanded beyond Europe and the French and told the history 
of humanity, from the savages to the barbarians to the civilized. Or consider Tourgout, 
Condillac, Maupertuis, Malherbe, Condorcet — the list of those who contributed to the 
invention of “the human” is long.
12. I quote according to the online edition of Kant’s second critique (last assessed on  
February 1, 2018): http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/kritik- der- reinen- vernunft- 2 
- auflage- 3502/3.
13. Note that Kant’s was a philosophical — or epistemological — and not a neuronal 
argument.
14. Kant also makes plain that what he calls a priori has nothing to do with experi-
ence, as if the forms of knowledge would get more refined over time. On the contrary, 
Kant insists that any experience is already contingent on these a priori conditions, which 
he considers as universal, as time- and- place independent.
15. The one place where Kant says that the question in which all of philosophy culmi-
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nates is “Was ist der Mensch?” is his lectures on logic, which are available only through 
student excerpts. The three questions that precede the culminating one — What can I 
know? What can I do? What can I hope for? — already appear in the Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft. On Kant’s philosophy as principally concerned with the human, see especially 
Brandt 2014, who points out that the question Was ist der Mensch? actually is at odds 
with Kant’s argument and may well have been added by the student who compiled the 
excerpt. By the late eighteenth century, thus, the whole world had become contingent on 
the human. Kant’s oeuvre marked the ‘completion’ of the anthropocentric epistemology, 
which has been constitutive of modernity — and as well of the human sciences.
I add that what I describe here was hardly a detached philosophical discourse. The 
work of Diderot and d’Almbert must be understood in the context of the struggles to 
question absolutism, which they — and many others — understood as the challenge to 
invent a new form of politics, one not focused on kings and their glory but on what was 
to them a new and exciting category: the human. This was, literally, revolutionary work. 
In a way, the whole Encyclopédie was — just as the invention of the philosophy of his-
tory, which happened in parallel — one massive effort to construct an anthropocentric 
conception of the world and to celebrate it as a breakthrough, and as a liberation (which 
no doubt it was). The aim was to explain that “the human” — whether in China or India, 
whether in France or Germany — was constitutive of the political and philosophical reali-
ties in which they lived, with the implication that if they created it, they could change it.
In Germany this took a somewhat different form. Kant’s work on anthropology is im-
possible to understand without the rise of the bourgeoisie. 
It is through a conceptual analysis of these events that one can appreciate the emer-
gence of a novel epistemic formation in Europe in the final decades of the eighteenth 
century: the emergence of a general conceptualization of “the human” that allowed one 
to explain many different life forms as variations of a human theme; that would allow 
one to make visible a continuum of experiences across time and space.
16. But hasn’t Kant’s philosophy been repeatedly critiqued by critical thinkers over the 
last 250 years? It has, so often indeed that it is impossible to provide a list of the many 
critical rejections here. But it seems fair to say that the vast majority of the critiques of 
Kant have concerned his transcendental philosophy rather than his conception of phi-
losophy as anthropology. This is to say that what has been exposed to critique is Kant’s 
suggestion that the conditions of knowledge as he described them transcend time and 
space and are universal. Consequently, his transcendental a priori has been replaced by 
a historical a priori (most famously perhaps by Michel Foucault), by a cultural a priori 
(the last in a long line of vehement cultural anthropologists who have forcefully insisted 
on culture a priori was probably Marshall Sahlins), or by a social a priori (Durkheim had 
famously described his work as a sociologization of Kant — and it seems fair to argue that 
neither Pierre Bourdieu nor his successors, say Boltanski or Thévenot, have exceeded 
this project). If anything, then, these critical replacements have been an affirmation of 
the human rather than a critique of it.
17. How have humans thought about and lived in the world before the birth of “the 
human”? At least in seventeenth- century Europe the focus was on a natural, cosmologi-
cal order. The assumption was that there is a natural order of the world that precedes the 
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human, an order not established by humans. On the contrary, humans had their place 
within this order. In the middle of the eighteenth century, with the emergence of the 
argument — probably nurtured by the dramatic increase of travel reports about foreign, 
faraway life forms — that humans, even if they didn’t know about it, were themselves the 
authors of the order they lived in, the idea of a natural, timeless cosmos began to crum-
ble. A good way to picture what happened is to think about the emergence of the central 
perspective in painting, which marks a human- centric way of organizing the world.
18. For a different critique of the concept of the human and of culture, see the work 
of Sylvia Wynter: a great overview of her work is offered by Wynter (2000) and Wynter 
(2014). I have gained significantly from Wynter’s writings — and yet depart from her solu-
tion. In my reading, Wynter severs the culture concept from the Western, male, bourgeois 
definitions of culture and then rethinks it from the perspective of the (African) diaspora. 
That is, Wynter, in principle, holds on to the idea that humans are cultural beings — while I 
emphasize the historicity of the configuration of the human as cultural being.
19. I am hardly the first to ask this question. For example, two authors that immedi-
ately come to mind are Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault (whose work I discuss in 
the below digression on “Anti- Humanism”). However, already decades before Althusser 
and Foucault, in early twentieth- century European art, there was a powerful movement 
to abandon the human. Apollinaire wrote (1980 [1913]), “Avant tout, les artistes sont 
des hommes qui veulent devenir inhumains. Ils cherchent péniblement les traces de 
l’inhumanité.” José Ortega y Gasset ([1925] 1962) wrote about “la deshumanización del 
arte.” And Theodore Adorno wrote in his posthumous Ästhetische Theorie (1970), “Treue 
hält Kunst den Menschen allein durch Inhumanität gegen sie.” Some may want to see 
Nietzsche quoted here, however, Wolfgang Welsch, in particular, has shown that  
Nietzsche’s Übermensch is an anthropological conception.
I am not referring here to writings of the posthumanists. I find I could write with 
Donna Haraway (2008, 16 – 17) the idea of an anthropology “of” the human / after “the 
human” “to be a much richer web than any of the posthumanisms on display after (or in 
reference to) the ever- deferred demise of man. I never wanted to be a posthuman, or a 
posthumanist, any more than I wanted to be a postfeminist. For one thing, urgent work 
still remains to be done in reference to those who must inhabit the troubled categories 
of woman and human, properly pluralized, reformulated, and brought into constitutive 
intersection with other asymmetrical differences.” What is at stake, Haraway adds, quot-
ing Karen Barad, is “not getting beyond one troubled category for a worse one even more 
likely to go postal” (Haraway 2008, 16 – 17).
20. The irreducible openness provoked by the break with “the human” — when the 
real is released from the already thought and known — would be immediately exhausted 
by a new set of normative (foundational) claims.
An anthropology that evolves around instances in which events in the present over-
flow (the term is borrowed from Michel Callon) the conceptual presuppositions that 
have hitherto structured the present — or constituted its reality — cannot afford such a 
replacement approach. It cannot afford it as it would negate the very possibility of the 
openness it is interested in: the irreducible openness that can be found when an event 
cuts loose the real from the form of thought that until recently contained it, the non-
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teleological movement that rules in the openness in which no new conceptual structure 
has yet emerged that could give directionality to this movement, could exhaust it. 
For an anthropology interested in instances of escape, it would be a fatal mistake to 
replace one normative framework with another one.
21. One can care about humanity by decentering it.
22. Take, for example, an anthropological study of the release of tiny co
2
 bubbles that 
have been frozen in ice for thousands of years (perhaps, in form of a fieldwork with ice sci-
entists in the arctic). What if the task of (one kind of) anthropology would consist in ren-
dering visible the comprehension — the beauty — of the world that emerges from the study 
of these co
2
 bubbles (rather than in pointing out that the scientific knowledge of these 
bubbles is socially grounded, which ultimately amounts to a reduction of the world to the 
human)? A world so vast and so old that “the human” shrinks and shrivels, that the epis-
temic anthropocentrism transported by “the human” becomes as ridiculous as ludicrous, 
that humans are displaced from the center and become little more than a late comer to the 
history of the Earth, an add on (if a destructive one). Could one make the statement that 
the constitution of the real that ice — melting ice — allows for escapes the anthropological 
certainties (the definitions of the human) that have silently structured anthropology? With 
the consequence that ice — melting ice — brings into view that (and how) the  
present outgrows — escapes — the (decoding) vocabulary anthropologists have (had) at 
their disposal? And could one argue that precisely this ‘escape’ undermines and tears open 
anthropology — and thereby allows one/compels one to learn to think differently?
The challenge would be to use the study of melting ice to expose “the human,” to ask 
what new, what other ways of thinking the human — of living a life — are emerging from 
the study of ice. To be more precise, the challenge would be to make the mismatch be-
tween reality as constituted by ice and reality as constituted by the human a (if not the 
only) central focus of one’s analysis. (This, while at the same time striving to avoid mak-
ing the mistake of then presenting this new/other anthropology — one that grounds in 
melting ice rather than in “the human — as the new normative.)
23. Such an anthropology of bacteria has no need to provide bacteria with agency or 
intentionality. There is no necessity to extend the concepts that were constitutive of hu-
man exceptionalism to the nonhuman world (what an odd universalization of the human 
it would be to make bacteria — or archaea or eukaryotes — humans among humans). Bac-
teria are literally world making, for all living things. Anthropology can bring this world 
making into view and can ask questions of it that bacteriologists don’t ask: questions 
about being in the world, about relationality, about the normal and the pathological, 
about things human.
24. As Peter Crane writes in his extraordinary Gingko (2013, 4 – 5), “For almost all of 
its long tenure on our planet gingko inhabited a world without people, and for much of 
that time, a world very different from that of today. For tens of millions of years it lived 
alongside plants and animals that are long since extinct. Several kinds of gingkolike trees 
watched as our ancestors transformed from reptiles to mammals. Fossil gingko leaves are 
known from every continent. The prehistory of gingko goes back to before the Atlantic 
Ocean existed and before the southern continents broke from Antarctica and went their 
own ways.”
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25. See Stefan Helmreich’s project on waves, “The Water Next Time: Changing Wave-
scapes in the Anthropocene” (Helmreich 2014).
On matsutake, see Anna Tsing (2015).
On methane bubbles in the Greenland ice sheet, see the forthcoming dissertation 
research of Julianne Yip.
On Ebola, see Vinh- Kim Nguyen’s recent work, for example, Nguyen (2014).
On snails, see my own research project “The Snail and the Human,” a first sketch of 
which I have provided in Rees (2014b).
On Hurricane Katrina, see Vincanne Adams (2013).
On the neoliberal social, see Stephen Collier (2011) and James Ferguson (2015).
One more example: take the set of genes — the cop9 complex — that humans and 
plants share and that open up an unexpected middle ground between plants and hu-
mans. Wouldn’t it be intriguing to explore this middle ground, to learn to think about 
things human from its perspective?
On L1 jumping genes see Rees (2016).
On SpaceX, see Lisa Messeri (2016) and on Mars see Vertesi (2015).
26. “And critique?” I hear someone say. “What becomes of critique if one gives up the 
social? Even the political? How to critically engage without any stable positions?”
To drop “the human” is hardly the end of critical inquiry. On the contrary, it is itself 
an act of critique. It is true, the exposure of established concepts and categories renders 
easy gestures to established scripts difficult; it requires learning to think anew. It re-
quires the reinvention, for each project, of what critique could mean and why it matters.
27. I think, for example, of the work of Stephen Collier (2011) and James Ferguson 
(2010, 2015). Collier and Ferguson both noted, independently from one another, that 
the genuine forms of social welfare the neoliberal reforms they studied produced — the 
former in post- Soviet Russia, the latter in post- Apartheid South Africa — were such that 
they defied the concept of the social on which the social sciences and along with them 
social critique and social theory were built. Struck by their discovery they both began (1) 
to write the history of the social as we knew it — thereby exposing its historicity and de-
priving it of its givenness — and (2) to elaborate the possibility of a study “of” the social/
after “the social.” In terms of an analysis of movement / in terms of movement: they used 
their recognition of the inadequacy of the social of the social sciences — the inadequacy 
of the depiction of the form human living together takes — to give contours to the new/
different concept of the social that emerged at the time of their fieldwork.
28. It seems to me that this is where I may differ from Tim Ingold’s (2014, 2017) “on-
tological commitment” to the world: “behind” the cool abstraction of “normal science” 
he discovers the really real — thereby granting his account the privilege of being onto-
logically true. Though where does the certainty of truth come from?
As soon as Ingold begins to articulate the really real he almost inevitably — or so it 
seems to me — reduces it to a scheme that is contingent, could be otherwise, is not more 
privileged than the schemes he critiques.
To avoid misunderstandings: I share the commitment to curiosity and care: but the 
form my curiosity and care take is hesitation, is doubt, is skepticism in the ancient sense: 
an attention to that which gets lost, which cannot be subsumed. My work is an effort to 
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render visible (Guattari and Deleuze) the “always new”: is the effort to ceaselessly recon-
stitute uncertainty (as the highest good).
29. Indeed, there is no doubt a correspondence between the idea of an anthropology 
“of” the human on the one hand, and Hacking’s “Making up People” (1986) and Rabi-
now’s “Midst Anthropology’s Problems” (2002) on the other. It is as if they pushed in a 
direction very similar to the one I am pushing — and, of course, years before me (Hack-
ing’s paper was written in 1983, Rabinow’s in 2001). And yet, it seems to me as if there is 
a perhaps subtle but far- reaching difference.
30. Rabinow’s Deleuzian epilogue to French dna (1999) is perhaps an exception: On 
the one hand, the emphasis on assemblages is a shift away from the intentional subject 
and allows one to understand the emergence of new logoi as the unforeseeable result of 
a series of events that point in different directions. On the other hand, it remains con-
cerned with human reality alone.
31. On the tape I continue to explain this: “I would like to add that this is exactly 
where I differ from, for example, Bruno Latour and his followers: He/they have replaced 
one grid, one scaffold, with another one which he/they claim is more true, which is 
closer to the really real. Here the human, there actor- networks understood as nature-
cultures. Even if it sounds a bit harsh, to me this replacement attitude is self- deception. 
It is the construction of a new universalism, which transports all the problems the old 
universalism they critiqued transported as well. What interests me instead, I mean in my 
research, are the very concrete derailments that emerge from chance recognitions, ac-
cidental findings, unexpected observations, etc. In that sense I have no program. Or so I 
like to think.” Again laughter follows.
32. “My aim,” Michel Foucault wrote in 1969, “is to define a method of historical 
analysis freed from the anthropological theme” (Foucault [1969] 1972, 17). And Louis 
Althusser, four years earlier, in 1965, had already put forth the view of “humanism as an 
ideology.”
On antihumanism, see Geroulanos (2010).
33. In the text he shows that the young Marx was a humanist, that his aim was to fight 
the alienation of the human from human nature: Marx hoped to return the human to its 
human nature. However, around 1845 Marx made what was, according to Althusser, a 
most significant “discovery”: that the concept of the human he had grounded his politics 
in was a generalization — he writes “essentialization” — of the bourgeois subject.
34. Althusser adds that bourgeois philosophy as it emerged in the late eighteenth cen-
tury “depended in all of its domains and arguments on a problematic of human nature” 
([1965] 2005, 227).
35. “Marx’s materialism excludes the empiricism of the subject” (Althusser [1965] 
2005, 228). “Marx established a new problematic, a new systematic way of asking ques-
tions of the world, new principles and a new method” (Althusser [1965] 2005, 229).
36. A theory of history that would be free from “the sovereignty of the subject, and the 
twin figures of anthropology and humanism.” (Foucault [1969], 1972, 12, 16).
37. The quotes are all taken from the “Introduction” of The Archeology of Knowledge.
38. His big archaeological discovery, presented in The Order of Things, was that “the 
human” is precisely the product of one such radical epistemic shift, which occurred 
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around 1800. And his hope was that the epistemic formation that gave rise to the human 
would soon dissolve and disappear.
39. On general history see especially Foucault (1971, 9 – 10).
40. This is hardly a critique of Althusser and Foucault: What I offer here, rather, is a  
differentiation. Althusser meant to get away from bourgeois ideology and to ground 
Marxist philosophy of history in materialism; and Foucault tried to escape the general-
ization of the subject and to come up with “a new general theory” for analyzing history 
epistemologically. Neither one of them was concerned with what I have called the open.
41. See also Rees (2010a).
42. And with Tim Ingold (2016) one could say that theories produce worlds: worlds of 
abstraction and generalities that render the world uninhabitable.
43. No doubt, the emergence of an anthropology not concerned with humans has 
been critical for me, has allowed me to give sharper contours to the idea of an anthropol-
ogy after “the human.” That being said, there are aspects of multispecies explorations 
that are, if looked at from the perspective of an anthropology after “the human” as I have 
thought to develop it, somewhat unfortunate. Indeed, it occasionally seems as if some 
multispecies anthropologies unwittingly hold on to “the human,” for example, when con-
cepts like agency or subjectivity or intentionality or the social are used, as if nothing were 
more evident, to describe animal life. 
It is not, I think, that I don’t understand the reason for this expansion. But my curiosity 
points in another direction: I am interested in the history of these concepts — and in how 
the recognition of a resemblance between humans and nonhumans undermines them and 
thereby opens up a new, different space for which we still lack terms and concepts. I won-
der how the bringing face- to- face of, say, snails and humans opens up an epistemic space 
that cannot be assessed by these human universals, how it derails them and thereby opens 
up new, yet to be explored venues for thinking or for living. Differently put, I am interested 
in what this encounter does to the human — and also to the snail (Rees 2014b).
One version of the reproduction of “the human” is the somewhat uncritical expansion 
of critical social theory to the nonhuman world. Perhaps the most prominent venue in 
which categories invented to describe the (supposedly) uniquely human are uncritically 
extended to the nonhuman world is behavioral research on animals, specifically, animal 
intelligence. Whatever concept philosophers invented to define the distinctively human, 
from thought and empathy to subjectivity or politics, from existential questions to self-
awareness and a sense of humor and the decoupling of sex from reproduction (and much 
more): in their (understandable) effort to prove human exceptionalism wrong, behav-
ioral researchers often enroll animals in human categories rather than question these 
categories as such, in their validity for humans.
44. I think in particular of Haraway’s Primate Visions (1990) and Latour’s We Have 
Never Been Modern ([1991]1993), two thorough problematizations of the nature/culture 
divide in terms of hybrid nature- cultures made up of humans and nonhumans. How-
ever, I think as well of Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” ([1984] 1991), which declared 
that “the boundary between human and animals is thoroughly breached” (151), and of 
Latour’s The Pasteurization of France (1988), with its exceptional witty critique of the 
category of society in the name of microbes. It was above all the work of Haraway and 
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Latour that has made it possible to radically rethink what the human sciences are or 
could be about.
45. For example, Tsing (2015) is an exploration of the possibility of an anthropology 
that thrives on indeterminacy (20, 23, 37 – 38, 46 – 47, and passim) rather than on knowl-
edge (that forgets the provinciality of its own condition of possibility). What is more, the 
book is an exploration of a new concept of knowledge, one that doesn’t ground in “sum-
ming up” or “scaling up,” but that still provides insights (33 – 34, 37 – 38).
I read Stefan Helmreich’s conception of “athwart” (2015, 90 – 105) as an exciting at-
tempt to allow for the possibility of nonfoundational research — of research that neither 
is grounded in nor attempts to build foundations.
I would also like to point out here how meticulously Kath Weston in her Animate 
Planet: Making Visceral Sense of Living in a High- Tech Ecologically Damaged World (2017) 
avoids ontological claims or conclusions: when she elaborates on animacies and intima-
cies, she explores contemporary ways of living — and not ontology- based corrections of 
an error called modernity.
A second difference between ontologists and multi- species anthropologists one could 
mention is that most of the ontologists work in classical modern ethnographic settings, 
while many multispecies authors are, from a classical ethnographic perspective, working 
in modern settings.
46. Let’s mention at least in passing that Mol’s critique of epistemology is somewhat 
odd, at least when it comes to the historical epistemology that emerges from the writings 
of Bachelard, Canguilhem, Rheinberger, and others. These authors are neither out there 
as judges of the accuracy of knowledge nor to provide a general foundation of knowledge 
that would be accurate to nature. On the contrary, they are adamant that whatever is 
known is contingent on the technical and methodological circumstances of its being 
known. But in sharp contrast to Mol, these authors haven’t done away with the idea of 
a world that exists independent of humans, a world that humans can successively get to 
know. In other words, for these authors a conceptual analysis is not in opposition — in a 
competition with — scientific knowledge production.
47. Mol cites as well Michel Callon and, especially, John Law.
48. How Latour can then allow microbes to participate in this network is a whole other 
question, which he addresses poorly, and at which point his ant alternative collapses.
49. Let me add that this critique of Mol’s humorless reading of Latour doesn’t take 
anything away from what has arguably been a most important contribution of her book: 
the expansion of the scope of the concept of practice, especially in sts. Before Mol, the 
concept of practice was largely defined by laboratory studies and narrowly focused on 
experimentation. With Mol’s work on performance, the concept of practice was cut loose 
from the important but somewhat narrow focus on experimentation. Mol’s contribution 
was paralleled by the work of Charis Thompson (2007).
50. Indeed, in his Politics of Nature, Latour ([1999] 2004) explicitly celebrated Descola 
for arguing that a precondition of a comparative anthropology is to recognize the nature 
concept as a Western peculiarity that needs to be dropped if one wants to bring into view 
non- Western societies that don’t have a concept for nature and whose societies include 
humans as well as nonhumans.
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51. For more than a decade I have worked on the discovery that thousands of new 
neurons are born every day in the adult human brain. This discovery was first made in 
1998. If one takes Mol’s argument seriously, then it amounts to the odd suggestion that 
no neurons were born in human brains before 1998.
52. To critique Mol or Latour doesn’t imply upholding a naïve positivism, according to 
which arteriosclerosis (or bacteria) objectively exist as discrete conditions or entities. Ar-
guably, what bacteria are, for humans, depends on the concepts and practices in place to 
know them. The critical remark here merely concerns Mol’s straightforward suggestion 
that arteriosclerosis — or Latour’s ironic suggestion that bacteria — are simply the product 
of human knowledge practices. That seems a gross over estimation of the significance of 
human ways of knowing + doing.
53. Durkheim and Mauss, in their Primitive Classification (1963), don’t offer such an 
argument. On the contrary, they maintain a strict anthropocentric epistemology, that is, 
they operate with a strict dualism that distinguishes between the human here and the 
natural world there. “The primitives” merely use their kinship terminology to structure 
the natural world.
54. Of particular pertinence here is what one could call Tom Boellstorff’s (2016) 
“provincialization” of the ontological turn. Boellstorff, a careful reader of classic modern 
ethnographies, notes that the notion of anthropology upheld by the authors of the onto-
logical term is specific to a Cambridge/UK- based understanding of “social anthropology 
as a comparative project.” As he beautifully — disarmingly — remarks, Franz Boas, for 
example, harbored a general “doubt of the possibility of establishing valid categories for 
the comparison of cultural phenomena.”
Boellstorff silently (and brilliantly) repeats — and reinforces — an earlier American 
critique of British social anthropology. Here I am particularly referring to Clifford Geertz 
(in his turn toward culture and cultural history, which he explicitly understood as a cri-
tique of British social anthropology; see Handler’s 1991 interview with Geertz and David 
Schneider — first with his culturalization of kinship in 1968 and then with his full- blown 
critique of the very idea of kinship in 1984).
55. It is interesting here to think through Kohn’s very thoughtful work from the per-
spective of Kath Weston’s (2017) differentiation of “animism” (a highly problematic term 
that served to mark supposed primitivism and political asymmetry) and “animacy” (a 
self- conscious living in close intimacy with animals, plants, and ecosystems). Is it fair to 
argue that Kohn’s work, by virtue of expanding human concepts to the nonhuman world, 
is ultimately a form of animism, not of animacy. 
56. A similar critique has been formulated with much more political vehemence 
by Bessire and Bond (2014a, 2014b). I quote at length: “In reference to those critical 
predecessors who are often erased from the intellectual genealogies of self- proclaimed 
ontologists — such as Frantz Fanon, Hannah Arendt, Raymond Williams, Judith Butler, 
and Michel Foucault — we suggest that the figure of the ontological may itself operate as 
a mode for reifying the very effects it claims to overturn. Indeed, it seems as if much of 
the ontological turn is premised on skipping over an entire generation of anthropologists 
that took up these same problems and worked them out in very different ways, whether 
in the cultural refractions of capitalist world systems (Mintz 1985, Wolf 1982), in the 
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labored dimensions of colonial categories (Comaroff 1985, Stoler 1989), or in feminist 
and queer critiques of structuralist binaries (Martin 1987, Ortner 1974).” 
One could easily come up with a whole library’s worth of further names, from An-
gela Davis and Sylvia Wynter to Lila Abu- Lughod, Tim Mitchell, Donna Haraway, Fritz 
Kramer, Johannes Fabian, Arjun Appadurai, and many more.
Bessire and Bond suggest here the erasure, by ontologists, of half a century of politi-
cal critique of the figure of the primitive. Why this erasure? Because to do away with the 
figure of the primitive — and with “feminists and halfies,” to quote Abu- Lughod’s article 
“Writing against Culture” (1991) — would undermine the very condition of the possibil-
ity of the ontological turn. In the words of Bessire and Bond (2014a, 442), “The analytic 
allegiances wrapped up in the ontological turn seem uniquely unable to examine the 
fraught conditions of their own flourishing.” That is, of the reliance on the premodern as 
the original, as the place were wisdom was preserved. “The pertinent questions of how 
difference comes to matter and what kinds of difference are allowed to matter are point-
edly left unaddressed. What we insist on is that the worlds conjured by such a project do 
not seem new at all. Rather, they appear frighteningly familiar.”
In his article “For Whom the Ontology Turns” (2016), Tom Boellstorff offers a similar 
critique of the ontological turn and its unacknowledged primitivism. Boellstorff’s sug-
gestion to the ontologists is that they begin with the critical step of “de- ontologizing the 
concept of difference” they are operating with. Of course, if the ontologists were to give 
up on radical ontological alterity (silently mediated by society), there would be no point 
(for the ontologists) in talking about ontology anymore.
57. This is not meant as wholesale critique. There are most excellent works that reflect 
on — or subversively play with — these inversions/relations; see, for example, (Povinelli 
2016, Tsing 2015, Helmreich 2009, Raffles 2011).
58. Why “existence at all”? The problem with any ontology is that, even if it seeks to 
allow for an otherwise, it must reduce the world to a scheme. Wouldn’t one need, in-
stead, to expose ontology? And to thereby simultaneously open up the many worlds that 
existed before ontology and after ontology (independent of being)?
59. This passage could not have been written without Alessandra Ponte’s work; see 
especially Ponte (2014, 169 – 221).
60. Marilyn Strathern (1972, 1988, 1991, 1992a) has brilliantly avoided just this pitfall 
of ontologization: In sharp contrast to many of her followers, she has consistently re-
fused to articulate a theory of the relation as the true ontological ground of being in the 
world. On the contrary, she has consistently de- ontologized the relation (e.g., 1995) and 
has rendered (and used) it as a functional, descriptive tool that can be used as experi-
mental technique that generates unexpected surprises (e.g., 1992b).
61. From here, it is perhaps but a small step to Michel Foucault’s Les mots et les choses — 
words and things, itself an attempt to think about the historicity of “the middle” in 
non- anthropocentric terms — or to Marilyn Strathern’s (in my reading radically) anti-
ontological studies of the “in between” (1972) and “the relation” (1995). Why radically 
antiontological? Because Strathern seems to be at pains to never let her work on rela-
tions become anything more than a somewhat antisubstantive (and in that sense func-
tional) tool for inquiry that she found.
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on fieldwork (itself)
1. I am also curious — but leave this for another time — if one couldn’t, once anthro-
pology is decoupled from ethnos, dissociate anthropological research from fieldwork? 
Is there any obvious reason why fieldwork would be the only, the sole, the authoritative 
form of anthropological knowledge production? I ask this as fieldwork enthusiast.
2. G. P. H. Normann (1785, 4n7). H. Fischer (1970, 176); and Stagl (1995, 237).
3. “Anthropological research” is a somewhat awkward category — one that is the out-
come rather than the starting point of the history I am trying to write.
4. “Expedition” seems to have been derived from the “expedite” efforts to provide 
goods from elsewhere by ship.
5. See (Keay 1991; Gardner 1971; Lawson 2014; Philips 1961).
6. See (Cook 1967, Thomas 1996).
7. George Stocking, Jr.’s Victorian Anthropology (1987, 78 – 109) gives a most excellent 
overview of the varieties of travelers that were characteristic of nineteenth- century 
anthropology.
8. Stocking (1984, 1987, 1988).
9. Why didn’t I mention, for example, the Spanish conquistadores? Or the French and 
English exploration of North America? My aim here was not to provide a list of every 
trip European travelers or explorers undertook. Instead, my aim has been to make visible 
a particular genre of scientific travel called “expedition.” And the term — the genre — 
“expedition” seems to have developed largely with respect to the Pacific Ocean, and later 
with respect to inner Africa, South America, and the poles.
10. In 1895 Haddon had already published a study of the evolution of art, from first 
figurines to modern realism.
11. No one introduced the term “field” in any conceptual way. However, my broad 
reading adventures in the history of anthropology led me to think of the Torres Strait 
expedition as a kind of caesura: it was only with the publications of the reports from 
the Torres Strait expedition that the term “field” was used in a continuous fashion to 
describe the kind of science anthropology is or ought to be. Let me stress again, though, 
that this seemed to have happened in an implicit way, as the transfer of a term from one 
field to another.
12. Already in 1930 the Seligmans had published the first edition of Races of Africa 
(which was reissued several times until the mid- 1960s). 
13. “It is only, however, since leaving the islands, and while getting the data into order, 
that I have realized the many possibilities which I believe [the genealogical method] 
opens to the anthropologists” (Rivers 1900, 74).
14. For Rivers’s efforts in genealogy, see volumes 5 and 6 of the Reports of the Cam-
bridge Expedition to the Torres Strait. See as well his The Todas (1906) and his article 
“The Genealogical Method in Anthropological Inquiry” (1910).
15. I am grateful to Allan Young for our conversations about Rivers.
In his article in the Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 
(1900, 74), Rivers writes that he first began to recognize the “many possibilities [the 
genealogical] method opens to the anthropologists” in 1899, when, back in Cambridge, 
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he began working through his notes. However, it was only his 1901 – 2 research among 
the Todas that allowed him to test the usefulness of the method.
The phrase “system of relations” is from Rivers (1910). On his “discovery,” see Rivers 
(1906, 11 – 12; also chapter 20).
“System” and “organization” might well be the technical terms Rivers used most often 
in his 1906 book on the Todas.
16. The interest in social organization had been a topic in anthropology since at least 
the works of Lewis Henry Morgan (1871, 1877) and John McLennan (in 1865 and 1877), 
two lawyers who studied how societies — in the legal sense of the term — were organized 
in terms of legal rights and responsibilities. However, in my interpretation, Rivers pow-
erfully departs from these older legal studies. Why? Because Rivers was not interested 
in a system of juridical rights and responsibilities — which leaves all nonlegal aspects of 
social life unmentioned — but in how kinship organized the whole of social life, includ-
ing a sense of self.
17. See especially Rivers Anthropology and Ethnology (1922), which, on the one hand, 
is a rejection of evolutionary anthropology and, on the other, suggests that ethnology is 
a kind of history of cultural diffusion and social differentiation of the very early stages of 
human history.
18. Quote from Rivers (1912, 112).
The challenge of fieldwork was, as Rivers put it, “to get to the bottom of native cus-
tomes and modes of thought, and to record the results of inquiry in such a manner that 
they carry conviction.” He added that this was possible only “by careful attention to 
method” (108).
19. Between 1906 and 1908, Radcliffe- Brown had repeatedly visited the Andaman 
Islands (located in the Indian Ocean). These visits were initially for his fellowship thesis 
at Trinity College at Cambridge and resulted in what one could describe as a classical 
nineteenth- century reconstruction of cultural history (he added a version of this cultural 
history as an appendix to his Andaman Islanders). 
After his return to the United Kingdom, he was, until 1910, lecturing on anthropology 
in Cambridge and at the London School of Economics. According to William Edward 
Hanley Stanner (1956), it was during these years that Radcliffe- Brown discovered the 
writings of Durkheim and Mauss. If the writings of the French sociologists mattered to 
Radcliffe- Brown, they did so for two reasons. First, they resonated strongly with Rivers’s 
systems approach but were more philosophically savvy. Second, they provided him with 
a way of theorizing questions that had concerned him since he first read Kropotkin’s 
Mutual Aid ([1902] 1909), which lays out a theory of early social life as free of property 
(Stanner 1969). 
This assemblage of questions (How is social cohesion in an anarchical state possible?) 
and conceptual tools (systems approach, social facts) led Radcliffe- Brown to return to 
the notes he had collected while on the Andamans to write The Andaman Islanders. See 
as well Kuper (2010). 
An exceptionally good review of Radcliffe- Brown as teacher and thinker has been 
given by Walter Stanner (1956). See as well Eggan and Warner (1956). 
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For the relationship between Radcliffe- Brown and Rivers — Radcliffe- Brown had been 
Rivers’s very first anthropology student — see Stocking 1984.
20. There are, of course, the special circumstances that led Malinowski to live among 
the Trobrianders: as citizen of Habsburg Austria he was considered a political enemy of 
the British Empire. The only way to escape encampment was to leave Australia and to 
live on the Trobriand Islands. As Malinowski had no financial means, however, he could 
not afford to live among the whites: he had to plant his tent among the natives. For the 
best background on the circumstances that led him to stay on Kiriwina, see M. Young 
2004. For an excellent study of the effect of Malinowski’s longer- than- usual stays among 
“the primitives,” see Kramer (1977).
21. Malinowski is famous for having introduced the phrase “participant observation.” 
However, given the focus of my essay, I stress that he was the first to use the term “field-
work” in a systematic, technical manner.
22. Malinowski [1922] 2005. See Gellner’s (1998) brilliant interpretation of Ma-
linowski’s work.
23. Malinowski [1922] 2005: 21, 60.
24. Of course, people traveled to faraway places, learned exotic languages, and wrote 
about foreign life forms long before Malinowski. And most certainly Malinowski (1922) 
was contingent on the Torres Straight expedition and even more so on the works of 
Seligman and especially Rivers (Kuklick 1991, 201; Stocking 1987, 1992; M. Young 
2004). But I would stress that while Malinowski’s formulation of fieldwork from 1922 
was arguably contingent on the works of his predecessors, it is not reducible to it. I thus 
disagree with authors such as James Urry (1993), who doubt Malinowski’s originality 
altogether. While I have profited from Urry’s reading of Rivers, I see no reason to support 
Urry’s iconoclasm: there is a perhaps subtle but still very far- reaching difference between 
Rivers’s “the native also has a point” and Malinowski’s “the native point of view.” For 
example, compare Rivers’s History and Ethnology (1922) with Malinowski’s Argonauts 
(1922). The difference couldn’t be starker: there is no necessary, no obvious way from 
Rivers’s historical, diffusionist conception of ethnography to Malinowski’s fieldwork- 
based ethnography.
25. Firth published Primitive Economics in 1929 and We, the Tikopia in 1936. Richards 
published Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe in 1932. Powdermaker’s Life in Lesu ap-
peared in 1932. Schapera’s The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa was published in 1930 and 
his Handbook of Tswana Law in 1938. Evans- Pritchard Azande book came out in 1937, 
and his The Nuer in 1940; Meyer Fortes, by training a psychologist, published The Web of 
Clanship among the Tallensi in 1945.
26. Fritz Kramer (1977) suggested that Malinowski’s “synthetic ethnography” was 
reminiscent of Picasso’s cubism.
27. It seems consequential, thus, that Radcliffe- Brown had little to contribute to the 
language of fieldwork Malinowski sought to provide. And indeed, in his early writings he 
used neither the term “field” nor the term “fieldwork.” This is by no means meant as a 
critique of Radcliffe- Brown let alone as an effort to lower his enormous significance for 
anthropology in any way.
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28. But what about American anthropology? Didn’t Boas introduce fieldwork as 
method to American anthropology? He did not, as George Stocking, Jr., has made 
plain (1992, 14). Boas, like Malinowski, decoupled ethnography (in the old geographi-
cal sense) from evolutionary speculations. However, in sharp contrast to Malinowski, 
he seems to have maintained a geographical understanding of ethnography, one that 
was partially informed by German Kulturgeschichte. He certainly did not — nor, as far 
as I can tell, did his students — come up with the suggestion that the goal of ethnogra-
phy is the collection of concrete episodes (Rivers, Malinowski) that would allow one 
to provide a glimpse of a single foreign society from the inside. Indeed, how far away 
from a Malinowski- style fieldwork/ethnography American anthropology was is nicely 
illustrated by a letter from Paul Radin to Edward Sapir (Radin 1998), in which he writes 
that the model that guides his research among the Winnebago is Jacob Burckhardt’s 
Kulturgeschichte der Renaissance in Italian. I am afraid that the invention of fieldwork/
ethnography was a British affair. American anthropology — just like French or German or 
Dutch or Scandinavian anthropology — largely continued (until after World War II) in an 
expedition- like style.
On American anthropology between 1888 and 1945, see the exceptionally helpful vol-
umes edited by George Stocking, Jr. (1968, 2001).
29. Arguably, these studies could no longer be contained by an analytical vocabulary 
invented to get at the “underlying ideas” that organize faraway societies and their culture 
(as Malinowski put it in 1922, and as Geertz upheld in 1973 when he suggested that the 
life of the Balinese was organized by inarticulated scripts the ethnographer has to ob-
serve). The consequence was a débordement, an overflowing of the assumptions and pre-
suppositions that had made fieldwork as ethnography a meaningful practice for almost a 
century.
30. The perhaps most powerful indicator of this interest in difference in time rather 
than in space has been the arrival of the concepts of the “emergent” and the “event” in 
anthropological inquiries. Exemplary here are Das 1996; M. Fischer 1999, 2004; Maurer 
2005; and Rabinow 1996a, 1999.
31. My understanding of fieldwork is thoroughly informed by the work of George Mar-
cus and Arjun Appadurai, who both, if in different ways, unbound fieldwork (I also refer 
to the works of James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta). However, I would maintain that while 
these works unbound fieldwork from space, they continued to frame fieldwork in spatial 
terms.
32. Another way of circumscribing the idea of a field science would be to describe it 
as a Wissenschaft that grounds in the primacy of the field (rather that in genealogies 
to which fieldwork is then a mere addendum or final chapter); that finds its questions, 
stories, and even theories in the field (and not in preset research questions or readings); 
that produces works that evolve essentially around the surprises and discoveries the field 
gives rise to.
33. An alternative way to capture the difference the anthropology after ethnos / in-
terested in difference in time introduces into fieldwork is to say that it has mutated the 
concept of “surprise” that anthropologists work with. Again there is some important 
overlap: for both the spatially and the temporally oriented anthropologist, fieldwork 
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means the long- term immersion in the actual, everyday life of a particular group of ac-
tors with the explicit purpose of being surprised in one’s thinking by what they do, by 
how they do it, and by how they think about what they do. This is to say that fieldwork 
is the (somewhat personalized) method for producing surprise — to generate insights 
one did not have and probably could not have had otherwise. However, in a most radical 
contrast, the fieldwork- based study of the new/different frames surprise not in spatial 
terms — as is the habit in much of sociocultural anthropology — but in temporal terms. 
Put differently, the surprise generated by fieldwork into the new — into that which 
escapes the already thought and known — does not ground in the recognition that else-
where it is different but rather in the insight that established concepts, ways of thinking, 
forms of knowing no longer work. Surprise consists in the experience that one’s concepts 
don’t work any longer — that an opening has occurred, a mutation, a rupture; that we live 
in a situation we have not yet learned to come to terms with (largely because the concep-
tual presuppositions implicit in the already existing concepts are inadequate to the new 
situation — and reform unlikely to do the job); a situation that unfolds beyond our estab-
lished categories of thought, including (at least potentially) society and culture. 
I tend to think — and realize that this is controversial — that a temporal concept/
experience of surprise is potentially more powerful, insofar as it is more radical and all- 
encompassing than a spatial one. For example, the more traditional (spatial) challenge of 
ethnography has been to identify that which is different (the foreign) as a variant of the 
already known, that is, as variants of society and culture. In sharp contrast, the challenge 
of an anthropology interested in difference in time is to identify (or be identified by) that 
which cannot possibly be captured by the already known. The yet incommensurable, 
identified- through- surprise- generating derailments in the course of fieldwork — this is 
the core of fieldwork into the emergent. At stake is the difference today makes with re-
spect to yesterday.
These surprises come in at least three forms. The first is thematic: one wishes to 
study neoliberalism in post- Soviet Russia or in contemporary South Africa — and is 
surprised that nothing conforms to what one has read (Collier 2011, Ferguson 2015); or 
one wishes to study Alzheimer’s in India — and is derailed by the discovery that there 
is no Alzheimer’s in South Asia (Cohen 2001). A second form of surprise is being led 
astray: say a fieldwork sets out to work on French biotechnology and ends up in a neu-
roscience lab — without ever having read anything about the brain — and then discovers 
that this lab is centrally involved in the formulation of a radically novel conception of 
the brain. A third kind of surprise is more discipline- specific: when one recognizes that 
well- established anthropological concepts, most notably “society” and “culture,” are not 
adequate to capture the phenomenon in question. 
34. George Marcus explained in a conversation with Tarek Elhaik on “Curatorial 
Designs in the Poetics and Politics of Ethnography Today” (2010): “In the mid 1990s I 
became interested in certain projects of installation and conceptual art that involved 
inquiry similar to fieldwork in their production. While I don’t think ethnography is or 
should be the same as these art movement, my attraction to the latter captures some-
thing in terms of practice that I think ethnographic inquiry is lacking and very much 
needs.”
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It is interesting to note that, just at the time of the ethnographic turn in art, Marcus 
makes a distinction between fieldwork and ethnography — as if he wishes to ‘rescue’ 
anthropology from the ethnographic turn while simultaneously appreciating the pos-
sibility to converse with artists and to explore the unarticulated artistic potentialities of 
fieldwork as Wissenschaft.
The artist Fiamma Montezemolo (http://fiammamontezemolo.com) and the an-
thropologist Tarek Elhaik are at home in just this in between world — in between art 
as informed by fieldwork and fieldwork as an artistically informed anthropological 
Wissenschaft. 
The consequence, beautifully, is that they both break with the significance of cultural 
difference and social identity and representation that plagued the ethnographic turn 
(which ultimately transported a primitivist conception of the other). Montezemolo 
explores the possibility of ethnography in the moment of its impossibility — and Elhaik 
curates the possibility of anthropology at just the time when this possibility ceases to 
exist. See as well Rabinow (2017).
35. Furthermore, it offers, if implicitly, a critique of the present in the name of a  
past that has probably never existed. As if all of classical modern ethnography grounded 
in the radical comprehension — in the practice — of anthropology as a radical field sci-
ence that I outlined above! Can one really claim that when anthropologists studied 
descent lines, rituals, and myths, anthropology was practiced as the radical kind of field 
science that I outlined above? Or that the study of science and medicine has diluted the 
once intact idea of the primacy of the field? Theoretical inclinations, pre- articulated 
research questions, and historical narratives were certainly not absent in the supposedly 
good old days.
36. The first anthropologists to use “event” as a technical term to indicate temporal 
difference, to make it amenable to anthropological analysis, were Das (1996) and Rabi-
now (1996b). The earliest reference to “the emergent” is Michael Fischer (1999).
37. One could also mention “reconstruction,” a term derived from Dewey (used by 
Collier 2011), and, of course, “genealogy” (which has been around since the late 1990s).
38. Obviously, I am hardly the first anthropologist to speak about assemblages. Paul 
Rabinow introduced the phrase “anthropology of assemblages” in 2003. Aihwa Ong and 
Stephen Collier, largely building on Rabinow, published an edited volume titled Global 
Assemblages in 2005.
In her 2015 The Mushroom at the End of the World Anna Tsing offered a version of an 
anthropology of assemblages that she explicitly juxtaposes to that of Rabinow on the one 
hand and that of Ong and Collier on the other.
39. Serres and Latour (1995).
On agencement, see Deleuze and Guattari (1987). A helpful comment on the  
agencement/assemblage relation/translation is provided by John Phillips (2006).
In a very interesting way the term “agencement” has been used by Michel Callon 
(2013, specifically 425 – 30).
40. Serres here also alludes to an earlier moment in their conversation, in which he 
explained his understanding of time thus: “If you take a handkerchief and spread it out 
in order to iron it, you can see in it certain fixed distances and proximities. If you sketch 
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a circle in one area, you can mark out nearby points and measure far- off distances. Then 
take the same handkerchief and crumple it, by putting it in your pocket. Two distant 
points suddenly are close, even superimposed. . . . Time . . . resembles this crumpled 
version much more than the flat, overly simplified one.” Serres then goes on to say that 
we might “need the latter for measurements,” but that if there is no point to “extrapolate 
from it a general theory of time. People usually confuse time and the measurement of 
time, which is a metrical reading on a straight line.”
Serres’s use of the term “contemporary” has led Paul Rabinow to design an “anthropol-
ogy of the contemporary” (Rabinow 1999, 2003). 
As I understand it, Rabinow’s use of the terms assemblage and contemporary gained 
contour by his effort to refine Foucault’s history of the present into an anthropology of the 
recent past and the near future, where the term contemporary replaces the term present/
modernity and where the term assemblage replaces the term apparatus (for Rabinow, 
Foucault’s dispositif has a longue durée, it is relatively stable, while assemblages are more 
tentative and short- lived: they might develop into a dispositive, but might as well dis-
solve just like that). On Rabinow’s use of the term contemporary and as well on his use 
of the term assemblage see Rabinow (2003). See as well footnote 2 of chapter 4.
In contrast to Rabinow, to whom I am greatly indebted for many conversations on 
both the contemporary and on assemblages, I am less interested in establishing either 
the term assemblage or the term contemporary (with which I am much less concerned 
here) as technical terms than in a playful exploration of their heuristic value for thinking 
about how to analyze difference in time.
41. Traditionally, all of these elements were regarded as independent, as having their 
own line of flight. Virology, for example, has been its own field, with its own history, a 
history of institutions, laboratories, discoveries, experimental systems. The same is true 
for veterinology and public health and ornithology and the management of river courses.
42. I write “chance formulation,” as Serres seems to have used the formulation in an 
ad hoc manner, and also because he never developed the term into a technical concept.
43. Again I want to refer here to the work of Tarek Elhaik.
Elhaik has used Rabinow’s concept of the contemporary and has abstracted from it the 
question of what it would mean to come up with a contemporary anthropology, one that 
is in conversation with — that studies but also learns from — contemporary art. See espe-
cially Elhaik (2013, 2016).
44. I think of the work of Carlo Caduff and Celia Lowe, but also of Julianne Yip and 
Frédéric Keck. With respect to sars see Kleinman and Watson (2005).
45. Or take in vitro fertilization in Jordan (Collier and Ong 2005). To have ivf in Jor-
dan you need eggs and sperm — and more than a century’s worth of biological research, 
largely with sheep (I could lift off here in an associate flight about England and Kinship 
and sheep and Australia and New Zealand). You also need airplanes — for bringing eggs 
and sperm from the United States to Jordan (and hence ivf in Egypt is contingent on a 
vast international aeronautics infrastructure). Why airplanes? As people in Jordan gener-
ally don’t like to donate gametes, they usually come from North American college stu-
dents. Consequently, you need a college population, and a biomedical infrastructure that 
can extract and freeze eggs and sperm (and you need advertisements, in newspapers and 
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on the Internet, to attract students/donors). And, critically, you need refrigerators (and, 
hence, electricity), which is a whole separate infrastructure project in Jordan. 
ivf in Jordan is a wild, untamed assemblage of heterogeneous technologies, concepts, 
histories, infrastructures, knowledge, biologies, and so on (with the consequence that 
an instance of globalization is thus becoming visible as a heterogeneous assemblage of 
people and things, infrastructure and expertise and machines).
I thank Marcia Inhorn for a long discussion about the globalization of ivf and how to 
analyze it.
46. According to Anna Tsing (2015, 22 – 23): “The term assemblage is helpful. Ecolo-
gists turned to assemblages to get around the sometime fixed and bounded connotations 
of ecological “community.” The question of how the varied species in a species assem-
blage influence each other — if at all — is never settled: some thwart (or eat) each other; 
others work together to make life possible; still others just happened to find themselves 
in the same place. Assemblages are open- ended gatherings. They allow us to ask about 
communal effects without assuming them. They show us potential histories in the mak-
ing. For my purposes, however, I need to see lifeways — and non- living ways of being as 
well — coming together. Nonhuman ways of being, like human ones, shift historically. 
For living things species identities are a place to begin. But they are not enough: ways of 
being are emergent forms of encounters. . . . Assemblages don’t just gather lifeways; they 
make them. Thinking through assemblages urges us to ask: How do gatherings some-
times become ‘happenings,’ that is, greater than the sum of their parts? If history without 
progress is indeterminate and multidirectional, might assemblages show us its possibili-
ties? Patterns of unintentional coordination develop in assemblages.”
Tsing offers a powerful critique of some of the ways in which the term “assemblage” 
has been used thus far. She writes (2015, 292 – 93): “Some social scientists use the term 
to refer to something more like a Foucaultian discursive formation (e.g., Aihwa Ong and 
Stephen Collier, eds., Global Assemblages). Such ‘assemblages’ expand across space and 
conquer place; they are not constituted through indeterminacy. Because constitutive en-
counters are a key for me, my assemblages are what gathers in a place, at whatever scale. 
Other ‘assemblages’ are networks, as in Actor- Network- Theory (Latour, Reassembling the 
Social). A network is a chain of associations that structures further associations; my as-
semblages gather ways of being without assuming that interactional structure.”
While I share Tsing’s differentiation of assemblages from ants, I don’t share her cri-
tique of Collier’s and Ong’s use of the term as planned and thus intentional or human (as 
the example of ivf in Jordan shows, there might be some degree of planning, but I think 
that no amount of planning can exhaust the indeterminacy of the assemblage).
47. Why then not just rely on the dispositif? Because, as Paul Rabinow (2003) has 
observed, a dispositif is a combination of elements — of concepts and practices and insti-
tutions and infrastructures — that is relatively stable over a relatively long period of time, 
and as such it is not a good concept — or model — for analyzing the continuous lines of 
flight of elements and how they relate to and enable each other, especially not where the 
relations are fickle and/or fragile.
48. Though one could also refer here to Kuhn’s (1962) paradigm shift or to the often- 
used term “revolution” (Shapin 1996).
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49. Wherever such a claim is made, one enters murky water. Is the shift really as radi-
cal as one claims? Haven’t there been earlier formations that undermine one’s claim?
50. The goal of an anthropology of difference in time should not be predetermined as 
the study of an event that divides a scene in a before and an after — but rather as an in-
quiry into movement (which then might be a rupture).
51. Calhoun (2010), Redfield (2013).
52. Rees (2014a, 2015), Brown et al. (2006).
53. For a related — in my reading complementary — anthropology of the present as a 
temporal figuration that doesn’t rely on the assemblage concept, see Kath Weston’s Gen-
der in Real- Time (2002). And for Weston’s elaborations on what “real- time” means in an 
interview with Stefan Helmreich, see Weston and Helmreich 2006. See as well the fasci-
nating new book by Nikolai Ssorin- Chaikov, The Two Lenins (2017). 
54. The question is hardly arbitrary.
“I have come to think,” John Borneman (2007, xii) recently wrote, “that the quality 
of writing as well as our interpretative skills has been compromised by subsuming all 
listening, viewing, observation, interaction, comparison, and contextualization into his-
torical narratives.”
To Borneman, the subjection of anthropology to history — think of it as the subjec-
tion of anthropology to genealogy — amounts to one big loss: “Lost is the accidental, 
incidental, and occasional; the serendipitous, fateful, and irregular; events and scenes 
that don’t always hang together, that resist facile inclusion in a temporal development or 
argument. Lost is the episodic: experience that is personal, tied to a particular time and 
place, a part that does not always readily fit into the whole” (Borneman 2007, xii).
On the one hand, I want to celebrate Borneman’s list: the accidental, incidental, occa-
sional, serendipitous. Borneman brings into view the role and relevance chance plays in 
anthropological, especially fieldwork- based, knowledge production. On the other hand, I 
find myself vehemently disagreeing with Borneman. For several different reasons. First, 
I am critical of Borneman’s critique of the present in terms of an imagined past: as if 
anthropological texts of the pre- 1990s or pre- 1980s were so rich in listening, viewing, 
observation, interaction, comparison, and, above all, episode. Is it necessary to put the 
present down? Second, I think Borneman’s depiction of history is grossly inadequate. As 
if historiography were devoid of the serendipitous, the irregular, of episodes, of scenes 
and events that don’t hang together and resist facile inclusion in a temporal development 
or argument. And third, I have a vague impression that Borneman confuses history or 
historical modes of inquiry with an anthropology interested in difference in time.
55. As Foucault noted in The Order of Things (1973): some future event will make the 
formation crumble. See as well Rabinow’s (2003).
on the actual (rather than the emergent)
1. I am grateful to Stefan Helmreich and Mette Nordahl Svendson for conversations about 
the difference between the actual and the potential or potentialities. See the special edition of 
Current Anthropology 54 (7) from October 2013, which contains an essay that emerged from a 
Wenner- Gren Symposium, “The Anthropology of Potentiality in Biomedicine.”
148 notes to chapter 4
2. The phrase “anthropology of the actual” was first used by Rabinow (2003, 55), who 
uses the “actual” synonymous with “the recent past and the near future.” For Rabinow 
the term indicates the time span of his anthropology of the contemporary, which itself 
is modeled on Foucault’s history of the present: Where Foucault’s history of the present 
is concerned with the long histories that gave rise to the present, the anthropology of 
the contemporary is concerned with the recent past/near future a.k.a. the actual (for 
example, when Foucault writes that Kant was concerned with “la pure actualité,” the 
English has that Kant was concerned with “contemporary reality alone”). In a later work, 
Rabinow and Stavrinakis (2013, 11), the term actual is used to mark a difference between 
the present (still largely used in a Foucauldian sense) and the actual (still used in the 
sense of a distinctive analytical focus on a recent past/near future).
My use of the term, while indebted to Rabinow, differs significantly. What concerns 
me is not a Foucault indebted anthropology of the here and now but the effort to make 
plausible a form of research — an almost artistic investigation understood as (virtuous) 
exercise — that renders visible the irreducibly open. To that end, or this is my aim in this 
chapter, I try to invent a rich, differentiating vocabulary that makes visible a sensibility 
rarely displayed.
3. At stake is also no genealogy of the actual, nor the construction of a tradition that 
one would wish to hold up. As far as I can see, there never really was any reflective effort 
to elaborate the concept of the actual in order to open up a space of inquiry.
4. I assemble these bits and pieces from works that themselves did not evolve 
around — perhaps did not even mention — the idea of the concept of the actual, not in 
any coherent, nor in any conceptually reflective, way.
5. The English version goes (Foucault 1984, 34): “He deals with contemporary reality 
alone.”
6. Foucault offered his reading of Kant as an elaboration of his own work. Kant’s work, 
he seemed to say, consistently evolved around the effort to think of the present as an 
exit, and the form this search for an exit took was to bring into view his present’s pure 
actuality.
7. The idea of a “rupture” was first presented by Bachelard as a correction of the 
naïveté of the assumption of a linear progress of truth/knowledge. See particularly his 
Essai sur la connaissance approchée (1927) and his Étude sur l’évolution d’un problème de 
physique: La propagation thermique dans les solides (1928). The idea of a fundamental 
discontinuity between everyday notions of reality — as informed by philosophy — was 
first articulated by Bachelard in his Le nouvel esprit scientifique (1934). See as well his La 
formation de l’esprit scientifique (1938).
8. The French original goes: “Les trajectoires qui permettent de séparer les isotopes 
dans les spectroscopes de masse n’existent pas dans la nature; il faut les produire tech-
niquement. Elles sont de théorème reifiés” (Bachelard 1949, 103).
9. New categories of thought were needed — not for all times but for each new experi-
ment. In his later work Bachelard referred to his efforts to understand the contemporary 
state of the human mind through the history of science as “rational materialism” (1953) 
or as “applied rationalism” ([1949] 1966).
10. Canguilhem (2005).
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11. At stake, Canguilhem (2005, 53) adds, is “die neuen Zeiten nachzuleben, die 
Zeiten, in denen gerade die wissenschaftlichen Fortschritte allenthalben explodieren 
und so die traditionelle Epistemologie notwendig sprengen.”
In my translation: At stake is “to relive the new times, that is, the times in which 
scientific progress everywhere makes huge leaps and thereby necessarily explodes the 
traditional epistemology.”
12. Some of these region- specific ruptures will merely reconfigure an already estab-
lished concept, others will perhaps generate a new concept, breaking open a novel epis-
temological region. If you wish, they lack any sense of the epochal.
13. See especially Deleuze’s book on Bergson, Le Bergsonisme (1966).
14. It cannot provide — and does not aspire to provide — “scalable knowledge” (Tsing 
2015).
Likewise, the anthropology of the actual is not much concerned with concept work. 
While it studies concepts in motion, it doesn’t itself aspire to invent general concepts — 
 condensations of the particular into the universal — that could then guide future research. 
If it is interested in concept work at all, then, insofar as its focus on conceptual motion 
makes it wonder about how to conceptually capture that which escapes that motion.
15. It is unlikely that such anecdotes produce any coherent picture of the open — or 
of the new formation that might or might not emerge. Unlikely and also irrelevant. 
Unlikely, for if the open (the actual) does not exist except in bits and pieces, in fleeting, 
fugitive formations, which might or might not stabilize — then there isn’t factually any 
necessary coherence (or order). Irrelevant, for the aim is not to capture the new succes-
sor formation but rather something of the actual, that is, of the open that reigns before 
the motion has given rise to a new possible.
16. Put differently, the challenge is to practice what I called “an analysis of movement 
in terms of movement.” “Of movement” — insofar as the being set in motion of concepts 
(which may result in their breaking open) is the focus of one’s research. “In terms of 
movement” — insofar as the way to capture movement is to expose the concepts we have 
and to then map if, and if, then how, precisely, they are set in motion.
17. Such “enabling anecdotes” put a fieldworker — an anthropologist — in a position to 
give contour, by way of precise fieldwork- based description, not to what new possible is 
emerging but to the play of movement itself, to how the old order falls apart and how its 
elements are in motion.
18. If the actual cannot be captured in the abstract — if it does not exist in the abstract, 
as pure movement — but only in relation to words and things in motion, then perhaps 
the only way to get at the actual is fieldwork: the immersion in a concrete domain, the 
getting drowned in it, carried away, while staying alert to — movement. 
It follows that it would be naïve — wrong — to assume that one could abstract the ac-
tual from scenes of nonteleological movement, as if behind a given conceptual formation 
one could find the real. On the contrary, there is no single the actual. Each one is differ-
ent, perhaps even incommensurable with any other one.
19. And knowledge?
The anthropology of the actual does not shy away from producing knowledge — or 
from an interest in truth. However, the knowledge it produces — the kind of truth it tries 
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to get a hold of — does not refer to any stable, object- like formation “out there.” Neither 
does it describe the rise of a category of knowledge, nor can the movements it seeks to 
capture be subsumed under any existing category of knowledge. Rather its knowledge 
comes in forms of recognitions, of openings, of surprises, of discoveries; it does not seek 
to generate generalities with which one could, eventually, build the house of truth; in-
stead it seeks to keep things moving.
20. I thank Miriam Ticktin for many conversations about the detection of the actual as 
a political mode of action.
21. Note that I am speaking here not about anthropology as such — but about an an-
thropology interested in the actual.
22. To refer to Guattari and Deleuze (1994, 5) again: if the goal is to capture some-
thing of the always new, then poetry is the genre.
I add that Fiamm Montezemolo and Norma Jeane (and Tarek Elhaik and Marina Pug-
liese and David Moretti), on the one hand, and Anthony Dunn, Fiona Raby, Tim Mar-
shall, and Jamer Hunt, on the other, convince me that the scope is broader than poetry: 
it is art and design (in the sense of Gestaltung).
23. Do I have to add that to speak of joy doesn’t mean to say that the anthropology of 
the actual isn’t serious? Or hard labor? That it has nothing to do with despair?
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